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Individuals often covet outcomes they cannot obtain by themselves. As a 
consequence, humans have evolved adaptations that enable them to effectively 
cooperate and jointly attain these goals (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) In other 
words, humans have an evolved capacity to form and maintain coalitions in which 
members pool their resources to attain a goal. These coalitions can be seen at different 
levels of society: employees form (informal) coalitions to further their own goals in 
organizations (e.g., Stevenson, Pearce, Porter, Pearce, & Porter, 1985), political parties 
form governments to rule countries (e.g., Bäck & Dumont, 2008), and companies form 
joint ventures to increase their market share or potential (such as the large KLM, 
China Southern, Xiamen and Air France joint venture; 
https://news.klm.com/successful-joint-venture-expanded/). 
A challenge when attempting to form a coalition is the decision whom to 
select as a coalition partner. As joint payoffs generated by a coalition need to be 
distributed among its members, the decision for a certain coalition partner will likely 
have consequences for the distribution of the payoffs. Individuals thus have an 
incentive—and are suggested to have evolved adaptions (e.g., Barclay, 2013; Tooby, 
Cosmides, & Price, 2006)—to choose a partner who will fairly share the spoils of the 
coalition and avoid exploitative partners who might claim a disproportionate share. 
This means that individuals use certain cues when selecting someone to cooperate 
with. 
One cue that individuals seem to use when choosing a coalition partner is 
how many resources that partner can contribute to a coalition. A somewhat 
counterintuitive observation is that seemingly advantaged coalition bargainers with 
many resources, henceforth labeled strong coalition bargainers, are surprisingly often 
excluded from coalitions: an observation that has been labeled the Strength-is-
Weakness effect (Caplow, 1956; Chaney & Vinacke, 1960; Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; 
Murnighan, 1978b; van Beest, Steinel, & Murnighan, 2011; van Beest, van Dijk, & 
Wilke, 2004b; Vinacke, 1959; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957; Wilke & Mulder, 1971, 1974). 
For example, political parties with many seats may be excluded from governments in 
favor of parties with fewer seats (Bäck & Dumont, 2008; Warwick, 1996). 
Although there are different hypotheses about the causes of the Strength-is-
Weakness effect (we will describe these in detail below), we know surprisingly little 
about the actual process behind the effect and factors that might moderate it. For 
example, are strong bargainers mainly excluded due to their own behavior or do weak 
bargainers’ perceptions and expectations play a large role as well? Does it matter how 
bargainers have acquired their resources? Answers to these questions will help us 
understand why those in a seemingly advantageous position might end up 
disadvantaged and provide some clues on how to prevent the disproportionate 





The aim of this dissertation is to increase our understanding of processes 
underlying the Strength-is-Weakness effect. Although the three empirical chapters 
entail different research questions, a unifying factor is the focus on the distributive 
fairness norm of equity (Adams, 1965; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973). In 
coalition bargaining, this norm is translated to the use of an equitable allocation rule: 
bargainers should obtain a share of the payoffs that is proportionate to the resources 
they bring to the coalition. In Chapter 2, we replicated the Strength-is-Weakness effect 
in a lab setting and online, utilizing the Online Coalition Game we developed 
(described in Chapter 5). In the same chapter, we investigated the causes of the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect. Specifically, we tested whether the effect is due to the 
application of equity norms or whether strong bargainers may be excluded from the 
outset because they are expected to apply equity. In Chapter 3, we investigated why 
strong coalition bargainers use the equity norm: do they passively adopt this 
allocation rule because it is most salient to them, or do they actively select it from a 
range of different allocation rules? Finally, in Chapter 4, we investigated whether the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect decreases when resources are perceived as a more 
legitimate input for calculating an equitable payoff. 
This introductory chapter is structured as follows. First, I discuss definitions 
of coalition formation. Second, I will provide an overview of empirical evidence for a 
Strength-is-Weakness effect. Third, I will shortly discuss dominant classic coalition 
formation theories. Fourth, I provide an overview and critical examination of three 
previously proposed explanations for why the Strength-is-Weakness effect occurs. 
Finally, I discuss the four unanswered questions regarding the Strength-is-Weakness 
that are central to this dissertation. 
 
Definitions of coalition formation 
An often used, rather broad, definition of a coalition is provided by Thibaut 
and Kelley (1959, p. 205): “two or more persons who act jointly to affect the outcomes 
of one or more other persons.” For conceptual clarity, the coalitions I refer to in this 
dissertation adhere to the more narrow definition by Gamson (1964, p. 85): “the joint 
use of resources to determine an outcome of a decision in a mixed-motive situation 
involving more than two units.” Although these two definitions share the aspect of 
cooperation to determine an outcome—that would otherwise be unattainable—
Gamson’s definition adds two main boundaries. First, it focuses solely on mixed-
motive situations. Other than pure coordination settings, in mixed-motive settings, it 
is impossible that all involved parties maximize their payoffs through cooperation. 
Other than pure conflict settings, in mixed-motive settings, individuals are never 
better off individually than when cooperating. According to Gamson’s definition, 




and cooperate; to coalesce (cooperation) in a subgroup in which not all involved 
parties are included (competition). 
A second feature of the coalitions I focus on in this dissertation is that they 
entail the combination of resources of coalition members, which enables the 
achievement of the coalition’s goal. In coalition formation research, the term resources 
refers to the input coalition bargainers bring to the table. Individuals form coalitions 
when they do not possess enough resources individually to attain a goal. A coalition 
allows them to pool their resources to reach a certain threshold. More technically, 
they form a winning coalition that reaches a decision point. Examples of such coalitions 
are political parties in a multi-party system that together reach a majority of seats in 
parliament in order to govern a country, and companies that combine their efforts in a 
joint venture to increase their potential or market share. In these settings, the 
resources bargainers bring to the table are the number of seats parties possess and 
the individual investments from companies respectively. 
Another relevant definition of coalition formation is one provided by Van 
Beest & Van Dijk (2007, p. 165): “the process in which two or more parties negotiate 
about the decision to allocate payoffs to those that are included and to those that are 
excluded in a coalition.” This definition highlights the existence of divisible payoffs 
that a coalition yields. Whereas the term resources refers to the input coalition 
bargainers bring to the negotiation table, the term payoffs refers to the output 
generated by a winning coalition. Going back to the previous examples, these payoffs 
can be the ministerial posts allocated to political parties in a coalition or the profits 
from the joint venture. Note that in this dissertation I focus on situations in which the 
payoffs are identical for every possible coalition (simple situations) rather than 
varying between possible coalitions. In this dissertation’s discussion (Chapter 6), I will 
discuss the applicability of our results to these latter multivalued settings. 
Van Beest and Van Dijk’s definition also highlights the negotiation process by 
which prospective coalition members decide which coalition to form and how to 
allocate the acquired payoffs among the coalition’s members. I will return to the 
importance of how this negotiation process is conceptualized in the section on 
previous evidence for the Strength-is-Weakness effect. Although I do not necessarily 
focus on it, a final aspect of van Beest and Van Dijk’s definition is that it acknowledges 
that decisions made by a coalition do not only influence payoffs for those included in 
the coalition, but also those outside of the coalition. For the coalitions I study in this 
dissertation, this means that excluded parties leave the bargaining table empty-
handed. 
A final note regarding the types of coalitions that I study in this dissertation is 
that I do not limit my scope to a single setting such as a political or economic one. 
Although our empirical studies vary in the context that is presented to participants, 





that fit with our description. In this dissertation’s discussion (Chapter 6), I will discuss 
how institutionalized norms or regulations such as the formateur advantage in 
governmental coalition formation might lead to deviations to this general processes. 
 
Strength-is-Weakness: Empirical evidence 
In this section, I will give an overview of empirical evidence for the Strength-
is-Weakness effect in different settings. An important note is that these findings are 
often based on small sample sizes. Instead of commenting on this in the text for every 
study, I provide footnotes denoting the sample size on which the discussed finding is 
based. This allows the reader to evaluate the strength of the provided evidence. 
 
Early theorizing 
The earliest mentioning of a Strength-is-Weakness effect in coalition 
formation—the idea that strong1 parties might be worse off than a coalition of weaker 
parties—is found in Caplow’s (1956) study of triads. Although Caplow was not specific 
about his conceptualization of terms such as strength and domination, he assumed 
that members of a triad may differ in strength and that stronger members would seek 
to use their strength to dominate the other members and avoid being dominated 
themselves. He also reasoned that, under some circumstances, two members of a triad 
might be motivated to form a coalition and use their combined strength to dominate 
the third member. Importantly, Caplow not only reasoned that a coalition stronger 
than the third member would dominate the third member, but that the strongest 
member of a coalition would dominate the weaker member. 
Of interest to the current phenomenon are Caplow’s Type 2 and Type 5 triads 
(see Figure 1.1). In Type 2, party A2 is stronger than B and C. However, combined, B 
and C are stronger than A, and B and C are of equal strength. Following Caplow’s 
assumptions, individually, A will dominate both B and C. Moreover, in any coalition 
including A, the smaller B or C will be dominated by A. Hence, a BC-coalition will help 
the individually weaker B and C to dominate the individually stronger A, whereas the 
equal strength of B and C will keep them on equal footing. In Type 5, A prefers to 
dominate B or C, but probably C, C has no other choice than to be dominated, but B is 
predicted to steer towards a BC-coalition, as they prefer to dominate C rather than to 
be dominated by A.  
 
                                                                    
1 Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms strong and weak bargainers to refer to the amount of 
resources participants hold, not to refer to their bargaining power. If at any point, I want to refer to 
situations in which bargainers differ in bargaining power, I will make this explicit. 





Figure 1.1. Caplow’s six types of triads. Reproduced from Caplow (1956) (Public 
Domain). 
 
To summarize, Caplow (1956) predicted that stronger parties might actually 
end up being dominated by a coalition more often than their weaker counterparts are 
when the strength of the weak coalition exceeds that of the strong member. Notably, 
Caplow did not make strong predictions about whether C would prefer an AC- or BC-
coalition, as he did not specify whether it would be worse to be dominated by the 
strongest or second strongest party. In his further development of his theory, Caplow 
(1959) acknowledged this issue and reasoned it could go both ways: either parties 
would seek to maximize their coalition’s strength or they would seek to maximize 





Note that the answer to this question, whether C prefers a coalition with A or with B, 
has implications for our assumptions regarding the explanation for the Strength-is-
Weakness effect. I will discuss this in our critical examination of the proposed 
explanations for the Strength-is-Weakness effect. 
 
Pachisi games 
The seminal Vinacke and Arkoff (1957)3 experiment was the first to provide 
empirical support for the idea that individual strength might be turned into a 
weakness when coalitions can be formed. For this experiment, Vinacke and Arkoff 
made use of modified pachisi games in which participants were assigned weights—a 
proxy for resources—to resemble Caplow’s (1956) different types of power relations. 
Participants could obtain points by being the first to reach the end of the pachisi track 
and the speed by which they did so was determined by a die-roll multiplied by their 
assigned weight. Participants were allowed to form a coalition by adding their weights 
together and dividing the points among the coalition members when one of them 
reached the goal. 
Of special interest to this dissertation are Vinacke and Arkoff’s (1957) 
conditions in which Caplow (1956) predicted a Strength-is-Weakness effect: games in 
which participant A obtained a weight of 3 and B and C both obtained weights of 2 
(resembling Type 2) and the games in which participants obtained weights of 4, 3, and 
2 (resembling Type 5). In these games, A’s weight gives them an initial advantage as 
they win when everyone plays the game individually. However, formed coalitions, 
including the BC-coalition of the initial weak, will always outperform the third 
member of the triad, ensuring victory. As predicted, in both the 3-2-2 and 4-3-2 
games, A’s initial advantage seemed to be turned around. Added together, BC-
coalitions were formed in 68% of all trials. This led to A being included in only 30% of 
all coalitions, whereas B and C’s inclusion rates were 81% and 86% respectively. 
Taking into account that all parties could be part of two possible two-person 
coalitions, inclusion rates when choices would be random are 66.6% for all parties. 
Thus, A is included far less often than one would predict by chance.  
Since the initial study, several other studies that have used pachisi games also 
found Strength-is-Weakness effects (e.g., Chaney & Vinacke, 1960; Kelley & Arrowood, 
1960; Vinacke, 1959; Wilke & Mulder, 1971, 1974).4 The study by Kelley and 
Arrowood (1960), however, suggests that there are limits to the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect. In their study, triads playing a 4-3-2 pachisi game demonstrated a Strength-is-
Weakness effect in the first trials of the game, but a decline over trials so that in the 
last three trials the pattern of formed coalitions did not differ from chance 
                                                                    
3 N = 30 triads. 
4 Respective sample sizes from left to right: N = 20 triads, N = 30 triads, observed within conditions of n = 30 




distributions. Although Kelley and Arrowood’s reporting is far from extensive—triads 
play between 10 and 70 trials and only the first and last three are reported—their 
results suggest a learning effect that diminishes the Strength-is-Weakness effect over 
time. 
Important to note is that in these pachisi games, the bargaining leading up to 
a coalition is relatively unstructured. That is, participants can propose to form a 
coalition to another participant at any time during the game. If this offer is accepted, 
the weights of the coalition members are directly added together. This also means that 
there is a possible first-mover advantage in which the first participant to make a 
somewhat attractive offer could prevent others from making offers (that might have 
been even more attractive). As discussed below in the section on possible 
explanations for the Strength-is-Weakness effect, this sequential bargaining—as 
opposed to situations in which everyone makes an offer at the same time—has led to 
speculation that differences in speed of realizing that a coalition is needed to win the 
game might be a driver of the Strength-is-Weakness effect. 
 
Simple weighted majority games 
 Further evidence for a Strength-is-Weakness effect comes from simple 
weighted majority games. The largest difference between these games and pachisi 
games is that the decision point is always a higher number of resources than any 
coalition bargainer has individually. Whereas in the abovementioned pachisi games, A 
could obtain the payoffs individually if no coalition would be formed, simple weighted 
majority games necessitate the formation of coalitions for every bargainer. This also 
eliminates the board game aspect, leaving a situation in which bargainers’ sole 
objective is to find a coalition partner and bargain over the allocation of payoffs within 
the coalition. 
Using a political convention paradigm, originally developed by Gamson 
(1961b), Chertkoff (1966)5 put participants in the role of a bargainer in a 4-3-2 
political convention in which three participants controlled 40, 30, and 20 votes (i.e., 
resources) and a winning coalition holding a majority of votes could allocate 100 jobs 
(i.e., payoffs) between the coalition members. Although, non-surprisingly, the 
inclusion of the bargainer with 40 votes increased when including them increased the 
possibility of winning, in a condition without manipulations of probability, weak 
bargainers were preferred over strong bargainers and the smallest coalition was 
formed most often. Across four trials, similar results were found by Wilke (1968)6, 
albeit not in every individual trial. A Strength-is-Weakness effect was found in 
political convention games conducted by Murnighan (1978b)7 but only in conditions 
                                                                    
5 Observed within conditions of n = 24 triads. 
6 N = 18 triads. 





in which participants held equal pivotal power. Pivotal power refers to the number of 
winning coalitions bargainers can be part of and is thus an indication of available 
alternatives (Shapley & Shubick, 1954b). When participants differed in pivotal power, 
strength was a real strength as those with more resources had more alternatives, 
leading to higher inclusion rates. More evidence comes from a 4-3-2 simple weighted 
majority game framed as a simulated meeting of company stockholders, in which 
strong bargainers were excluded in almost all cases, except in later trials in conditions 
that facilitated feedback on offers (Chertkoff & Braden, 1974).8 Finally, evidence for a 
Strength-is-Weakness effect was found in a political convention-like questionnaire 
study (Phillips & Nitz, 1968)9 in which participants were asked which of two other 
candidates they would approach to form a coalition. Across 20 different 
configurations of votes in which all possible coalitions would be winning coalitions, 
participants—who were always a weak bargainer—chose the other candidate with 
fewest votes in at least 75% of the cases. 
In more recent years, Van Beest and colleagues have employed a landowner 
paradigm in which participants take the role of landowners who need to form a 
coalition to jointly sell an area of land to a project developer (e.g., van Beest, van Dijk, 
& Wilke, 2004a). In some of their studies, acres (resources) were assigned to mimic 
Caplow’s (1956) Type 2 and Type 5 triads. In these settings, in line with a Strength-is-
Weakness effect, the smallest coalitions predominated (van Beest et al., 2011, 
2004b).10  
Again, it is important to comment on the bargaining protocols leading up to 
the forming of a coalition as these protocols influence the inferences we can make 
about the explanations for the existence of the Strength-is-Weakness effect. In the 
study by Wilke (1968) for example, bargaining was relatively unstructured. In these 
situations, as in pachisi games, individual differences in decision speed could influence 
which coalitions were formed. In the study by Chertkoff (1966), offers were made at 
the same time, but participants went into a separate room to bargain when they made 
reciprocal offers to each other, regardless of whether they offered the same allocation 
of the payoffs. Chertkoff and Braden (1974) used a procedure in which bargainers 
sent offer slips to each other and in which bargainers more explicitly accepted or 
rejected the offers made, which possibly led to a bit more feedback about the relative 
attractiveness of one’s offers. Finally, Van Beest and colleagues’ (van Beest et al., 2011, 
2004b) landowner studies utilized the Komorita and Meek (1978) display procedure, 
in which all bargainers sent offers at the same time, subsequently saw all offers made 
(even those they were not involved in) and selected the offer they wanted to execute. 
A coalition was formed if all prospective members of a coalition selected the same 
                                                                    
8 Observed within conditions of n = 30. 
9 N = 479 participants. 




offer. Despite the differences between these different procedures, all of them 
corroborated the finding that small coalitions were formed most often, meaning 
strong bargainers were most often excluded. 
 
Real-world equivalents  
Finally, there are real-world equivalents of the Strength-is-Weakness effect 
that have been reported in literature. Frans de Waal—in his seminal study of 
chimpanzees (de Waal, 1982/2007)—describes how the physically strongest alpha 
male Luit is usurped by a coalition of two individually weaker chimpanzee males. A 
more systematic Strength-is-Weakness effect in humans has been observed in 
Western European multi-party system governments, albeit an effect that seems to 
affect the second-largest political party rather than the largest. As the (informal) rule 
in many multi-party systems is that the largest party is allowed to start coalition 
bargaining, this advantage often leads to the inclusion of the largest party, shifting the 
negative effects of having many resources to the second-largest party (Bäck & 
Dumont, 2008; Warwick, 1996). 
 
Classic coalition formation theories 
In the next section, I will describe and critically examine the three dominant 
previous explanations for the Strength-is-Weakness effect. To facilitate understanding 
of this overview, I will first provide a short overview of classic coalition formation 
theories (for extensive reviews of classic coalition formation theories, see Kahan & 
Rapoport, 1984; Komorita, 1984; Murnighan, 1978a). 
One of the basic assumptions that is shared by most coalition formation 
theories is that bargainers attempt to form a coalition in which their own payoffs are 
maximized (cf. van Beest & van Dijk, 2007). Bargainers are assumed to do this by 
calculating which share of the payoffs they can reasonable obtain in each coalition, 
given a certain allocation rule (based on notions of distributive justice) and 
conceptualization of input, and attempt to form a coalition in which this share is 
largest. Despite this shared assumption, two rough distinctions can be made: theories 
differ on which allocation rules bargainers apply to determine a fair share of the 
payoffs, and on how differences in input are conceptualized. 
 
Allocation rules 
A prominent allocation rule is equity: the notion that an outcome is fair when 
one’s payoff is proportional to one’s input (Adams, 1965; Walster et al., 1973). In 
general, equity theory predicts that individuals compare their inputs and outcomes in 
a certain situation to the inputs and outcomes of others. Inequity, generally 





outcome to input differs to someone else’s ratio. Applied to coalition formation, this 
notion of equity is, amongst others, reflected in Gamson’s (1964) notion of a parity 
norm: the belief that one’s share of the payoffs should be proportional to their relative 
input in the coalition.  
Another view on allocation rules is provided by bargaining theory (Komorita 
& Chertkoff, 1973), which postulates that the allocation rules applied by bargainers 
differ depending on one’s own relative input in a coalition. Those with a higher input 
favor equity, because this rule dictates that they should get a higher payoff as well. 
Those with a relatively little input are thought to favor an equal division of payoffs 
within a coalition, as the use of this rule leads to better outcomes for them than an 
equitable division would. Although more sophisticated than the notion that bargainers 
only use equity, a prediction that the two views have in common is that those with 
more input demand a larger share of the payoffs than those with less input.11 
Conceptualization of input. A second distinction between classic coalition 
theories is which inputs coalition bargainers apply when calculating a fair payoff. 
Some theories assume that differences in input are directly related to differences in 
resources (Gamson, 1961a; Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973), whereas other theories 
assume that input should be conceptualized on the level of differences in bargaining 
power resulting from differences in resources (Gamson, 1964; Komorita, 1974).  
Resources as input. In resource theories, resources serve what Komorita 
(1984) calls a normative function; coalition bargainers calculate a fair share of the 
payoffs based on the relative amount of resources they have in a coalition. According 
to minimum resource theory (Gamson, 1961a), bargainers apply equity norms to the 
amount of resources they have and bargain for a share that is proportional to their 
resources in a coalition. As bargainers with more resources will thus claim more than 
those with fewer resources, bargainers are motivated to seek out a partner with few 
resources to form the cheapest winning coalition; a coalition that is just able to attain 
the payoffs, but in which they maximize their relative resources, and thus share of the 
payoffs.  
Pivotal power as input. A second conceptualization of input is not that of 
resources, but the power differences resulting from differences in resources. 
According to this perspective, resources only shape the coalition formation process 
when they lead to differences in pivotal power; when they lead to differences in the 
number of possible winning coalitions in which one can be included (Shapley & 
Shubick, 1954b). Komorita (1984) refers to this as a strategic function of resources. 
For example, consider a situation in which four individuals—I will refer to them as A, 
                                                                    
11 It is debatable whether bargainers apply different allocation rules. Alternatively, one could argue that 
strong and weak bargainers differ in their conceptualization of input: strong bargainers use resources as 
input whereas weak bargainers do not. Regardless, both perspectives lead strong bargainers to make higher 




B, C, and D—hold 30, 20, 20, and 10 resources respectively, and the threshold to a 
winning coalition is 50 resources. In this setting, A is said to have more pivotal power 
(see Shapley & Shubick, 1954b) as a coalition between him and any other individual is 
a winning coalition, whereas B and C can only form a two-party winning coalition with 
A, and D has to be included in at least a three-party coalition. 
According to minimum power theory (Gamson, 1964), those with more 
pivotal power try to leverage their advantage in number of alternatives by claiming an 
equitable share of the payoffs that is proportional to their pivotal power rather than to 
their resources. Consequently, bargainers are expected to form a coalition in which 
one’s pivotal power is highest, because this maximizes their share of the payoff. In the 
abovementioned example, minimum power theory would thus predict the coalition 
between B, C, and D and that B and C obtain a larger share of the payoffs than D. 
 
Strength-is-Weakness: Previous explanations 
As mentioned earlier, the Strength-is-Weakness effect has been studies using 
different bargaining procedures. Besides this variety in procedures—and sometimes 
maybe due to a variety in procedures—different explanations for the existence of the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect haven been proposed. In this section, I will describe and 
critically examine these previously proposed explanations for the Strength-is-
Weakness effect. 
 
Confusion: Incorrectly equating resources with bargaining power 
 Based on the observed Strength-is-Weakness effect in their pachisi studies, 
Vinacke and Arkoff (1957) provided the first tentative explanation for the effect. 
According to them, people incorrectly equate differences in resources with differences 
with bargaining power. In their 4-3-2 and 3-2-2 games, participants did not differ in 
pivotal power: every two-player coalition would outperform the third party. Hence, 
they reasoned, rational participants would not display a systematic preference for 
formed coalitions and would always split the payoffs equally. The finding that weak 
BC-coalitions were formed most often was thus attributed to irrationality. Specifically, 
Vinacke and Arkoff hypothesized that, because A could win the game if no coalition 
was formed, “it is harder for an initially stronger member to reach the conclusion that 
the relative strengths are irrelevant...than for the other one or two to arrive at this 
interpretation” (Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957, p. 408). This thus implies that the Strength-
is-Weakness effect exists because the strong themselves confuse differences in 
resources with differences in bargaining power and subsequently fail to initiate a 
coalition before their weaker counterparts do.  
A similar explanation was brought forward by Kelley & Arrowood (1960), 
although they aimed to show that the confusion was an artefact of the difficult nature 





resources sometimes were and sometimes were not related to power differences, 
participants were likely to perceive a correlation between resources and power, even 
in the Type 2 and Type 5 triads. To test this notion, Kelley and Arrowood let 
participants play multiple rounds (between 10 and 70, Mrounds = 26) of the same 4-3-2 
game with, although unclear in which way, more extensive instructions. As evidence 
for their argument, Kelley and Arrowood showed that the BC-coalition is favored in 
the first three trials, but that the incidence of formed coalitions is equalized during the 
last three trials. 
This confusion hypothesis, however, has not received much support in later 
studies. Wilke and colleagues (Wilke, 1968; Wilke & Mulder, 1971, 1974) conducted 
several 4-3-2 pachisi studies and one 4-3-2 political convention game. In these studies, 
participants’ self-reports suggest that they believed parties to be equal in bargaining 
power rather than that they believed resources to reflect actual strengths. Moreover, 
contradicting the assumptions of Kelley and Arrowood (1960), there did not seem to 
be a learning effect: participants did not initially report believing in power differences, 
which subsequently decreased over trials. Finally, it did not seem that the strongest 
bargainer had markedly more irrational views regarding a resources-power link. 
There is, however, a reason to be critical regarding the above interpretations. The 
format of the self-report questions is such that participants choose which statement 
they endorse most. Confronted by both the statement that resources are irrelevant 
and by the statements that small coalitions should form, and having to choose 
between the two statements, participants might choose the statement that sounds 
most rational, even though they might have engaged in irrational decision-making.  
Another study that seems to speak against the confusion hypothesis is one in 
which none, some, or all members in a triad in a 4-3-2 and 3-2-2 pachisi games were 
informed that the weak bargainers can win from the strong bargainers by forming a 
coalition, but also that weights do not matter because each coalition is a winning 
coalition (Vinacke, Crowell, Dien, & Young, 1964). Speaking against the confusion 
hypothesis, BC-coalitions were still predominant in conditions in which participants 
received the extra information. Moreover, although reporting is a bit opaque, the 
results seem to suggest that most participants—even the uninformed ones—reported 
to understand that the bargainer with a weight of 4 did not actually have more power. 
Finally, the confusion hypothesis’ explanation for the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect is mainly that B and C are more likely to initiate a coalition than A. It does not 
make predictions about whether B or C prefer coalitions with each other or with A. 
Evidence from studies, however, does show that bargainers prefer coalitions with 
weak bargainers (e.g., Chertkoff, 1966; Phillips & Nitz, 1968). This suggests that this 
initial preference for weak bargainers is an antecedent for the Strength-is-Weakness 





Overall, there does not seem to be much evidence for the confusion 
hypothesis as a main cause of the Strength-is-Weakness effect in coalition formation. 
Moreover, whereas the confusion hypothesis has at least some theoretical plausibility 
in pachisi games—in which players with more resources have an individual 
advantage—it is more difficult to use as an explanation for Strength-is-Weakness 
effects in simple weighted majority games. As these experiments necessitate the 
formation of a coalition in order to obtain the payoffs, it is unlikely that participants 
differ in how easy it is to reach the conclusion that a coalition must be formed. This is 
especially the case for experiments using the Komorita and Meek (1978) display 
protocol, in which all participants always make opening offers at the same time, which 
are then displayed to everyone before participants select their preferred offer, 
meaning that differences in initiation of bargaining are eliminated as a suspect. 
 
Conspiracy hypothesis  
A second hypothesized reason for the Strength-is-Weakness effect places the 
causes for the effect not in the hands of the strong bargainer, but rather in those of the 
weak bargainers. According to the conspiracy hypothesis, a term coined by Wilke and 
Mulder (1971, 1974), weak bargainers form a coalition against the strong bargainer 
because they have been handed an initial advantage. This explanation for the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect was inspired by a coalition formation study from E. 
Hoffman, Festinger, and Lawrence (1954) in which participants gained points by 
jointly forming squares with pieces held by members of a triad. Although participants’ 
pieces did not differ in size, one of the bargainers (a confederate) obtained an early 
advantage. E. Hoffman and colleagues found that, especially when the outcome of the 
task was considered important and social comparison with the confederate was made 
easy, the two other bargainers tended to coalesce against the confederate. The 
suggested explanation for this is that, under these conditions, participants would be 
especially motivated to be equal to or surpass the advantaged person. 
Wilke and Mulder (1971, 1974) argue that the above situation is comparable 
to 4-3-2 and 3-2-2 pachisi games. After all, if no coalition is formed, the participant 
with the highest weight automatically wins and the supposed way to equalize the 
situation would be to form a coalition against the strong bargainer. I am skeptical of 
this explanation for three reasons. First, as excluding the strong bargainer from a 
coalition puts them at a disadvantage instead of equalizing payoffs, I do not think the 
pachisi games are similar to the setting created by E. Hoffman and colleagues (1954). 
Second, Wilke and Mulder accept the conspiracy hypothesis because participants’ self-
reports—which I have criticized above—indicate no support for alternative 
explanations such as confusion and adherence to a minimum resource norm. Ruling 
out one explanation should not be considered evidence for another. Finally, if viable at 





effect in simple weighted majority games. As strong bargainers cannot win in a 4-3-2 
simple weighted majority game with a decision point of 5, they cannot be said to have 
an advantage, which would not lead to a conspiracy against them. 
 
The use of equity norms 
As mentioned in the section on classic coalition formation theories, several 
classic theories of coalition formation assume that bargainers use equity norms in 
which one’s payoff should be proportional to their input. In Gamson’s (1961a, 1964) 
minimum resource theory, this input is conceptualized as resources, meaning that 
those with more resources bargain for a higher share of the payoffs. This is also 
Gamson’s explanation for the Strength-is-Weakness effect: if bargainers with more 
resources want a higher share of the payoffs, bargainers are better off forming the 
cheapest winning coalition in which one’s relative input—and thus one’s expected 
share of the output—is highest. Gamson (1964) also argues that, unlike the confusion 
hypothesis, this makes the Strength-is-Weakness effect a rational phenomenon: if 
participants with more resources ask for a higher share, bargainers who are 
motivated to maximize their share of the payoffs makes a rational decision when it 
avoids the strong bargainer. This explanation thus seems to place causes for the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect at both weak and strong bargainers: strong bargainers 
claim higher shares of the payoffs, and weak bargainers avoid them because of this. 
Although the idea of the use of equity norms in coalition formation is 
dominant in classic coalition theories, the discussed studies in which a Strength-is-
Weakness effect has been observed often lack detailed information on the mean 
payoffs in formed coalition. Hence, the evaluation of the use of equity norms in these 
experiments is difficult. A few studies, however, do show that, when included, strong 
bargainers obtain the largest share of the payoffs (Chertkoff, 1966; Chertkoff & 
Braden, 1974). Several studies that provide little information hint at unequal 
distributions when strong bargainers are included (Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957; Wilke & 
Mulder, 1974), whereas others have shown less consistent evidence for use of equity 
or equality (Wilke, 1968).  
More, but equally sporadic, evidence for the use of equity norms leading to 
the Strength-is-Weakness effect comes from findings on expected payoffs. Several 
studies provide support for the idea that strong bargainers expect a higher payoff than 
their weaker counterparts (Chertkoff & Braden, 1974; Wilke & Mulder, 1971). Other 
studies provide evidence for the idea weak bargainers anticipate the use of equity 
norms and thus make their initial offers to each other rather than to the strong 
bargainer12 (Chertkoff & Braden, 1974; Phillips & Nitz, 1968; van Beest et al., 2011). 
                                                                    
12 Note that this behavior could also be indicative of the conspiracy hypothesis, but see above section for 




Surprisingly, none of the presented studies in which a Strength-is-Weakness effect has 
been found gives enough information to deduce whether strong bargainers actually 
claim a higher share of the payoffs than their weaker counterparts do. As mentioned 
earlier, most used bargaining protocols do not require everyone to make a first offer, 
or to record it, meaning that often this information is not present.   
Another study hints more indirectly at the idea that expected payoff steers 
the formation of weak coalitions. In this study, participants bargained in a 4-3-2 
simple weighted majority game using a protocol in which bargainers had to explicitly 
reject or accept offers, which supposedly facilitated feedback on participants’ offers 
(Chertkoff & Braden, 1974). Results showed that over time strong bargainers’ 
expected share of the payoffs decreases, which seemed to promote their inclusion in 
subsequent trials. This suggests a causal chain from payoff expectations, magnitude of 
offers, and inclusion. 
Wilke and colleagues (Wilke, 1968; Wilke & Mulder, 1971, 1974) suggest that 
self-reports do not match minimum resource theory. Whereas they did find many 
formed BC-coalitions in 4-3-2 and 3-2-2 pachisi games, participants indicated to have 
no clear preference for bargaining partner before bargaining. Moreover, after 
bargaining, they indicated to adhere more to the idea that all bargainers are equally 
necessary to obtain the payoffs (in line with equal pivotal power) than the idea that 
inputs should dictate payoff. However, as I have argued above, it is not impossible that 
bargainers adhered to one principle but confronted with a more rational sounding 
principle chose to report this option. 
In short, previous literature hints at the role of equity norms as a cause for 
the Strength-is-Weakness effect. Yet, direct evidence in the form of differences in 
magnitude of first offers by strong and weak bargainers seems to be absent due to not 
recording this information. Besides this lack of direct evidence, I also think there is a 
large logical gap in the proposed equity hypothesis. Contra Gamson (1964), I dispute 
the statement that the equity account is a rational pathway to the Strength-is-
Weakness effect. As the effect is observed in situations in which bargainers are, at 
least logically, equal in terms of pivotal power and value in a coalition, both the use 
and expectation of proportional offers seem irrational. From a game-theoretical 
perspective (e.g, minimum power theory, Gamson, 1964; pivotal power theory, 
Shapley & Shubick, 1954b), bargainers should bargain on this functional equality and 
bargain for equal shares with no preference for specific coalition. Whereas acting on 
expected proportional offers from other bargainers seems rational, this expectation 
and the actual implementation of the equity norm thus seems far from rational. 
Moreover, as remarked earlier by Van Beest and colleagues (van Beest & van 
Dijk, 2007; van Beest et al., 2004b), coalition bargainers seem to be using a mixture of 
self-interest and fairness rules. As suggested by bargaining theory (Komorita & 





that strong bargainers are most likely to use equity and weak bargainers are more 
likely to use equality, both because this is the rule that would maximize their share of 
the payoffs if it is accepted. If this is the case, strong bargainers have even less reason 
to expect their equitable offer is accepted. 
 
Remaining questions: Outline of this dissertation 
I argue that none of the three previously proposed reasons seems to provide a 
completely satisfying answer for why the Strength-is-Weakness effect in coalition 
formation occurs. The first two explanations—confusing differences in resources with 
differences in actual power or a conspiracy against those with an initial advantage—
seem to get little support based on self-reports. Moreover, they are untenable in 
simple weighted majority games, because a) all bargainers should see the necessity of 
forming a coalition, and b) strong bargainers do not have any advantage over weak 
bargainers. There is some evidence supporting the third explanation, the use of the 
equity norm, but direct evidence is lacking. Moreover, the current evidence for this 
third explanation does not mesh with self-reports, nor does it explain why coalition 
bargainers use or expect equity norms in the first place. 
The aim of this dissertation is to increase our understanding of processes 
underlying the Strength-is-Weakness effect and provide a tentative new theory of how 
the Strength-is-Weakness effect emerges. In line with what others have done before 
(van Beest & van Dijk, 2007; Wilke, 1985), this tentative theory is a process-oriented 
theory of coalition formation, in which not coalition outcomes, but the (psychological) 
processes that shape these outcomes are central. Hence, the focus of dissertation will 
be on bargaining behavior, such as initial partner selection and magnitude of first 
offers, and bargainers’ perceptions of legitimacy and deservingness. 
Below I describe some of the unanswered questions and the chapters that 
attempt to answer these questions. 
 
How strong is the empirical support for the Strength-is-Weakness effect?  
There are many examples of the Strength-is-Weakness effect in the existent 
literature (e.g., Caplow, 1956; Chaney & Vinacke, 1960; Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; 
Murnighan, 1978b; van Beest et al., 2011, 2004b; Vinacke, 1959; Vinacke & Arkoff, 
1957; Wilke & Mulder, 1971, 1974). However, there are some reasons to conduct a 
replication. First, most of the abovementioned studies have utilized pachisi games. As 
suggested by Chertkoff (1971), the lack of standardized bargaining in this method—
participants sit face-to-face and can make offers at any point—can lead to personality 
variables trumping the effect of variables of interest such as resources. More relevant 
for this dissertation, it is also unclear whether observed Strength-is-Weakness effects 




Arrowood, 1960) and conspiring against the advantaged (e.g., Wilke & Mulder, 1971) 
cannot explain the results. Second, previous studies have often suffered from small 
sample sizes. As a consequence, sufficient statistical power is debatable and the 
probability of false-positives is thus relatively high (Ioannidis, 2005). Moreover, 
attempts to increase power through within-subjects designs in with iterated 
bargaining might have biased results in later trials (e.g., Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; 
Wilke & Mulder, 1974). Finally, most previous coalition formation studies either used 
no incentives or tournament incentives, which might lead to either more 
heterogeneity in answers (e.g., Camerer & Hogarth, 1999) or more risky behavior (e.g., 
Schedlinsky, Sommer, & Wöhrmann, 2016) respectively. 
To address the question whether the Strength-is-Weakness effect is a robust 
phenomenon, we conducted two high-powered preregistered replications of the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect using two incentivized 5(4-3-2) interactive landowner 
paradigm studies. As argued above, in simple weighted majority games, such as the 
landowner paradigm, the strong bargainer can only win when forming a coalition. 
This makes it unlikely for strong bargainers to equate resources with bargaining 
power (against the confusion hypothesis), and makes it unlikely that weak bargainers 
perceive the strong bargainer as advantaged (against the conspiracy hypothesis). The 
results of these studies are presented in Chapter 2.  
 
Do coalition bargainers use equity norms in coalition bargaining?  
As direct evidence for the use of equity norms as a cause for the Strength-is-
Weakness effect is scarce, we also aimed to find evidence for this in Chapter 2. 
Specifically, we focused on two possible mechanisms. First, we focused on the 
question whether these equity norms are directly applied, by comparing the 
magnitude of first offers between strong and weak bargainers: do strong bargainers 
claim a larger share of the payoffs than weaker bargainers do? Second, we focused on 
the question whether the use of equity norms is expected by weaker bargainers—
leading them to make first offers to other weak bargainers rather than the strong 
bargainer—by looking at whom they approach in their initial offers.  
 
Why do strong coalition bargainers use equity norms in coalition bargaining? 
The third question we attempt to answer in this dissertation is why 
bargainers make use of equity norms in coalition bargaining. Although Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation seems to suggest bargainers indeed use equity norms, the fact that 
bargainers do so even when they understand that they actually have equal bargaining 
power (Vinacke et al., 1964; Wilke & Mulder, 1971, 1974) seems puzzling.  
In Chapter 3, we disentangle two possible reasons for the use of these equity 
norms. First, in line with insights on egocentric perceptions of fairness (e.g., Babcock 





rule that is provided by the number of resources they have, without realizing this is 
perceived to be unattractive or unfair by their weak counterparts. On the other hand, 
suggested by Wilke (1985), coalition bargainers could choose the equitable allocation 
rule in a more strategic way to attempt maximize their share of the payoffs, in the 
hope that this offer is accepted. 
 
Is having many resources always a liability?  
The final question we wanted to answer is whether having many resources is 
always a liability. According to equity theory, equity is established when payoffs are 
allocated in proportion to input (Adams, 1965; Walster et al., 1973). Importantly, 
individuals might disagree on which inputs are relevant to the situation and thus 
which inputs are legitimate to use to calculate an equitable share. This raises the 
question whether the Strength-is-Weakness effect is in part due to a disagreement on 
whether resources are relevant input in which strong bargainers use resources as 
input, but weak bargainers think this is unjustified. 
In Chapter 4, we test this hypothesis by manipulating input relevance in two 
different ways. According to accountability theory, a fair allocation is one in which 
one’s share of the payoff is based on variables under one’s control and not based on 
variables outside one’s control (Konow, 1996, 2000). In Study 4.1., we thus 
manipulate how coalition bargainers obtain their resources: randomly or through 
effort. Although previous research has shown that equitable allocations are deemed 
more acceptable when the input of bargainers is attained through effort rather than 
randomness (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, & Kurki, 2004; Lee & Shahriar, 2016; Oxoby & 
Spraggon, 2008; Ruffle, 1998), the question is whether this would hold in situations in 
which it is possible to self-servingly avoid deserving others. In Study 4.2, we 
manipulate input relevance by creating an explicit link between input (resources) and 
output (payoffs), which should also increase the perception that resources are a 
relevant input and possible promote the approach and inclusion of strong bargainers. 
 
How can others replicate our findings and/or conduct high-powered coalition 
formation studies?  
There are two large challenges when conducting coalition formation research. 
First, large samples are often necessary, because the unit of observation is often the 
triad. Second, coalition formation is a complex and interactive process that is not 
easily substituted by non-interactive approaches such as hypothetical scenario’s or 
strategy methods.  
In Chapter 5, we present the Online Coalition Game, the open source coalition 
program we developed to conduct most studies in this dissertation. The Online 




interactive coalition experiments. This enables researchers to sample from large 
online participant pools, whilst at the same time using a real-time interactive 
bargaining protocol. 
 
What have we learned?  
In Chapter 6, I will end this dissertation with a general discussion. In this 
discussion, I will summarize the findings obtained in the following chapters, evaluate 
the three previous explanations for the Strength-is-Weakness effect in the light of 
these findings, and propose a novel tentative theory on the mechanisms underlying 
the Strength-is-Weakness effect. Moreover, I will present new questions, providing a 










On whether having many resources leads to 
exclusion from coalitions: 





















Based on: Wissink, J., van Beest, I., Pronk, T., & van de Ven, N. (2020). Strength is still a 
weakness in coalition formation: Replicating and understanding the Strength-is-
Weakness Effect. Manuscript under review. 
 
A data package including (meta) data, analysis scripts, stimulus materials, and 





A key observation in coalition formation is that bargainers with most resources are 
often excluded from the negotiated agreement: the Strength-is-Weakness effect. 
Previous studies have suffered from low sample sizes and lack of (appropriate) 
incentives, and have rarely focused on underlying processes. To address these issues, 
we conducted a cross-platform replication using the Online Coalition Game (OCG)—a 
novel interactive coalition game. Both in a psychology laboratory and on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, we replicate the Strength-is-Weakness effect. The effect seems 
driven by actual and expected equitable offers; those with more resources demand a 
high payoff, and bargainers seek out coalition partners with few, rather than many, 
resources. Importantly, despite methodological differences, results from both studies 
are highly similar. Together, they provide evidence that having many resources can 
hinder inclusion in coalitions. Moreover, they demonstrate that the OCG is viable tool 
for conducting interactive coalition formation research across research platforms.
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Transactions are often shaped by differences in how many resources 
interaction partners bring to the table. According to equity theory (Adams, 1965; 
Walster et al., 1973), individuals expect to be rewarded in proportion to their input. 
People often accept inequality if differences in outcomes are equitable; if they can be 
justified on the basis of differences in input (Tausch, Potters, & Riedl, 2013). For 
example, recipients in an ultimatum bargaining game accept lower offers when a 
larger share of the allocator’s endowment is earned (Lee & Shahriar, 2016). 
In situations in which it is possible to form coalitions, however, those with the 
highest input do not always receive better payoffs. In coalition formation, there are 
more than two individuals or parties of which a subset needs to combine their 
resources to attain a shared payoff that is subsequently distributed among the 
members of the formed coalition (Gamson, 1964). For example, political parties may 
need to combine their seats (resources) to obtain a majority in parliament to form a 
government and distribute the ministerial posts (payoffs). Similar to equity theory 
(Adams, 1965; Walster et al., 1973), classical theories of coalition formation predict 
that individuals or parties often try to obtain an equitable share of the payoffs 
generated by the coalition (Gamson, 1961a, 1964; Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973). 
However, the possibility of choosing between multiple prospective coalition partners 
often results in bargainers strategically selecting the bargaining partner with just 
enough resources to attain the coveted payoffs, because this maximizes the equitable 
share of the payoffs that they can obtain (Gamson, 1961a, 1964; Komorita & Chertkoff, 
1973). This can lead to the seemingly paradoxical Strength-is-Weakness effect; 
bargainers with the most resources are often excluded from coalitions, receiving no 
share of the payoffs at all (Caplow, 1956; Chaney & Vinacke, 1960; Kelley & Arrowood, 
1960; Murnighan, 1978b; van Beest et al., 2011, 2004b; Vinacke, 1959; Vinacke & 
Arkoff, 1957). 
The Strength-is-Weakness effect illustrates that adding a third person can 
drastically change the dynamics or outcomes of an interaction. Despite this, 
exceptions aside (Huffaker, Swaab, & Diermeier, 2011; Swaab, Kern, Diermeier, & 
Medvec, 2009; van Beest et al., 2011), coalition formation has been an understudied 
topic the last decade. Especially considering the recent replicability crisis in 
psychology (see Open Science Collaboration, 2015), scrutiny of key findings seems 
warranted, especially if initial evidence is based on small samples (Ioannidis, 2005). 
To address this, we present two preregistered,13 piece-rate incentivized replications 
of the Strength-is-Weakness effect, one conducted in a standard social psychology lab 
setting—with undergraduate psychology students—and one on the online labor 
market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)—with AMT workers. To conduct the 
replication, we introduce the Online Coalition Game: a novel tool for conducting 
                                                                    




(online) three-player interactive coalition experiments, which enables researchers to 
conduct a large sample study on coalition formation in which at least three players 
interact. 
 
The Strength-is-Weakness effect 
A first mention of a Strength-is-Weakness effect can be found in Caplow’s 
(1956) theorizing on coalitions in the triad. Caplow theorized that members of a triad 
may differ in strength and that strong members try to dominate weaker members. 
However, when the combined strength of the two weaker members would be 
sufficient to control the strongest member, the two weak members would form a 
coalition against the strong member.  
Empirical evidence for a Strength-is-Weakness effect was first obtained using 
modified pachisi games (Chaney & Vinacke, 1960; Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Vinacke 
& Arkoff, 1957). In these games, participants were part of a triad in which 
participants’ resources were represented by a weight: one participant (Player A) had a 
weight of 3, the other two (Players B and C) both had a weight of 2. Participants would 
receive a monetary payoff upon reaching the last space of a pachisi board. Each turn a 
die was rolled and participants’ pawns moved the amount of pips on the die 
multiplied by their personal weight. Moving individually, Player A, having a higher 
weight, would always win the game. However, if two players would agree on how to 
distribute the payoffs among themselves if one of them reached the final space, these 
two players would add their weights together. In these experiments, the individually 
strong Players A were more than often excluded from a coalition in which the 
individually weak Players B and C dominated with a combined weight of 4; Player A 
was included in only 28% of the cases, versus inclusion rates of 86% and 84% of 
Player B and Player C respectively (Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957). 
Further support for the Strength-is-Weakness effect has been found in 
situations in simple weighted majority games (Komorita, 1984; Komorita & Parks, 
1995) in which having more resources within a coalition does not bring additional 
benefit to the individual or coalition (Gamson, 1961b; Murnighan, 1978b; van Beest et 
al., 2011, 2004b). These situations are simple (Komorita, 1984), which means that the 
payoff is the same for every coalition, regardless of the combined resources. 
Moreover, in these situations, resources are power-irrelevant (Kravitz, 1981), meaning 
that all individuals have an equal number of possible winning coalitions they could be 
part of, regardless of their individual resources. A common structure is the 5(4-3-2) 
game in which a coalition needs at least 5 resources to attain the payoffs and in which 
every possible combination of bargainers with 4, 3, and 2 resources respectively for 
players A, B, and C reaches this threshold. In this situation, a coalition between the 
weakest members (BC coalition with 5 resources) is formed most often (Murnighan, 
1991). 
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An important observation is that coalition bargainers in these simple, power-
irrelevant situations seem to strongly depart from rationality. Without inherent value, 
resources should not influence a) which coalitions are formed, and b) the target and 
height of offers made. Consequently, in a situation with rational bargainers, each 
possible coalition would form equally often (1/3 of the time) and offers would not 
differ as a function of the amount of resources someone holds. Nonetheless, coalition 
bargainers seem to ascribe value to resources. Moreover, paradoxically, those with 
more resources are actually less often included than those with fewer resources are. 
This occurrence of a Strength-is-Weakness effect is anticipated by prominent 
coalition theories. For example, Gamson’s (1961b, 1964) minimum resource theory 
predicts the formation of coalitions with as few resources as possible. The reason for 
this is the parity principle, which, in a similar vein as equity theory (Adams, 1965), is 
the belief that “a person ought to get from an agreement an amount proportional to 
what he brings into it” (Gamson, 1964, p. 88). Having this belief, individuals are better 
off approaching prospective coalition partners for which an equitable share is as low 
as possible. Although bargaining theory (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973), extends 
minimum resource theory by predicting that only those with more resources are 
likely to endorse an equitable distribution—those with fewer resources would 
endorse equality—this theory also predicts the formation of the smallest winning 
coalition (for a comprehensive review of coalition formation theories, see Kahan & 
Rapoport, 1984). 
 
Reasons for replication 
There are three main reasons for conducting our replications. First, the 
puzzling observation that parties with more resources are more frequently excluded 
than parties with fewer resources are has profound implications. It shows that those 
who are seemingly more entitled to influencing a decision end up having no influence 
at all. Using the example of governmental coalition formation, it means that parties 
that receive ample support from the electorate end up having little influence on how 
the country is ruled. Indeed, analyses of Western European parliamentary 
democracies shows that parties with most votes—provided that they are not entitled 
to starting negotiations—were less likely to be included in government than parties 
with fewer votes (Bäck & Dumont, 2008; Warwick, 1996).  
Second, the Strength-is-Weakness effect is an understudied phenomenon in 
which the (psychological) mechanisms that give rise to the effect are still mostly 
unclear. Although there is ample evidence that coalition bargainers apply self-serving 
allocation rules (e.g., Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973; van Beest et al., 2004a, 2004b), 
there is no direct evidence linking the application of equity norms to the Strength-is-
Weakness effect. To this aim, in the current replication, we did not only focus on 




hint at the underlying process. Specifically, we tested whether the Strength-is-
Weakness effect was already observed in first offers; whether strong bargainers 
would indeed demand a higher share than weak bargainers, and whether weak 
bargainers’ first offers would mainly be directed at one another. 
Third and final, before saying more about underlying processes, we want to 
make sure we can actually replicate the effect itself. An illustration of why this 
skepticism is warranted is a large-scale replication attempt, which included the 
replications of 100 studies from three high-impact psychology journals in which only 
39% of the effects were, replicated (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Moreover, in 
previous coalition formation studies, experimenter intervention was often necessary, 
for example to physically collect offer slips (e.g., C. E. Miller & Wong, 1986), creating 
the possibility for experimenter bias. The Online Coalition Game, the program 
developed for the current replication, addresses this by automatizing random 
matching of, and interaction between, participants. Moreover, other possible 
researcher degrees of freedom (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) such as 
selective reporting and optional stopping of data collection are addressed by 
preregistration of both replications. In addition, a data package including (meta) data, 
analysis scripts, stimulus materials, and preregistrations is available on the Dutch 
Dataverse network: https://doi.org/10.34894/JXRELG. 
Additionally, as coalition formation settings inherently contain more than two 
participants per observation, and the traditional laboratory has a limited pool of 
participants, previous studies have often suffered from low sample sizes, leading to 
low statistical power. Consequently, it is also more likely that previous literature 
contains false positive results (Ioannidis, 2005). Although this problem may be 
alleviated by using a within-subjects design in which participants complete multiple 
trials, this solution may lead to order and learning effects. For example, Kelley and 
Arrowood (1960) showed quite substantial changes in formed coalitions in a 5(4-3-2) 
game after 10 to 70 trials. In these situations, it is difficult to determine which 
observations are valid and which have been transformed by repeated exposure and 
feedback. As will be demonstrated later, the integration between oTree (Chen, 
Schonger, & Wickens, 2016) and Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) helped us obtain a 
substantial sample size while retaining an interactive design without the necessity of 
multiple trials. 
Finally, previous studies have used either no incentives or tournament 
incentives. That is, either there was no monetary payoff related to participant’s 
performance, or the payoff was related to participant’s performance relative to other 
participants. This has possibly affected participants’ bargaining behavior, on which we 
will elaborate after explaining the setting that we designed for this study. 
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The Online Coalition Game 
To address the abovementioned issues, we developed the Online Coalition 
Game (OCG) using oTree (Chen et al., 2016); a free, open-source platform for 
behavioral research. The latest version of the OCG—albeit using a political instead of a 
landowner setting—can be found here: 
https://github.com/JoeriWissink/OnlineCoalitionGame. See Chapter 6 for a more 
detailed description of the game, its use, and adjustable parameters. 
There are three benefits of using oTree. First, oTree allows for interactive 
studies in which many participants can be flexibly matched into separate groups, 
which simultaneously participate in the experiment. This allowed us to have up to 
four triads simultaneously interacting in our 12-cubicle lab and many more triads on 
AMT. Moreover, random assignment to position and interaction partner as well as the 
actual bargaining happened entirely without experimenter intervention. A second 
benefit is that oTree runs in a web browser, meaning no installation is required and 
data can be easily gathered online. A third benefit is that oTree has an integration with 
AMT. Although there are clearly benefits and challenges when conduction online 
interactive experiments (for a recent overview, see Arechar, Gächter, & Molleman, 
2017), the AMT integration allowed us to obtain a large sample and made it easy to 
directly relate bargaining outcomes to actual payoffs. In the general discussion, we 
will compare the benefits and challenges we encountered during data collection in the 
lab and on AMT and critically compare the two methods of data collection. 
The landowner paradigm. For the current replication, we chose to adapt the 
landowner paradigm developed by Van Beest and colleagues (van Beest et al., 2004a; 
van Beest, Wilke, & van Dijk, 2003): a simple weighted majority game (Komorita, 
1984; Komorita & Parks, 1995) that simulates coalition formation in a three-player 
bargaining setting. In the 5(4-3-2) landowner game we used, participants took on the 
role of landowners who want to sell their parcel of unused land to a project developer. 
As the project developer wants to buy at least 5 acres, and the landowners 
individually only hold 4, 3, or 2 acres, two landowners need to form a coalition in 
order to sell their parcels of land together for a fixed price of $100,000. 
The main advantage of using a simple weighted majority game such as the 
landowner paradigm for the current replications is that, other than in modified pachisi 
games (Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957), participants always need to form a coalition to obtain 
a share of the payoffs. This makes it easier to disentangle the possible causes of the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect. In modified pachisi games, the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect could be due to two different causes: 1) weak bargainers are faster to realize 
that they need to form a coalition because otherwise the strong player would win by 
default (see Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957), and 2) weak bargainers (expect others to) use 
the equity norm, making the smallest coalition more attractive. As in a simple 




causes is eliminated, making it more likely that and observed Strength-is-Weakness 
effect is due to the parity norm.  
 
Appropriate incentives 
Previous studies on the Strength-is-Weakness effect have often not been 
incentivized. In some cases, participants negotiated about hypothetical payoffs 
(Chaney & Vinacke, 1960; Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Vinacke, 1959; Vinacke & Arkoff, 
1957). This might be problematic in light of findings that responses from empirical 
studies are less heterogeneous when they are incentivized, and that this might be due 
to a reduction of thoughtless responses made by unmotivated participants (Camerer 
& Hogarth, 1999; Smith & Walker, 1993). If the same applies to coalition studies, it 
might be that a portion of self-defeating offers made by strong participants in non-
incentivized studies are made by unmotivated participants applying a quick heuristic 
such as equity. If so, an incentivized experiment should be a more conservative test of 
the Strength-is-Weakness as such offers should decrease. 
Other experiments that did relate payoffs attained in the experiment to a real 
monetary payoffs used a tournament incentive; participants were reimbursed based 
on their performance relative to their peers rather than their absolute performance. 
For example, participants were simply told that better negotiation would lead to a 
higher chance of obtaining a prize of 100 Dutch guilders (van Beest et al., 2004b) or 
that 20% of a grade for a course depended on doing better than other participants in 
the same bargaining position (Murnighan, 1978b). 
 The reason why this tournament approach may be problematic is that 
individuals become more risk seeking under tournament incentives in which only a 
few participants gain an actual prize (Schedlinsky et al., 2016). Applying this notion to 
coalition formation, tournaments might incentivize participants to make risky offers 
in which they apply the equity norm in an attempt to maximize their payoffs. Hence, 
these incentives might possibly inflate a Strength-is-Weakness effect, making the use 
of piece-rate incentives a more conservative test of the Strength-is-Weakness effect.  
Moreover, piece-rate incentives seem to create a better match between the 
incentives one might have in real-life coalition bargaining and the one introduced in 
the lab. For example, in the formation of municipal councils, party outcomes are 
determined by how well they negotiate within their own municipality, not by how well 
they negotiate compared to parties in other municipalities. To address these possible 
issues, we presented participants with a more straightforward piece-rate incentive 
scheme in which there was a fixed conversion rate between money earned in the 








First, our replications were aimed at replicating the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect; the observation that strong bargainers are disproportionally often excluded 
from coalitions compared to their weaker counterparts. Hence, we hypothesized that 
the weak coalition (BC-coalition with 5 acres) would be formed more often than both 
coalitions including the strong landowner (AB coalition with 7 acres and AC coalition 
with 6 acres). 
Moreover, we formulated three exploratory hypotheses to gain insight in the 
causes of the Strength-is-Weakness effect. The first pertains to whether, in line with 
the application of the equity norm (Gamson, 1961a, 1964; Komorita & Chertkoff, 
1973), strong bargainers make first offers in which they claim a higher share of the 
payoffs than weaker bargainers do. A second mechanism that we explored is whether 
bargainers anticipate a lower offer from those with most resources and, even before 
receiving offers, make their first offers to the other with fewer resources, rather than 
to the other with more resources. This prediction is based on Gamson’s (1964, p. 87) 
notion of a parity norm not just as the application of the equity norm but also the 
expectation that others will “demand from a coalition a share of the payoff 
proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to a coalition.” Finally, 
we wanted to explore whether, in formed coalitions, those with more resources 
acquired a higher proportion of the payoffs than those with fewer resources. 




As a first controlled test of the OCG, we conducted our first replication in our 
social psychology lab. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. For this study, we recruited 180 undergraduate 
psychology students (Mage = 19.34 years, age range 17-28, 142 females, 37 males, 1 
other). Of these 180 participants, 156 could be grouped into 52 triads. Within triads, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the three positions in a 5(4-3-2) 
landowner game: landowner A with 4 resources, landowner B with 3 resources, and 
landowner C with 2 resources. The 24 participants who could not be matched only 
made a first offer, after which they learned that they could not be assigned to a triad. 
As interpretations of results are the same regardless of including or excluding these 





Having been allowed two weeks of lab time, the end of the second week was a 
natural stopping rule. A sensitivity power analysis conducted with G*Power (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) revealed that we could detect a medium to large 
effect size (w = 0.43) when testing whether the distribution of formed coalitions 
differed from chance (i.e., equal proportions for all possible coalitions) with 80% 
power. 
Materials and procedure. 
Game structure. After giving informed consent, participants were forwarded 
to the OCG; an oTree version (Chen et al., 2016) of the landowner paradigm (van Beest 
et al., 2003). Participants read that they would take the position of one of three 
landowners that each owned an unused parcel of land. They were told that these 
landowners were landowner A (owning 4 acres of land), B (owning 3 acres of land), or 
C (owning 2 acres of land). They read a project developer offered to buy at least 5 
acres of land for €100,000 and that any coalition of two landowners could sell their 
parcels of land for this price. They read a coalition would form when two participants 
reached a consensus on how to distribute the €100,000 between the coalition 
partners, and that for each €1,000 that a participant gained, they would receive a 
bonus of €0.10. They also read that the landowner would always pay €100,000, 
regardless of the size of the land sold. 
Bargaining. As a bargaining procedure, we adapted the Komorita and Meek 
(1978) display procedure, which consisted of three phases.  
Phase I. In Phase I, all participants made a coalition offer. In this offer, they a) 
chose whom to send the offer, and b) indicated how they would like to distribute the 
€100,000 between themselves and the chosen landowner in increments of €1,000. 
Phase II. In Phase II, participants saw all offers that were made in Phase I. 
They then selected one of the coalition offers that included them. This could be either 
their own offer or an offer from another landowner.  
Phase III. In Phase III, participants saw who selected which coalition offer. If 
two participants selected the same offer, the coalition would be formed and the 
payoffs were distributed as agreed upon by the two landowners. If no offer was 
selected twice, a new round started in which participants went through the same 
three phases. This process was repeated until two participants selected the same offer 
and a coalition was formed. 
Comprehension check. In order to gauge whether participants understood 
the instructions, participants completed a multiple choice quiz (correct answers in 
italics) asking for the amount of money the project developer would pay (€100,000 / 
This depends on the size of the sold land), what the payoffs would be of the landowner 
not included in the coalition (This depends on the offer that was accepted / This 
landowner doesn’t receive any money), and which coalitions could be formed (AB & AC 
/ AB & BC / AC & BC / AB, AC, & BC). If participants made a mistake, they received a 
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message that gave them the correct answer, and were presented with the question 
again until they answered correctly. 
Dependent Variables. To test our hypotheses, we focused on four dependent 
variables. 
Formed coalition. As our main goal is replicating the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect, our main dependent variable was the formed coalition after one or more 
rounds of bargaining. That is, was the coalition formed an AB-, AC-, or BC-coalition?  
Allocation in formed coalitions. For each formed coalition, we investigated 
whether, in line with previous literature suggesting the use of the equity norm 
(Gamson, 1961a; Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973; van Beest et al., 2004b), those with 
more resources in a coalition also attained a higher share of the payoffs. As allocations 
were made in increments of €1,000, participants actually made offers ranging from 1 
to 100. Therefore, all offers and allocations are reported in the results without the 
three extra zeros. 
First offer – choice of bargaining partner. To investigate whether the Strength-
is-Weakness effect was already apparent before participants had seen the offers of 
their counter parts, we analyzed to which other landowner participants make their 
first offer. 
First offer – allocation. As first offers were made before participants learned of 
the offers made by their bargaining partners, we consider this allocation as reflecting 
most closely the participants’ own preferences for a certain allocation, rather than a 
response to the other bargainers’ offers. Testing whether those with more resources 
also claimed a higher share of the payoffs in their first offer is thus a second way to 
test the use of equity. 
 
Results 
Comprehension check. Out of 180 participants, one participant falsely 
indicated that the size of the sold parcels would influence the size of the payoffs, and 
two participants falsely indicated that the payoffs of the excluded landowner 
depended on the offer that was accepted. Twenty-six participants gave a wrong 
answer to the question which coalitions would be formed. As preregistered, we 
conducted analyses including all participants and including those who answered all 
questions correctly (n = 152). Only for one exploratory test did the interpretation 
between the two analyses differ (see footnote 14). In Study 2.2, no differences 
occurred. 
Formed coalitions. Replicating the Strength-is-Weakness effect, a Chi-square 
goodness of fit test showed that BC-coalitions (n = 35; 67%) were formed more often 
than AC-coalitions (n = 15; 29%), and AB-coalitions (n = 2; 4%), 2(2, N = 52) = 31.89, 
p < .001, w = 0.78, 95% CIw [0.50, 1.04]. This difference remained significant when 




showing that the significant effect is not due to the AB-coalition being formed only 
twice, 2(1, N = 52) = 6.23, p = .01, w = 0.35, 95% CIw [0.07, 0.62]. Translating these 
results into inclusion rates, A was only included in 33% of all coalitions, whereas B 
and C were included in 71% and 96% respectively. See Table 2.1 for an overview of 
formed coalitions and allocations. 
Allocation in formed coalitions. Because coalition members allocated a 
fixed payoff of $100,000, and therefore the payoffs of the two coalition members were 
inversely related to each other, we could measure inequality in payoffs by testing 
whether one of the two mean payoffs differed from $5,000. One-sample t-tests 
revealed that, in line with our expectations, bargainers with more resources always 
obtained a larger share of the payoffs. In AC-coalitions, A obtained a larger share than 
C (MA = 54.13, SD = 3.91), t(14) = 4.10, p = .001, d = 1.06, 95% CId [-0.92, 3.04]. In BC-
coalitions, B obtained a larger share than C (MB = 57.06, SD = 4.29), t(34) = 9.73, p < 
.001, d = 1.65, 95% CId [0.22, 3.07]. Finally, in AB-coalitions, A obtained a larger share 
than B (MA = 55.00, SD = 7.07), but as only two AB-coalitions were formed, these 
numbers will not be interpreted. 
Average bonus per position. Exploratorily, as an alternative metric of the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect, we looked at the average monetary bonus participants in 
the different positions obtained. A one-way ANOVA revealed that we again found a 
Strength-is-Weakness effect, F(2, 153) = 19.88, p < .001, η2 = .21, 95% CIη2 [0.10, 0.31]. 
Tukey HSD tests showed that, even though A obtained a higher payoff in the formed 
coalitions, the frequent exclusion clearly made the average payoffs of A (M = 1.77, SD = 
2.58) lower than that of B (M = 4.01, SD = 2.62), p < .001, d = 0.86, 95% CId [0.46, 1.27], 
and C (M = 4.21, SD = 0.95), p < .001, d = 1.26, 95% CId [0.83, 1.68]. The average bonus 
of B and C did not differ, p = .89, d = 0.10, 95% CId [-0.28, 0.49]. 
 
Table 2.1. 
Formed coalitions and mean allocations for each position in Study 2.1. 
Formed    Mean allocation 
Coalition n % MA MB MC SD 
AB 2 3.8% 55.00 45.00 - 7.07 
AB 15 28.8% 54.13 - 45.87 3.91 
BC 35 67.3% - 57.06 42.94 4.29 
 
First offers – choice of bargaining partner. Chi-square goodness of fit tests 
showed that most bargainers sent a first offer to the bargaining partner that owned 
fewest acres of land, showing a Strength-is-Weakness effect before first offers are 
even known. Landowners A made more first offers to C (n = 48) than to B (n = 10), 
2(1, N = 58) = 24.90, p < .001, w = 0.66, 95% CIw [0.40, 0.91]. Likewise, landowners B 
made more first offers to C (n = 56) than to A (n = 5), 2(1, N = 61) = 42.64, p < .001, w 
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= 0.84, 95% CIw [0.58, 1.09]. Finally, landowners C also made more first offers to B (n = 
55) than to A (n = 6), 2(1, N = 61) = 39.36, p < .001, w = 0.80, 95% CIw [0.55, 1.06]. See 
Table 2.2 for an overview of proposed coalitions and mean proposed allocations for 
each position. 
First offers – allocation. In line with previous research on the use of the 
equity norm (Gamson, 1961a; Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973), a one-way ANOVA 
showed that those with more resources allocated more money to themselves in their 
first offers, F(2, 177) = 165.02, p < .001, η2 = .65, 95% CIη2 [0.57, 0.71]. Tukey HSD 
tests showed that landowners A (M = 60.21, SD = 7.27) allocated more to themselves 
than landowners B (M = 57.10, SD = 5.83), p = 0.012, d = 0.47, 95% CId [0.10, 0.84], 
who in turn allocated more to themselves than landowners C (M = 42.11, SD = 4.06), p 
< .001, d = 2.98, 95% CId [2.46, 3.50].14 See Figure 2.1 for the distributions of 
allocations for the three bargaining positions.  
 
Table 2.2. 
Proposed coalitions and mean proposed allocations for each position in Study 2.1. 
 Proposed   Mean proposed allocation 
Position Coalition n % MA MB MC SD 
A (4 acres) AB 10 17.2% 55.90 44.10 - 5.11 
 AC 48 82.8% 61.10 - 38.90 7.37 
B (3 acres) AB 5 8.2% 55.40 44.60 - 3.65 
 BC 56 91.8% - 58.21 41.79 4.55 
C (2 acres) AC 6 9.8% 57.50 - 42.50 6.12 
 BC 55 90.2% - 57.93 42.07 3.85 
 
                                                                    
14 After excluding those who failed at least one of the comprehension check questions, landowners A (M = 
58.73, SD =6.52) do not significantly allocate more to themselves than landowners B (M = 57.36, SD = 5.86), 





Figure 2.1. Violin plot of allocation to self by different bargaining positions in Study 2.1 
with means (dot), CI95 (line), and probability density (width). 
 
Discussion 
In Study 2.1, we clearly replicated the Strength-is-Weakness effect; the 
smallest BC-coalition was formed substantially more often than both the AB- and AC-
coalitions. Landowner A was only included in 33% of the formed coalitions, whereas 
landowners B and C were included in 69% and 96% of formed coalitions respectively. 
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Looking at participants’ first offers provides insight into the causes of the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect. First, individuals apply equitable division rules; in their 
first offers landowners with more resources made higher allocations to themselves 
than those with fewer resources. This allows landowners B and C to deduce that a 
coalition between themselves is more profitable than a coalition with landowner A. 
Looking at the target of first offers, however, it seems that the basis for a Strength-is-
Weakness effect is already in place before bargainers observed each other’s first 
offers. In their first offer, the majority of landowners showed a preference for the 
bargaining partner with the least amount of resources. Although we do not have 
access to the reasons landowners made these choices, a parsimonious explanation is 
that they already expected the smallest coalition to be the most profitable coalition. 
 
Study 2.2 
We conducted our second replication on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). 
Conducting this second study had two main goals. First, it allowed us to test the 
robustness of the Strength-is-Weakness effect obtained in Study 2.1 in another setting 
with a different participant pool. Previous comparisons between lab and AMT samples 
seems to suggest no large differences in results (e.g., Arechar et al., 2017; Paolacci, 
Chandler, & Stern, 2010). However, research also seems to indicate that AMT workers 
are often non-naïve participants. For example, more than half of a sample of AMT 
workers indicates to have participated in prisoner’s dilemmas or ultimatum games 
(Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014). There seems to be evidence that the Strength-
is-Weakness effect decreases with more exposure to coalition bargaining games 
(Kelley & Arrowood, 1960). Hence, there is a possibility that, due to prior exposure to 
other economic games, the Strength-is-Weakness effect would be less prominent in 
our AMT sample. 
A second goal of Study 2.2 was that it was a first online test of the OCG. 
Conducting online interactive experiments has its own challenges, such as 
constructing triads on the go and dealing with participant idleness when others are 
dependent on their choices (for an overview of possible issues, see Arechar et al., 
2017). As such, Study 2.2 helped us weigh the benefits and challenges of conducting 
coalition formation research on a platform such as AMT that have the benefit of 
assessing a larger and more varied participant sample and compare these to lab 
settings where one has more control on the environment in which they participate 
(e.g., standardized lab cubicles). We will reflect on this comparison in the general 
discussion of this chapter. 
 
Method 
Besides the few changes mentioned below, the materials and procedure were 




Participants and design. As preregistered, we aimed for 75 triads but 
eventually obtained a sample of 80 triads, which, according to a sensitivity power 
analysis conducted in G*Power (Faul et al., 2007), allowed us to detect a medium to 
large effect size (w = 0.35) when testing whether the distribution of formed coalitions 
differed from chance (i.e., equal proportions for all possible coalitions) with 80% 
power. 
Participants were recruited in batches of varying sizes (30 to 45 participants) 
to facilitate matching into triads (see matching procedure below). Participants 
received $2.40 for completing the hit and another $0.05 cents per $1,000 they 
attained in the scenario, leading to a payout of between $2.40 and $7.40. 
A total of 441 participants started our study. Of these 441, 336 were matched 
and entered the interaction phase after which 34 participants dropped out due to 
idleness, causing another 62 matched participants to drop out as well. Thus, our final 
sample was N = 240 AMT workers, grouped in to 80 triads (Mage = 36.88 years, age 
range 19-70, 119 females, 121 males). Within these triads, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three positions in a 5(4-3-2) landowner game. 
Materials and procedure. Materials and procedure were nearly identical to 
Study 2.1, meaning we will only mention the few changes we made. First, we 
translated the Dutch materials from Study 2.1 to English. Second, we changed the 
order of the experiment so that participants were matched after reading the 
instruction and completing the comprehension check instead of before. Finally, we 
added timers during the interaction phase of the experiment. 
Matching procedure. In Study 2.2, we changed the matching procedure to 
address two specific challenges of running interactive studies on AMT. First, on AMT, 
participants starting the experiment but not finishing it are more prevalent than in the 
lab. As participants are interdependent once matched into a triad, this means that the 
dropout of one participant would lead to dropout of two matched participants. We 
assumed that this type of dropout would be most prevalent during the consent form, 
instructions, or comprehension check. By matching only participants who have 
already passed these phases of the study, we minimized the chance of losing matched 
participants due to idleness of only one participant. 
Second, unlike in our lab session, we had no control over how many 
participants would be starting our study at the same time. For this reason, if 
participants could not be matched within 5 minutes after they entered the matching 
screen, they were given the possibility to quit the study and collect their show-up fee. 
Moreover, we conducted the study in batches of between 30 and 45 participants to 
increase the odds that all participants would start playing around the same time and 
thus maximize the possibility that participants could be matched with other 
participants. 
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Timers. To make sure that matched idle participants did not stall their 
interaction partners, we added 2-minute timers to the different pages in the 
interaction phase of the study. To minimize feelings of time pressure but still remind 
participants of the timer, these timers were only made visible after 1.5 minutes. 
 
Results 
Comprehension check. Out of our 240 participants who were matched, four 
participants falsely indicated that the size of the sold parcels would influence the size 
of the payoffs, 32 participants falsely indicated that the payoffs of the excluded 
landowner depended on the offer that was accepted, and 14 participants gave a wrong 
answer to the question which coalitions could be formed. Interpretations of all 
analyses did not differ when only including participants who have made no errors 
during the comprehension check (n = 199). Below we report analyses using all 240 
participants. 
Formed coalitions. Replicating the Strength-is-Weakness effect, a Chi-square 
goodness of fit test showed that BC-coalitions (n = 52; 65%) were formed more often 
than AC-coalitions (n = 22; 27.5%), and AB-coalitions (n = 6; 7.5%), 2(2, N = 80) = 
40.90, p < .001, w = 0.72, 95% CIw [0.49, 0.93]. Again, this difference remained 
significant when combining the AB- and AC-coalition and comparing them against the 
BC-coalition, showing that the significant effect is not due to the AB-coalition being 
formed only six times, 2(1, N = 80) = 7.20, p = .01, w = 0.30, 95% CIw [0.08, 0.52]. 
Translating the results into inclusion rates, A was only included in 35% of all 
coalitions, whereas B and C were included in 72.5% and 92.5% respectively. See Table 
2.3 for an overview of formed coalitions and allocations. 
Allocation in formed coalitions. As in Study 2.1, one-sample t-tests showed 
that bargainers with more resources obtained a larger share of the payoffs (i.e., more 
than €50,000) in the coalitions that were formed (see Table 2.3). In AC-coalitions, A 
obtained a larger share than C (MA = 54.77, SD = 6.30), t(21) = 3.55, p = .002, d = 0.76, 
95% CId [-1.88, 3.39]. In BC-coalitions, B obtained a larger share than C (MB = 55.10, SD 
= 6.60), t(51) = 5.57, p < .001, d = 0.77, 95% CId [-1.02, 2.57]. Finally, in AB-coalitions, 
A obtained a larger share than B (MA = 52.50, SD = 2.74), but as only six AB-coalitions 
were formed, these numbers will not be interpreted. 
Average bonus per position. Again, as an alternative metric of the Strength-
is-Weakness effect, we exploratorily looked at the average monetary bonus 
participants in the different positions obtained. A one-way ANOVA revealed that we 
again found a Strength-is-Weakness effect, F(2, 237) = 24.87, p < .001, η2 = .17, 95% 
CIη2 [0.09, 0.25]. Tukey HSD tests showed that, again, the average bonus of A (M = 0.95, 




[0.47, 1.12], and C (M = 2.08, SD = 0.67), p < .001, d = 1.08, 95% CId [0.75, 1.42]. The 
average bonus of B and C did not differ, p = .80, d = 0.11, 95% CId [-0.20, 0.42].15 
 
Table 2.3. 
Formed coalitions and mean allocations for each position in Study 2.2. 
Formed    Mean allocation 
Coalition n % MA MB MC SD 
AB 6 7.5% 52.50 47.50 - 2.74 
AB 22 27.5% 54.77 - 45.23 6.30 
BC 52 65.0% - 55.10 44.90 6.60 
 
First offers – choice of bargaining partner. As in Study 2.1, landowners A 
made more first offers to C (n = 66) than to B (n = 14), 2(1, N = 80) = 33.80, p < .001, 
w = 0.65, 95% CIw [0.43, 0.87]. Likewise, landowners B made more first offer to C (n = 
72) than to A (n = 8), 2(1, N = 80) = 51.20, p < .001, w = 0.80, 95% CIw [0.58, 1.02]. 
Finally, landowners C made more first offers to B (n = 68) than to A (n = 12), 2(1, N = 
80) = 39.20, p < .001, w = 0.70, 95% CIw [0.48, 0.92]. See Table 2.4 for an overview of 
proposed coalitions and mean proposed allocations for each position. 
First offers – allocation. As in Study 2.1, a one-way ANOVA showed that 
those with more resources allocated more money to themselves in their first offers, 
F(2, 237) = 139.22, p < .001, η2 = 0.54, 95% CIη2 [0.27, 0.45]. Tukey HSD tests showed 
that landowners A (M = 61.95, SD = 9.32) allocated more to themselves than 
landowners B (M = 55.21, SD = 7.22), p < .001, d = 0.81, 95% CId [0.48, 1.13], who in 
turn allocated more to themselves than landowners C (M = 41.85, SD = 6.44), p < .001, 
d = 1.95, 95% CId [1.57, 2.33]. See Figure 2.2 for the distributions of allocations for the 
three bargaining positions.  
 
Table 2.4. 
Proposed coalitions and mean proposed allocations for each position in Study 2.2. 
 Proposed   Mean proposed allocation 
Position Coalition n % MA MB MC SD 
A (4 acres) AB 14 17.5% 54.29 45.71 - 5.14 
 AC 66 82.5% 63.88 - 36.12 9.22 
B (3 acres) AB 8 10.0% 50.37 49.63 - 9.16 
 BC 72 90.0% - 55.83 44.17 6.76 
C (2 acres) AC 14 17.5% 54.29 45.71 - 5.14 
 BC 66 82.5% 63.88 - 36.12 9.22 
                                                                    
15 Again, non-parametric tests lead to the same interpretation. 




Figure 2.2. Violin plot of allocation to self by different bargaining positions in Study 2.2 
with means (dot), CI95 (line), and probability density (width). 
 
Discussion 
In Study 2.2, the Strength-is-Weakness effect was again successfully 
replicated; the BC-coalition was formed substantially more often than the AB- and AC-
coalitions. Landowner A was included in 35% of all formed coalitions, whereas B and 




Moreover, as in Study 2.1, causes for the effect can again be found in both the 
allocation of payoffs in the first offer and the first choice of bargaining partner. 
Landowners A allocated more to themselves than landowners B, which allocated more 
to themselves than landowners C. Moreover, participants again seemed to prefer the 
bargaining partner with the least amount of resources. 
 
Comparison Study 2.1 and Study 2.2 
To test whether results from the lab (Study 2.1) and AMT (Study 2.2) differed 
from each other, we conducted additional analyses. First, a chi-square test of 
independence showed that there was no systematic relationship between type of 
sample and formed coalitions, 2(2, N = 132) = 0.74, p = 0.69, w = 0.07, 95% CIw [< 
0.01, 0.21]. Second a 2 (Study: 1 vs. 2) by 3 (Position: A vs. B vs. C) ANOVA on first 
allocation to self, shows, that only bargaining position predicted participants’ first 
offers, F(2, 414) = 114.90, p < .001, η2 = .58, 95% CIη2 [0.28, 0.42]. There was no main 
effect of study, F(1, 414) = 2.08, p = .15, d < .01, 95% CId [-0.19, 0.20] nor was there an 
interaction effect between study and position, F(2, 414) = 2.30, p = .10, η2 < .01, 95% 
CIη2 [< 0.01, 0.03]. Finally, the proportion of participants who did not make errors in 




In two studies, one using a psychology undergraduate laboratory setting and 
one using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), we successfully replicated the Strength-is-
Weakness effect in coalition formation. In line with previous literature (Caplow, 1956; 
Chaney & Vinacke, 1960; Gamson, 1964; Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Murnighan, 1978b; 
van Beest et al., 2011, 2004a; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957), coalition bargainers with more 
resources were disproportionately excluded from coalitions. In addition, we provided 
new insights in causes of the Strength-is-Weakness effect. Analyses of first offers and 
partner choice suggest that bargainers both utilized and expected the use of the equity 
norm. Those with more resources claimed a higher share of the payoffs, making 
themselves less attractive than those with fewer resources. Additionally, those with 
fewer resources approached each other from the outset, suggesting that they 




Besides replicating the Strength-is-Weakness effect, our studies corroborate 
coalition formation theories that highlight the importance of resources in the coalition 
formation process. Two notable examples are minimum resource theory (Gamson, 
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1961a) and bargaining theory (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973) which both predict that 
coalition bargainers aim to form the smallest possible winning coalition and that those 
with more resources—following the equity norm—try to secure a larger share of the 
payoffs than those with fewer resources. The results from the current replication 
cannot be explained by coalition formation theories that assume that bargaining is 
shaped by the number of possible coalitions bargainers can be part of (e.g., minimum 
power theory, Gamson, 1964; weighted probability model, Komorita, 1974). In the 
current replications, all landowners had an identical number of possible coalitions 
they could be part of, namely two. Hence, an account purely based on bargaining 
opportunities cannot explain why some coalitions are formed more often, nor why 
some bargainers claim or receive a higher share of the payoffs. 
 
Practical implications  
The current studies addressed several issues that might have plagued 
previous studies of the effect. First, integrating the oTree (Chen et al., 2016) 
landowner game with AMT allowed us to collect sufficient triads for a high-powered 
study of the effect. A post hoc power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007), 
indicates that the probability of finding the observed effect sizes (w = 0.78 and w = 
0.72), given the effect exists, exceeds 0.99. Second, our use of piece-rate incentivizes 
addressed the possibility of increased variance in responses due to no incentives at all 
(Smith & Walker, 1993), and the possibility of risky high offers driving the effect in the 
presence of tournament incentives (Schedlinsky et al., 2016). Finally, preregistration 
and automation of all the experiment’s procedures minimized researcher degrees of 
freedom. 
An encouraging finding is the high similarity between results of our two 
studies, despite methodological differences and differences in participant 
characteristics. Whether Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) produces valid results has 
been debated: effects established in the lab have generally been replicated in an online 
setting (e.g., Arechar et al., 2017; Paolacci et al., 2010), but there have also been 
concerns about participant attention and non-naivety (Chandler et al., 2014). In our 
study, however, differences between a relatively isolated lab cubicle and a possibly 
distracting environment for AMT workers did not seem to result in a different 
understanding of the game. Moreover, despite the likely experience AMT workers 
have with economic games, this did not lead to markedly different results. Finally, the 
addition of timers and the difference in timing of matching did not seem to have a 
noticeable effect on bargaining behavior.  
 
Benefits and challenges of the lab and AMT 
The above comparison implies that both the lab and AMT settings are equally 




research in the lab and on AMT both have their own benefits and challenges. Below we 
discuss a few benefits and challenges that may help researchers to realize the trade-
offs when choosing one of the two samples. 
Speed of data collection and sample size. In terms of speed of data 
collection, AMT is clearly the superior option. For Study 2.1, we managed to collect 52 
triads in 10 workdays. For Study 2.2, we collected our 80 triads within a few hours 
spread across three days. Moreover, whereas we were close to the limits of our lab 
participant pool, the effective sample size one can acquire through AMT is estimated 
at 7,300 participants (Stewart et al., 2015). 
Cost inefficiency due to participant attrition. In our two replications, 
participants who dropped out due to idleness were not paid and did not contribute to 
cost inefficiency. Participants who could not be matched within five minutes or 
participants whose interaction partner dropped out did receive a base fee, but did not 
produce complete data. Hence, the latter two led to cost inefficiency. In the lab, 13% of 
our sample did not produce complete data but still received the show-up fee, 
compared to 35% on AMT, showing that our AMT study was less efficient. This 
difference can mainly be attributed to participants who were unable to be matched. 
This was likely exacerbated due to starting AMT sessions without knowing how many 
participants would show up. Previous online interactive research that made 
participant register for a study that would take place at a later time attained an 
attrition rate of only 7%, meaning that AMT could possibly be even more efficient than 
a lab setting (Gallo & Yan, 2015).  
Consequences of misunderstanding the instructions. Despite our efforts 
to make the instructions as clear as possible, some participants got stuck due to giving 
responses in an incorrect format (i.e., they wrote offers in thousands instead of leaving 
out the three extra zeroes). In the lab, participants had ample time to discover their 
mistake. On AMT, however, participants only had two minutes to complete the page, 
meaning some could not correct this mistake in time, dropping out of the experiment 
along with their interaction partners. Fortunately, only 12 out of 336 matched 
participants made this mistake. Possibly, imposing a stricter comprehension check 
before the actual interaction phase could eliminate this mistake.  
Whereas the above list of dimensions is far from exhaustive, it shows that 
there are distinct benefits and challenges to conducting interactive studies in the lab 
and online. However, we think that the benefit of having a large sample outweighs the 
loss of control that leads to inefficiency. Moreover, it is clear that some of this 
inefficiency might be alleviated by 1) using a different recruitment method, and 2) 
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Limitations and future research 
An implication of the current research is that having more can actually come 
with higher costs. The current research, however, has only demonstrated this notion 
in a simple situation in which having a larger coalition does not lead to a higher 
shared payoff. There is, albeit scarce, some evidence that in multivalued situations 
(i.e., when a coalition’s payoff increases with an increased number of combined 
resources, Komorita, 1984) a too strong focus on obtaining an equitable share of the 
payoffs can also lead to exclusion (Komorita, Aquino, & Ellis, 1989). Future research 
could be aimed at discerning when the added value of having more resources is high 
enough to offset the larger share one with more resources would demand and when it 
is not. 
An important implication of the Strength-is-Weakness effect is that it suggests 
that those with more resources disproportionally suffer the consequences of 
exclusion. Research on belonging shows that individuals have a fundamental need to 
belong and social exclusion threatens this need, leading to negative psychological 
consequences (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, 2007). An interesting next step 
would be to investigate whether being excluded from a coalition leads to similar need 
threat as being socially excluded. If so, this would show that excluded bargainers—
often the strong bargainer—suffer a second loss besides leaving empty-handed.  
Future implementation of the Online Coalition Game. With the two 
presented studies, we have shown that the OCG is a viable way of conducting 
interactive coalition formation research. Below, we provide two examples of how 
future research could implement additional oTree features to address further 
research questions regarding the Strength-is-Weakness effect. 
Chat rooms. Previous research has shown that different channels of 
communication can influence which coalitions are more likely to be formed; public 
communication channels foster the formation of large coalitions, whereas private 
channels foster minimum winning coalitions (Swaab et al., 2009). Future research 
could implement oTree’s built-in chat function to investigate whether communication 
channels affect the prevalence of the Strength-is-Weakness effect. For example, it is 
possible that allowing strong bargainers to communicate their bargaining intentions 
to the weak bargainers diminishes the tendency for weak bargainers to direct their 
first offers to each other from the outset, which in turn may possibly lower the 
occurrence of the Strength-is-Weakness effect. 
Resources based on effort. In our studies, participants were randomly 
allocated to different positions. Previous research shows that claims based on equity 
are more likely to be accepted when resources are earned than when they are 
randomly allocated (Konow, 2000; Tausch et al., 2013). An interesting question is 
whether participants with more resources will be more readily included when they 




allocated. This question could be addressed by utilizing oTree’s compatibility with 
Javascript and program a real effort task and allocate participants to a position based 
on their performance on the task. 
Different context. In the current studies, we have implemented the 
landowner paradigm (van Beest et al., 2003), which is one possible operationalization 
of a simple weighted majority game. Researchers could frame a simple weighted 
majority game in a political setting (e.g., a political convention game; Gamson, 1964) 
or organizational setting (Polzer, Mannix, & Neale, 1998; Swaab et al., 2009). Although 
we do not expect any strong differences in results—the Strength-is-Weakness effect 
has also been found in a political convention game (Murnighan, 1978b)—a systematic 
comparison might reveal subtle differences in bargaining behavior and expectations. 
 
Conclusion 
 In thus chapter, we presented two preregistered, piece-rate incentivized 
replications of the Strength-is-Weakness effect in coalition formation using the Online 
Coalition Game—a novel online interactive coalition game—in both a lab setting and 
using an Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) sample. Besides replicating the effect, the 
results seemed to suggest that both the use of equitable division rules such as the 
parity norm (Gamson, 1964) and expectation that others will apply these rules shape 
the effect. Although conducting online interactive studies online brings its own 
challenges, a comparison between the results of the two replications shows that 
results do not strongly differ between the two settings. Moreover, AMT addresses the 
necessity of larger sample sizes in coalition formation studies in which the triad is the 
unit of analysis. As such, the current research does not only provide evidence for the 
existence of a Strength-is-Weakness effect, but also shows that the Online Coalition 
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In coalition formation, bargainers with many resources are often excluded from 
coalitions (the Strength-is-Weakness effect). Literature suggests this effect is driven 
by strong bargainers using self-serving allocation rules that backfire, as they prefer 
equity to equality (while weak bargainers prefer the opposite). Four studies test 1) 
whether this is actually the case and 2) whether strong bargainers attempt to make a 
fair offer but solely consider an equitable allocation or whether they consider both 
equity and equality but selfishly choose equity as an allocation rule. We find the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect even when equality rules are made salient, strengthening 
the idea that the strong bargainers actively select equity as their framework for 
fairness to attempt to maximize their payoffs. The studies, however, cast doubt on 
whether this is the sole cause of the Strength-is-Weakness effect. We found that strong 
bargainers are likely avoided because they are expected to bargain self-servingly, 
making the weak bargainers seek out each other.




People often form coalitions to reach goals that cannot be attained 
individually. Examples are political parties that form governments, workers that form 
unions, and companies that engage in joint ventures. A seemingly paradoxical finding 
is that those adding most resources to a coalition are surprisingly often excluded; an 
observation called the Strength-is-Weakness effect (Caplow, 1956; Chaney & Vinacke, 
1960; Gamson, 1964; Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Murnighan, 1978b; van Beest et al., 
2011, 2004a; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957).  
Although the cause of the Strength-is-Weakness effect has not been directly 
studied, literature hints that it might lie in the use of allocation rules rooted in 
distributive fairness principles (Gamson, 1961a; Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973). A 
prominent fairness principle is equity, which dictates that individuals should be 
rewarded in proportion to their input (e.g., Adams, 1965; Walster et al., 1973). This 
use of equity is often seen in coalition formation: those with more resources often try 
to obtain a higher share of the payoffs a coalition brings (e.g., Gamson, 1961b, 1964; 
van Beest et al., 2004b; Warwick & Druckman, 2006). Moreover, people use allocation 
rules self-servingly: those with more resources prefer an equitable division of payoffs, 
whereas those with fewer resources prefer an equal division (Komorita & Chertkoff, 
1973; van Beest et al., 2004b). These tendencies make those with more resources less 
attractive as a coalition partner than those with fewer resources, often leading to 
exclusion of the former. 
An unanswered question is why these coalition bargainers apply an allocation 
rule that is clearly self-defeating. One possible explanation is that bargainers are 
motivated to apply an allocation rule that is deemed fair by their counterparts but that 
their specific bargaining position biases their perception of what the appropriate 
allocation rule is. They could passively adopt the most salient allocation rule without 
adequately considering alternative allocation rules. For example, those with more 
resources could utilize the equity norm without adequately considering the use of an 
equal allocation rule. Another explanation is that bargainers’ use of allocation rules is 
guided by a selfish active selection of allocation rules: bargainers could attend to 
multiple allocation rules but actively choose the allocation rule that seems to yield a 
higher payoff.  
To address this research question, we conducted four studies in which we 
created coalition bargaining settings where equality was made as salient as—or even 
more salient than—proportionality/equity. We found that in this setting, the self-
defeating application of the equity norm by bargainers with most resources persisted. 
This suggests that the Strength-is-Weakness effect cannot be explained by an attempt 
to make a fair offer that fails due to the passive adoption of the allocation rule that is 
most salient, but instead by an active selection between multiple allocation rules 




overview of relevant literature on coalition formation and the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect, before turning to our studies. 
 
Coalition formation and the Strength-is-Weakness effect 
Coalition formation can be found in many layers of society. Political parties 
form governments, companies combine resources in joint ventures, and employees 
form informal coalitions within an organization. A formal definition of coalition 
formation is “the joint use of resources to determine the outcome of a decision in a 
mixed-motive situation involving more than two units” (Gamson, 1964, p.85). This 
means that, first and foremost, a party needs to be included in a coalition to use their 
resources (e.g., money, seats) to influence the outcome that is at stake (e.g., the 
allocation of profits or influence on policy). Those excluded from a coalition may not 
share in the payoffs the coalition yields or may even be (negatively) affected by the 
decision without having any influence themselves (van Beest et al., 2003). Moreover, 
coalition members need to reach a consensus on how to allocate the payoffs generated 
by the coalition. 
Which coalitions are formed and how payoffs are allocated is for a large part 
influenced by the resources coalition bargainers bring to the bargaining table. Often 
there is a minimum number of resources (a decision point) that needs to be held by a 
coalition in order to attain the coveted payoffs (Komorita, 1984). For example, in 
governmental coalition formation parties often have to form a majority coalition, 
meaning that political parties need to find coalition partners with whom they capture 
at least 51% of the total votes.  
Intuitively, one might assume that having many resources is advantageous 
when trying to form a coalition. However, having many resources does not always 
equate to having more bargaining opportunities and, depending on whether or not 
this is the case, having more resources can either be a strength or a liability 
(Murnighan, 1978b; van Beest et al., 2004a). If having more resources leads to having 
more alternatives, this can lead to more bargaining power and a higher likelihood of 
being included in a coalition (Gamson, 1964; Murnighan, 1978b; Shapley & Shubick, 
1954a). If, however, the number of resources parties hold do not dictate their 
alternatives, having more resources leads to a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon in 
which those with most resources are disproportionally excluded from coalitions, an 
observation dubbed the Strength-is-Weakness effect (Caplow, 1956; Chaney & 
Vinacke, 1960; Gamson, 1964; Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Murnighan, 1978b; van 
Beest et al., 2011, 2004b; Vinacke, 1959; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957).16  
The Strength-is-Weakness effect shows that having many resources than 
others can have large consequences. Those who, based equity norms, expect to have 
                                                                    
16 We limit our scope to simple situations (as opposed to multi-valued situations, see Komorita, 1984) in 
which the number of resources does not influence the size of the payoffs of a coalitions. 




more influence may end up having no influence at all. In governmental coalition 
formation, it might mean that the largest parties actually turn out to have little to no 
influence on policy. This idea is supported by studies of Western European 
parliamentary democracies, showing that parties with a higher seat share—but 
without a first mover advantage—are less likely to be included in governmental 
coalitions than parties with fewer seats (Bäck & Dumont, 2008; Warwick, 1996). 
Better insight into the mechanisms behind the Strength-is-Weakness effect 
might help to explain why it occurs or perhaps even what people can do to prevent it. 
Although previous research has uncovered several factors that moderate the extent to 
which a Strength-is-Weakness effect occurs (e.g., Messe, Vallacher, & Phillips, 1974; 
van Beest et al., 2004b), to our knowledge no research has directly investigated the 
underlying mechanisms behind the Strength-is-Weakness effect. The presented 
research is a first step in uncovering the underlying causes of the Strength-is-
Weakness effect by pitting two possible reasons for the effect against each other: a 
passive adoption of focal self-serving allocation rules or an active choice of these 
allocation rules in an attempt to maximize payoffs. To be able to better explain these 
two accounts, we will first describe the experimental situations in which the Strength-
is-Weakness effect has typically been studied. 
 
Prior findings on the Strength-is-Weakness effect 
Coalition bargaining and outcomes—such as the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect—are often studied using coalition games such as modified pachisi games 
(Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957), political convention games (Gamson, 1961b), and 
landowner games (van Beest et al., 2003). Although differing in context, these games 
share the same structure. Multiple bargainers individually do not have enough 
resources to attain an outcome alone hence, a subset of bargainers need to form a 
coalition to attain the payoffs together.17 To do so, bargainers need to negotiate on 
how they will distribute the payoffs among the members of the coalition.  
A typical game in which the Strength-is-Weakness effect has been studied is 
the 4(3-2-2) game. In this game, three bargainers—A with 3 resources, B with 2 
resources, and C with 2 resources—attempt to form a coalition with at least 4 
combined resources by bargaining about the distribution of 100 points or dollars. 
Despite the structural equivalence of all three bargaining positions, bargainers with 
more resources—henceforth referred to as strong bargainers—are less often included 
than weak bargainers—those with fewer resources (Chaney & Vinacke, 1960; 
Gamson, 1964; Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Murnighan, 1978b; van Beest et al., 2011, 
                                                                    
17 In the modified pachisi game, the bargainer with most resources can attain the payoffs alone. In the 
classic demonstration of the Strength-is-Weakness effect, this, however, only happened in two out of 180 




2004b; Vinacke, 1959; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957).18 In the classic demonstration of the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect, the strong bargainer A was included in only 28% of the 
cases, versus weak bargainer’s inclusion rates of 86% and 84% (Vinacke & Arkoff, 
1957). 
 
What causes the Strength-is-Weakness effect? 
A likely cause of the Strength-of-Weakness effect is provided by bargaining 
theory (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973). This theory postulates that coalition bargainers 
strive to maximize their payoffs by applying self-serving allocation rules when 
bargaining for their share of the payoffs. For strong bargainers this is the equity norm, 
in which all coalition members get a share of the payoffs that is proportional to their 
resources. For weak bargainers this is the equal allocation rule, in which every 
coalition member gets an equal share of the payoffs. Although both rooted in 
conceptions of fairness, these rules are used self-servingly; one that provides higher 
payoffs is preferred over one that provides lower payoffs. In the 4(3-2-2) game with 
divisible payoffs of $100 this means that strong bargainers with 3 resources, having 
60% of the resources in a coalition with one weak bargainer with 2 resources, use a 
60-40 allocation (i.e., $60 for themselves, $40 for the other) as a reference point, 
whereas weak bargainers use a 50-50 split as a reference point, regardless of the 
coalition they attempt to form. Even though bargaining theory does not claim that 
every bargainer strictly applies these rules, these differences in reference points are 
assumed to steer offers closer to proportionality for strong bargainers and closer to 
equality for weak bargainers. In situations in which more resources convey neither a 
power difference nor an increase in the coalition’s payoff, it is clear that weak 
bargainers would rather form a small coalition and obtain an equal share of the payoff 
than forming a larger coalition in which the other coalition member demands a larger 
share. 
Although bargaining theory predicts that, over multiple negotiations, strong 
bargainers’ offers are increased in an attempt to attract weak bargainers (Komorita & 
Chertkoff, 1973), the theory is silent on why—when having more resources does not 
equal having more bargaining opportunities—strong bargainers do not make equal 
offers to begin with. The current research pits two possibilities against each other.  
The first possibility is that bargainers attempt to make an offer that is deemed 
fair by the other bargainer but passively adopt the allocation rule that is most salient 
to them. Strong bargainers thus might myopically focus on equity and simply fail to 
consider different allocation rules. Strong bargainers could thus fail to realize that 
their proportional offers are perceived as unfair and would change their behavior if 
the situation would enable them to look beyond the focal allocation rule provided by 
                                                                    
18 Remember that the terms strong and weak refer to the amount of bargainers hold, not to their bargaining 
power. In all our studies, the pivotal power (see Shapley & Shubick, 1954b) bargainers hold is equal. 




their bargaining position. This idea is consistent with literature on egocentric 
interpretations of fairness, which suggest that—due to biased information 
processing—individuals often adopt notions of fairness that benefit themselves 
(Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997; DeScioli, Massenkoff, Shaw, Petersen, & Kurzban, 
2014; Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer, & Babcock, 1993; Loewenstein & Moore, 
2004; Messick & Sentis, 1979).  
A second possibility is that strong bargainers do take multiple allocation rules 
into account, but that they actively select an allocation rule that would maximize their 
payoff if their offer would be accepted. This active selection of allocation rules is 
implied by Komorita and Chertkoff (1973) in their formulation of bargaining theory. 
They state that the extent to which bargainers use or deviate from their self-serving 
allocation rule should vary in response to less or more pressure to reach an 
agreement. In other words, coalition bargainers actively change their allocation rules 
depending on how profitable they think the making that offer will be. Extrapolating 
this notion to situations in which we find a Strength-is-Weakness effect, it could be 
that strong bargainers in coalition formation do not passively adopt the most salient 
allocation rule they are myopically focused on, but actively select proportionality over 
equality, hoping that it will be accepted by their lower-resource counterparts and 
subsequently increase their payoffs. If this is the case, they might simply overestimate 
the likelihood that weak bargainers will accept their offer. 
Following this line of reasoning, introducing an intervention that minimizes 
the opportunity for a passive adoption of a salient equity norm addresses the question 
why strong bargainers’ make self-serving offers that supposedly lead to the Strength-
is-Weakness effect. If strong bargainers start from either a position in which no 
specific allocation rule is particularly salient, or a situation in which another allocation 
rule (i.e., equality) is more salient, but still make lower offers than weak bargainers, 
this provides evidence for the idea that strong bargainers are aware of multiple 
allocation rules and actively select the equity norm in an attempt to maximize their 
payoffs. However, if in these situations, strong bargainers temper their demands to 
match those of weak bargainers, this provides evidence for the idea that, usually, 
strong bargainers passively adopt the salient equity norm, but change their behavior 
once this passive adoption is made difficult. 
 
Overview of studies 
The presented studies minimize the opportunity of a passive adoption of 
equity deviating from previous research in which participants are assigned to a 
bargaining position. In Studies 3.1 and 3.4 we did this by not assigning participants at 
all so that they could read and process the instructions from a viewpoint that was 
unbiased by a salient allocation rule, after which participants selected their bargaining 




Camerer, & Babcock (1993) has been shown to decrease biased information 
processing and subsequent self-defeating bargaining behavior. In their simulated 
settlement of a tort case, participants who were assigned a role of plaintiff or 
defendant after reading the case files showed less biased information retrieval, a less 
biased estimate of what a judge would award, and less bargaining impasse, than 
participants who read the case file whilst knowing their role in the upcoming 
negotiation. In Study 3.2 we took this intervention even further by assigning 
participants to either a strong or weak position—to make a different allocation rule 
salient—and allowing them to switch to another bargaining position.  
If the use of self-serving allocation rules is usually driven by passive adoption 
of the equity norm, we expected that strong bargainers who first viewed the 
bargaining situation from a neutral or alternative perspective should make fewer self-
serving offers to match those of weak bargainers. After all, they have initially had 
either no salient or an alternative salient allocation rule. In contrast, if participants 
who select or switch to the strong position ask for a more proportional share, claiming 
a larger share than weak bargainers, this would imply that strong bargainers are 
aware of multiple allocation rules, but actively apply the one they think benefits them. 
Furthermore, the current setup also allows us to gauge participants’ 
preferences for specific bargaining positions. From previous research we know that 
those in strong positions are often worse off than those in weak positions are. 
However, to our knowledge, no previous research has investigated which bargaining 
positions individuals prefer and are thus likely to self-select into advantageous or 
disadvantageous bargaining positions. Moreover, if the majority of participants would 
self-select into strong positions, we would interpret this as additional evidence for the 
active selection account: participants would not only select a self-serving allocation 
rule but also select a bargaining position that allows them to maximize the outcome of 
this allocation rule. 
Additionally, the current research more directly investigates the assumption 
that self-serving offers from strong bargainers are a mechanism driving the Strength-
is-Weakness effect. Although bargaining theory (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973) suggests 
that the smallest coalition is most often formed because weak bargainers rather split 
the payoffs equally than to accept a proportional offer from strong bargainers, this 
assumption has not been directly tested. Therefore, in Study 3.3 we investigate 
whether strong bargainers are indeed predominantly excluded from coalitions 
because they make proportional offers or whether they are excluded regardless of 
whether their offers are self-serving or egalitarian. 
Finally, in Study 3.4, we tested the entire process in an interactive, 
incentivized coalition game. This allowed us to measure the aspects tested in Study 3.1 
to 3.3 (i.e., preference for position, use of allocation rules, and subsequent inclusion 




in—or exclusion from—coalitions) in a single study in which coalition bargaining has 
actual monetary consequences. 
In all our studies, we report how we determined our sample size, all 
manipulations and all dependent variables. A data package including (meta) data, 
analysis scripts, stimulus materials, and preregistrations is available here: 




Study 3.1 was the initial test of our research question whether strong 
bargainers passively adopt the equity norm or actively select it. We presented 
participants with a hypothetical 4(3-2-2) coalition bargaining scenario in which three 
bargainers—one strong bargainer with 3 resources and two weak bargainers with 
each 2 resources—bargained for inclusion in a two-party coalition and the subsequent 
allocation of €100. In order to provide an unbiased viewpoint from which information 
about the bargaining setting could be processed, similar to Loewenstein et al. (1993), 
participants attained a bargaining position only after they had read all instructions. 
They then selected one of the three bargaining positions and made a first offer one of 
their counterparts. 
If the Strength-is-Weakness effect is mainly driven by a passive adoption of 
the equity norm, starting from a neutral position—opposed to starting from an 
assigned position—should reduce proportional first offers. Consequently, there 
should be no difference in allocations between self-selected strong and weak 
bargainers. If, conversely, the Strength-is-Weakness effect is caused by an active 
selection of the equity norm, as in prior research, strong bargainers should allocate 
more to themselves than weak bargainers.  
Moreover, we reasoned that the selection of bargaining positions would 
provide additional insight. If the majority of participants would select the strong 
position—and make lower offers to other bargainers than weak bargainers do—this 
suggests that individuals actively select this position because it rationalizes allocating 
more to themselves. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. For this study, 204 Dutch psychology 
undergraduate students (Mage = 19.43 years, age range 17-26, 161 females, 43 males) 
were recruited in our laboratory. The study was embedded in an hour-long session for 
which participants received course credit. Using maximum lab time allowed per 
session, we collected data for two weeks. Sensitivity analyses conducted with 




to medium effect size (w = 0.22) when testing for a preference for bargaining 
positions, a small to medium effect size (d = 0.38) when testing for differences in 
allocations, and a medium to large effect size (w = 0.36) when testing for weak 
bargainers’ preferences for small or large coalitions—all with 80% power. 
Materials and procedure. 
Game structure. Participants read a scenario in which we asked them to 
imagine that they were one of three individuals—A with 3 votes, B with 2 votes, or C 
with 2 votes19—about to negotiate how to allocate €100. They also read that any 
coalition of two bargainers could secure the payoffs of €100 and that payoffs could 
only be allocated between members of the coalition. Next, they read that bargaining is 
done by sending offers to another bargainer regarding the allocation of the €100. If all 
opening offers were rejected, no coalition would be formed and a new bargaining 
round would start by making new offers. 
Comprehension check. Next, participants completed a multiple choice quiz 
(correct answers in italics) asking 1) which coalitions could be formed (AB, AC, and BC 
/ AB, AC, BC, and ABC), 2) the minimum number of votes necessary to secure and 
allocate the sum of money (2 votes or more / 3 votes or more / 4 votes or more), and 
3) the amount of money to be allocated (€40 / €50 / €100). Participants received 
feedback on whether they had answered all questions correctly or whether they had 
made at least one mistake and, in both situations, received the correct answers. 
Choice of bargaining position. Next, participants selected the bargaining 
position they wanted occupy. To ensure participants had an overview of the situation, 
they saw a table containing everyone’s number of votes, possible coalition partners, 
and possible coalitions. 
Opening offer. Finally, participants indicated: 1) to which other bargainer 
they wanted to make an opening offer, and 2) their proposed allocation (out of the 




Comprehension check. Nine out of 204 participants gave at least one wrong 
answer. Having made errors was unrelated to choice of bargaining position, 2(2, N = 
204) = 2.30, p = .32, w = 0.11, nor did statistical interpretation of all subsequent 
analyses differ when excluding those who had made errors. For the sake of 
completeness, analyses were conducted on the full sample. 
Choice of bargaining position. A total of 144 (70.5%) participants preferred 
position A, the strong position with 3 votes, 26 (12.7%) preferred position B, and 34 
                                                                    
19 In the instructions, these positions were referred to as position M, K, and P. For simplicity, the letters A, B, 
and C will be used throughout this chapter. 




(16.7%) preferred position C; the weak positions with 2 votes each. A Chi-square 
goodness of fit test shows that these proportions differed significantly from 0.33, the 
expected proportion when participants would be indifferent to each position and 
would have chosen one randomly, 2(2, N = 204) = 127.88, p < .001, w = 0.79. See 
Table 3.1 for chosen positions, coalition partners selected to make the first offer to, 
and the proposed allocations.   
 
Table 3.1. 
Chosen positions, proposed coalitions and average proposed allocations in Study 3.1. 
   Proposed   Mean proposed allocation 
Position n % Coalition n % MA MB MC SD 
A (3 votes) 144 70.6% AB 67 46.5% 59.34 40.66 - 10.32 
   AC 77 53.5% 57.27 - 42.73 8.05 
B (2 votes) 26 12.7% AB 0 0% - - - - 
   BC 26 100% - 50.00 50.00 4.90 
C (2 votes) 34 16.7% AC 4 11.8% 49.00 - 51.00 6.38 
   BC 30 88.2% - 48.83 51.17 5.68 
 
Allocation of payoffs. Strong bargainers (M = 58.24, SD = 9.20) allocated 
more money to themselves than weak bargainers did (M = 50.65, SD = 5.33), t(181.26) 
= 7.36, p < .001, d = 1.13. Moreover, we can visually compare the distributions of 
allocations by strong and weak bargainers by looking at the width of the violin plots in 
Figure 3.1 (the width indicates the probability density of the distribution, i.e. the 
predicted distribution in the population). As can be seen, weak bargainer’s allocations 
are relatively straightforward: they display a preference for the 50-50 allocation. 
Strong bargainers showed more variation in their offer. Two common strategies stand 





Figure 3.1. Violin plot of allocation to self by different bargaining positions in Study 3.1 
with means (dot), CI95 (line), and probability density (width). 
 
Choice of bargaining partner. A large majority of the weak bargainers made 
an offer to the other weak bargainer: 56 out of 60 weak bargainers made an offer to 









The results of Study 3.1 suggest that the Strength-is-Weakness effect is driven 
by active selection of the equity norm rather than a passive adoption of the most 
salient allocation rule. Despite starting from a neutral position—which minimized the 
salience of particular allocation rules—strong bargainers allocated more money to 
themselves than weak bargainers did. More support for this active selection account 
comes from the finding that the strong position is preferred over weak positions. 
Individuals seem to choose a bargaining position strategically because they think it 
will somehow benefit them. 
Additionally, the results from Study 3.1 suggest an additional pathway to the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect. The vast majority of weak bargainers make their first 
offer to the other weak bargainer. This suggests that, aside from strong bargainers 
who might be excluded due to their unattractive offers, some of them might be 
excluded from the outset due to the initial attraction between weak bargainers. 
Finally, an interesting finding is that, even though strong bargainers allocated 
more to themselves on average, a substantial number made an equal rather than a 
proportional offer. We will address this finding in Study 3.3. 
 
Study 3.2 
In Study 3.2, we tested the robustness of our findings. Instead of placing 
participants in a neutral position, as we did in Study 3.1, we assigned participants to a 
strong or weak position, but then allowed them to switch to a different position prior 
to making their opening offer. This eliminated an alternative explanation for our 
findings from Study 3.1. Although participants in Study 3.1 had a neutral position 
before choosing a bargaining position, a possibility is that those who coveted the 
strong positon immediately imagined themselves in that position. Consequently, those 
choosing a strong position might have already passively adopted the equity norm 
from their imagined bargaining position. In Study 3.2, we eliminated this possibility by 
assigning participants to the weak position. Following the assumptions of bargaining 
theory (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973), participants assigned to a weak position should 
be more likely to adopt an equal allocation rule as a reference point for subsequent 
bargaining.  
Our intervention in Study 3.2 thus provided a stricter test of our research 
question. If participants initially assigned to a weak position would choose to switch 
to a strong position and make a proportional offer—despite the initial salience of the 
equal allocation rule the weak position elicited—this would be additional support for 
the idea that strong bargainers’ self-serving offers are actively selected in an attempt 
to maximize payoffs. If, on the other hand, strong bargainers’ self-serving offers are 




initially weak bargainers who decide to switch positions would use equality rather 
than equity, as initially equality would be the salient allocation rule.  
Finally, as in Study 3.1, we interpreted switching from a weak to a strong 
position as indicative of the active selection account. If those assigned to a weak 
position switch to a strong position more often than those from a strong position 
switch to a weak position—and make lower offers than those who remain in the weak 
position—this suggests that they switch to this position because it rationalizes more 
demanding first offers. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. For this study, 452 US based respondents (Mage = 
34.8 years, age range 18-69, 183 females, 266 males, 3 other) were recruited via 
Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange for $1. Based on a pilot study (see Appendix A) 
we expected that only a few participants would switch from a strong to a weak 
position. Hence, we determined our sample size so that there would be enough 
participants in the remaining three cells (Switch to Strong, Stay Weak, and Stay 
Strong) to detect a d = 0.4 between conditions using Tukey HSD. According to Brooks 
& Johanson (2011), this required cell sizes of n = 127. Based on the pilot study we 
expected that about 50% of participants who were assigned to a weak position would 
switch to a strong position. To account for fluctuations in switching behavior and 
participant dropout, we set up Qualtrics to assign 2/3 of participants to a weak 
position (2 votes) and 1/3 to a strong position (3 votes).  
Materials and procedure. 
Game structure and assigned position. As in Study 3.1, participants 
imagined that they were one of three individuals—A with 3 votes, B with 2 votes, or C 
with 2 votes20—about to negotiate how to allocate $100. In the Weak Assigned 
condition (n = 307), individuals learned that they were C and had 2 votes. In the 
Strong Assigned condition (n = 145) individuals learned that they were A and had 3 
votes. They received the same instructions relating to the game’s structure as in Study 
3.1. Next, participants saw a table displaying each individual’s amount of votes, their 
possible coalition partners, and their possible coalitions. To prompt participants to 
reflect on the bargaining situation from the perspective of the assigned position, they 
could only continue to the following screen after 30 seconds. 
Comprehension check. Individuals answered the same questions as in Study 
3.1, as well as two additional questions asking how many votes they had themselves 
(2 / 3 / 4) and how many votes the other two individuals had (both hold 2 votes / one 
                                                                    
20 In the stimulus materials, we referred to positions M, K, and P, instead of A, B, and C. For standardization, 
in Study 2, participants were always assigned to position M. In the Weak Assigned condition, M had 2 votes, 
K had 2 votes and P had 3 votes. In the Strong Assigned condition, M had 3 votes and K and P both 2 votes. 




holds 2 and one holds 3 votes / both hold 3 votes). Again, after completion, 
participants received feedback and the correct answers. 
Choice of bargaining position. Next, participants chose either to retain their 
assigned position or to switch to one of the other two positions. Whilst making this 
decision, participants saw the same table as before the quiz.  
Opening offer. Finally, participants indicated: 1) to which other bargainer 
they wanted to make an opening offer, and 2) their proposed allocation of the €100. 
 
Results 
Switching. A total of 158 of 307 (51%) initially weak participants switched to 
a strong position, versus 16 of 145 (11%) initially strong participants who switched to 
a weak position. A Chi-square test of independence shows that this difference is 
statistically significant, 2(1, N = 452) = 68.00, p < .001, w = 0.39. This, again, shows a 
clear preference for strong over weak positions. Because of the low number of 
participants switching from a strong to a weak position, the remaining analyses were 
conducted on the remaining three conditions: Stay Weak (n = 149),21 Switch to Strong 
(n = 158), and Stay Strong (n = 129). See Table 3.2 for chosen positions, preferred 

















                                                                    
21 The Stay Weak condition includes 11 participants who were assigned to a low-resource position (position 
C) but switched to another low-resource position (position B). Note that excluding these participants would 
not have changed the interpretations of the reported results. Anecdotally, an explanation given by a 
participant when given the option to provide a remark seems to suggest that switches were made out of 
aesthetic reasons: the participant wanted to stay in a weak position but changed to a position that was 





Chosen positions, proposed coalitions and proposed allocations in Study 3.2, split by 
assigned position. 
Assigned  Final   Proposed   Mean proposed allocation 
Position Position n % Coalition n % MA MB MC SD 
Strong A 129 89% AB 67 52% 52.91 47.09 - 11.71 
(n = 145) (3 votes)   AC 62 48% 53.63 - 46.37 11.29 
 B  8 5.5% AB 4 50% 45.25 54.75 - 10.18 
 (2 votes)   BC 4 50% - 41.25 58.75 11.81 
 C  8 5.5% AC 4 50% 59.40 - 40.50 19.00 
 (2 votes)   BC 4 50% - 53.75 46.25 4.79 
Weak A  158 51% AB 69 44% 54.09 45.91 - 11.27 
(n = 307) (3 votes)   AC 89 56% 57.37 - 42.63 13.36 
 B  11 4% AB 6 55% 45.00 55.00 - 13.78 
 (2 votes)   BC 5 45% - 54.00 46.00 5.48 
 C  138 45% AC 38 28% 51.05 - 48.95 8.55 
 (2 votes)   BC 100 72% - 51.73 48.27 5.75 
 
Comprehension check. Out of 436 participants, 101 gave at least one wrong 
answer. Although this looks like a high number, only 9.6% made more than one error 
and all participants received feedback on what the correct answers were. Having 
made errors was unrelated to being in one of the three remaining conditions, 2(2, N = 
436) = 3.25, p = .20, w = 0.09, nor did statistical interpretation of all subsequent 
analyses differ when excluding those who had made errors. For the sake of 
completeness, analyses were conducted on the full sample 
Allocation of payoffs. A one-way ANOVA comparing mean proposed 
allocations to oneself between the three conditions revealed a main effect of condition, 
F(2,433) = 16.95, p < .001, η2p = .07. Tukey HSD tests showed that those who switched 
from a weak to a strong position (M = 55.94, SD = 12.56) allocated more to themselves 
than those who stayed in a weak position (M = 48.91, SD = 7.09), p < .001, d = 0.68, and 
also allocated more to themselves than those who stayed strong (M = 53.26, SD = 
11.47), albeit non-significantly, p = .09, d = 0.22. Finally, those who stayed strong 
allocated more to themselves than those who stayed weak, p = .002, d = 0.46.See 
Figure 3.2 for a violin plot showing the means, confidence intervals and distributions 
of allocation to oneself in each of the three conditions.  
 





Figure 3.2. Violin plot of allocation to self by three cells in Study 3.2 with means (dot), 
CI95 (line), and probability density (width). 
 
Choice of bargaining partner. Similar to Study 3.1, the majority of those 
switching to a weak position made an offer to the other weak bargainer: specifically, 
105 out of 149 weak bargainers made an offer to the other weak bargainer, 2(1, N = 







Study 3.2 provided additional support for the idea that proportional offers 
made by strong bargainers are due to selfish selection of the equity norm rather than 
a failed attempt to make a fair offer by passively adopting the equity norm. First, those 
switching from a weak to a strong position asked for a higher share of the payoffs than 
those staying in a weak position. Even though the equal allocation rule should initially 
be equally salient in both abovementioned groups, this salience did not impede the 
now strong bargainers to ask for a higher share of the payoffs than those staying in the 
weak position. This implies that the strong bargainers’ tendency to propose self-
serving offers is unlikely to be caused by a passive selection of equity, but more likely 
a selfish selection of the seemingly most beneficial allocation rule. 
Second, about half of the initially weak bargainers switched to a strong 
position, substantially more than the 11% of strong bargainers who switched to a 
weak position. This strengthens the notion of an active selection account, in which 
individuals seem drawn to positions from which they can rationalize a large claim on 
the payoffs of the coalition. 
 
Study 3.3 
In Study 3.3, we investigated our assumption that the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect mainly exists due to strong bargainers’ use of equity and weak bargainers’ 
rejection of these offers. In Study 3.1 and 3.2 we found that strong bargainers make 
more equal offers than expected on the basis of bargaining theory (Komorita & 
Chertkoff, 1973). In Study 3.1, 35% of strong bargainers made equal offers. In Study 
3.2, 52% of participants who stayed strong and 59% of those who switched to a strong 
position made an equal offer. In Study 3.3, we investigated if strong bargainers are 
included more often when they make equal offers rather than the proportional offers. 
Is ‘strength’ only a weakness when one behaves as a dominant coalition partner (i.e., 
makes a proportional offer), or is ‘strength’ even a weakness when one behaves as an 
attractive coalition partner (i.e., makes an equal offer)? As weak bargainers and strong 
bargainers both compete for inclusion in a coalition—and weak bargainers often 
propose an equal allocation—the critical test is as follows: if both strong and weak 
bargainers use an equal allocation rule, which offer is most likely to be accepted?  
On the one hand, there is reason to believe that the offer from the weak 
bargainer will be accepted more often. Previous literature shows that individuals are 
more positive and cooperative towards similar others, even when this similarity is 
superficial (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As the two weak bargainers are more similar to 
each other than to the strong bargainer, this might make the weak bargainers more 
likely to form a coalition. On the other hand, it is possible that the strong bargainer’s 
offer will be preferred. The observed avoidance of strong bargainers by weak 
bargainers suggests that they are expected make less attractive offers than weak 




bargainers. If, counter to this expectation, strong bargainers ask much less than 
expected, this could signal generosity. This resonates with attribution theory (Jones & 
Davis, 1965); actions seemingly made out of a selection of several options and that 
seem out-of-role (e.g., an egalitarian offer from a strong bargainer) are seen as more 
reflective of individuals’ dispositions than actions that seem to be less freely chosen 
and more in-role (e.g., an egalitarian offer from a weak bargainer).  
In Study 3.3, we assigned individuals to a position with 2 votes in the same 
coalition scenario used in Studies 1 and 2. In the Strong Equal Offer condition 
participants learned that both the strong (with 3 votes) and weak (with 2 votes) 
bargainer proposed to keep $50 and give $50 to the participant. In the Strong 
Proportional Offer condition participants learned that the strong bargainer proposed 
to keep $60 and give $40 to the other participant, and that the other weak bargainer 
offered an equal split. Participants then indicated which offer they would accept, 
enabling us to use the acceptance rates of offers as an indicator of which offers by 
which bargainers are most successful in the formation of coalitions. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. For this study, 402 US based respondents (Mage = 
35.13 years, age range 19-70, 173 females, 228 males, 1 other) were recruited via 
Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange for $0.60. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of two conditions: the Strong Equal Offer condition, in which both bargaining 
partners made the same (equal) offer, and the Strong Proportional Offer condition, in 
which the strong bargaining partner made a proportional offer and the weak 
bargaining partner made an equal offer. According to a power analysis conducted in 
G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) we needed 200 participants to detect of a small to medium 
effect (w = 0.2) with 80% power in the Strong Equal Offer condition. To create equal 
cell sizes we aimed for a total of 400 participants.  
Materials and procedure. Participants imagined being C, a bargainer with 2 
votes, negotiating how to allocate $100 with A (3 votes) and B (2 votes). In both 
conditions, participants received offers from bargainers A and B. In the Strong Equal 
Offer condition (n = 200), both bargaining partners made them a 50-50 offer. In the 
Strong Proportional Offer condition (n = 202), the weak bargainer made them a 50-50 
offer and the strong bargainer made them a 60-40 offer. Participants then selected the 
offer they wanted to accept. Finally, to explore whether perceived generosity or 
similarity indeed steered participants’ choices, we asked them to explain their choice 









Selected offer. A chi-square test of independence indicated that there was a 
statistically significant difference in selected offers between conditions, 2(1, N = 402) 
= 120.79, p < .001, w = 0.55. When the strong bargainer made a 60-40 offer, a large 
majority selected the weak bargainer’s offer: only 13.5% accepted the strong 
bargainer’s offer. Conversely, when both strong and weak bargainers made a 50-50 
offer, this preference flipped: 67.3% now accepted the strong bargainers’ offer. 
Reasons for selected offer. The reasons participants gave for selecting the 
offer were coded by the first author. Of interest to us was whether choices in the 
Strong Equal Offer condition were guided by perceived generosity or similarity. 
Results showed that 5 (3.6%) participants accepted the strong bargainer’s offer 
because they perceived it to be generous. Of those choosing the weak bargainer’s 
offer, 14 (21.2%) indicated choosing it due to the perceived similarity between the 
other weak bargainer and themselves. The largest response category, however, was 




First, it becomes clear from Study 3.3 that having many resources and making 
proportional demands clearly yields worse outcomes than having fewer resources and 
proposing an equal split: 50-50 offers from weak bargainers were accepted much 
more often than 60-40 offers from a strong bargainer. This supports the idea that 
when strong bargainers make proportional offers, this leads to a Strength-is-
Weakness effect. 
Second, a comparison between the acceptance rates of strong and weak 
bargainers who both propose an equal split reveals that strong bargainers who make 
this offer actually become more attractive than the weak bargainers making the same 
offer; 50-50 offers from a strong bargainer were twice as likely to be accepted than 
weak bargainers’ 50-50 offers. The reasons given by participants why they accepted 
this offer did not provide a clear-cut reason for this attraction. Nevertheless, we 
speculate that strong bargainers are generally avoided because they are expected to 
use the equity norm. When, counter to these expectations, strong bargainers make 
more egalitarian offers, this general avoidance seems not only to dissipate but 
replaced by a preference for the strong bargainer. This resonates with attribution 
theory, which postulates that out-of-role behavior is seen as more reflective of one’s 
disposition than in-role behavior (Jones & Davis, 1965). It is thus possible that the 
unexpected strong bargainers’ egalitarian offers are perceived as reflective of their 
generous nature, whereas the expected egalitarian offers from weak bargainers are 
simply attributated to them following a salient allocation rule. Moreover, given that 




the answers to our open question reveal that individuals to a certain extent seem to 
value a larger coalition, it could be that they actually prefer the idea of a larger 




In Studies 3.1 to 3.3 we found that a) individuals preferred strong positions, 
b) strong bargainers often made less attractive offers than weak bargainers—even 
when no allocation rule was especially salient or equality was more salient, in line 
with the idea that proportionality is actively selected and not passively adopted—and 
c) these offers were often rejected. In Study 3.4, we conducted an incentivized, 
interactive experiment programmed in oTree (Chen et al., 2016, see also Chapter 5 of 
this dissertation) to test the entire process. Participants were matched in groups of 
three bargainers, one participant chose a bargaining position out of one strong 
position (3 resources) and two weak positions (2 resources), the other two were 
assigned the two remaining positions, and the three participants bargained for a real 
monetary bonus. This allowed us to test whether—when there are actual stakes—
participants starting from a neutral position still use the strong position to make a 
proportional offer (or at least a less attractive offer than the weak bargainer), which 
subsequently leads to their exclusion. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. For this study, 150 US based respondents (Mage = 
34.97, age range 21-99, 59 females, 90 males, 1 other) were recruited via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk in exchange for a base fee of $2.40. Participants were randomly 
matched into triads and one participant was randomly selected to select a strong (3 
resources) or weak (2 resources) position, the other two participants were randomly 
assigned to the remaining two positions. According to power analysis conducted in 
G*Power (Faul et al., 2007), we needed 40 observations to find the d = 1.01 we found 
in Study 3.1—assuming a similar distribution of selected positions—for the allocation 
to self between strong and weak bargainers. To account for fluctuations we decided to 
sample 50 triads meaning 50 participants who have selected a position and made an 
offer from this self-selected position. 
Materials and procedure. 
Game structure. In Study 3.4, participants participated in an interactive 
landowner game (van Beest et al., 2003) programmed in oTree (Chen et al., 2016). 
Structurally, this game was similar to the hypothetical settings from Studies 3.1 to 3.3. 
The difference is that participants take the role of a landowner who has a parcel of 




wants to buy a minimum of 4 acres of land for $100,000 and landowners need to form 
a coalition to sell their parcels of land together. For each $1,000 obtained in the game, 
participants received a real bonus of $0.05, meaning a $5 bonus was distributed 
among the coalition members. 
Comprehension check. Participants completed a multiple choice quiz 
(correct answers in italics) about: 1) the price offered for at least 4 acres of land 
(Always $100,000/This depended on the parcel of land sold), 2) the payoffs for the 
excluded landowner (This depends on which offer is accepted/This landowner does 
not receive any money), and 3) the permitted coalitions (AB and AC/AB and BC/AC and 
BC/AB, AC, and BC). They could only continue after having given the correct answers. 
Choice of bargaining position. Next, participants were randomly grouped 
into triads. In each triad, one participant selected one of the three positions: A (with 3 
acres of land), B (with 2 acres of land), or C (with 2 acres of land). The other two 
participants were randomly assigned to the two remaining positions. Participants who 
could not be grouped within 5 minutes (n = 72) could not continue and received their 
base fee. 
Bargaining. Participants bargained in one or multiple rounds, which existed 
of three phases. In phase I, every landowner made an offer to one of the other 
landowners on how to allocate the $100,000 between the two of them (in increments 
of $1,000). In phase II, all landowners saw all offers made by themselves and the other 
two landowners, and selected the offer they wanted to execute. In phase III, all 
landowners saw which offers were selected. If two landowners selected the same 
offer, the proposed coalition was formed and the $1,000 was allocated as agreed upon. 
If no offer were selected twice, a new round of bargaining would begin. This continued 
until a coalition was formed. 
 
Results 
Comprehension check. Out of 150 participants, 21 participants gave at least 
one wrong answer. Of the 50 participants who could select their position, 11 
participants gave at least one wrong answer. Having made errors was unrelated to 
choice of bargaining position, 2(2, N = 50) = 1.54, p = .46, w = 0.18, nor did statistical 
interpretation of all subsequent analyses differ when excluding those who had made 
errors. For the sake of completeness, analyses were conducted on the full sample. 
Choice of bargaining position. Of the 50 participants who selected a 
bargaining position 26 (52%) selected position A (3 acres), 20 (40%) selected 
position B (2 acres), and 4 (8%) selected position C (2 acres). Although this was a 
significant departure from random selection, 2(2, N = 50) = 15.52, p < .001, w = 0.56, 
this significant difference disappeared after combining positions B and C, which are 
equivalent positions in terms of acres, 2(1, N = 50) = 0.08, p = .78, w = 0.04. Contrary 
to the previous studies, the strong position was thus not preferred above the weak 








Chosen positions, proposed coalitions and average proposed allocations in Study 3.4. 
   Proposed   Mean proposed allocation 
Position n % Coalition n % MA MB MC SD 
A (3 acres) 26 52% AB 21 80.8% 56.33 43.67 - 6.59 
   AC 5 19.2% 55.00 - 45.00 18.03 
B (2 acres) 20 40% AB 0 0% - - - - 
   BC 20 100% - 50.95 49.05 8.06 
C (2 acres) 4 8% AC 0 0% - - - - 
   BC 4 100% - 51.25 48.75 2.50 
 
Allocation of payoffs. As in previous studies, we were interested in 
differences in first offers between weak and strong bargainers. Moreover, having both 
self-selected and assigned participants in this sample allowed us to make a 
comparison between the two groups. If self-selected strong bargainers made higher 
offers than assigned strong bargainers did, this would be evidence for the passive 
adoption of salient allocation rules account, as it would indicate an increase in 
attractive offers when such a passive adoption is impossible. On the other hand, 
similar offers between the two groups would be evidence for the idea that strong 
bargainers actively select a proportional allocation rule, as their offers would be 
equally self-serving when a proportional allocation is salient and when it is not. 
A 2 (Position: Weak vs, Strong) by 2 (Means of attaining position: Assigned vs. 
Chosen) ANOVA revealed no significant interaction, F(1,146) = 0.36, p = 0.55, η2p < .01, 
nor a significant main effect of means of attaining position, F(1,146) = 2.46, p = 0.12, d 
= 0.42. Corroborating the previous studies, strong bargainers (M = 54.54, SD = 8.93) 
allocated more money to themselves in their first offers than weak bargainers (M = 
49.44, SD = 7.14), F(1,146) = 14.41, p < .001, d = 0.66. As can be seen in Figure 3.3, 
again, weak bargainers seemed to mainly focus on an equal distribution, whereas 





Figure 3.3. Violin plot of allocation to self by different bargaining positions in Study 3.4 
with means (dot), CI95 (line), and probability density (width). 
 
Choice of bargaining partner. Out of the 100 weak bargainers—both self-
selected and assigned—87 made a first offer to the other weak bargainer, 2(1, N = 
100) = 54.76, p < .001, w = 0.74. This again points out that strong bargainers are 
disadvantaged from the outset. 
Formed coalitions. Replicating the Strength-is-Weakness effect, a Chi-square 
goodness of fit test showed that BC-coalitions (n = 34; 68%) were formed more often 




than AC-coalitions (n = 4; 8%), and AB-coalitions (n = 12; 24%), 2(2, N = 50) = 28.96, 
p < .001, w = 0.76. To illustrate how these results support the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect: A was only included in 32% of all coalitions, whereas B and C were included in 
92% and 76% respectively. 
Payoff. Finally, the payoff between strong (M = 49.06, SD = 8.21) and weak (M 
= 50.18, SD = 5.51) coalition bargainers who were included in a coalition did not differ, 
t(17.66) = 0.52, p = .61, d = 0.14. In other words, in the limited cases that a strong 
bargainer did manage to be included, their ‘strength’ in resources did not lead to an 
increase in payoffs. See Table 3.4 for mean allocations per formed coalition. 
 
Table 3.4. 
Average payoffs in formed coalitions per coalition and position. 
Formed   Mean proposed allocation 
Coalition n % MA MB MC SD 
AB 12 24% 50.42 49.58 - 6.20 
AC 4 8% 45.00 - 55.00 12.10 
AB 34 68% - 48.82 51.18 4.62 
BC 12 24% 50.42 49.58 - 6.20 
AC 4 8% 45.00 - 55.00 12.10 
BC 34 68% - 48.82 51.18 4.62 
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 3.4 largely corroborated the results of Study 3.1 and 3.2. 
Strong bargainers again allocated more to themselves than weak bargainers, 
regardless of whether their position was chosen or assigned. Moreover, weak 
bargainers again more often approached weak bargainers than strong bargainers. 
Contrary to Study 3.1 and 3.2, strong and weak positions were preferred equally in 
Study 3.4. Many who chose the strong position, however, did not make an attractive 
offer to the weak bargainers. Together, this suggests that a substantial portion of our 
sample still actively selected a self-serving allocation rule, as self-selected strong 
bargainers made higher demands than weak bargainers—and similar demands to 
those assigned to a strong position—despite their neutral starting position without a 
single salient allocation rule. 
Taken together, the results from Study 3.4 strengthen the idea that strong 
bargainers are excluded both due to expected and actual self-interested bargaining. 
First, strong bargainers made lower first offers than weak bargainers did. Second, 22 
out of 50 strong bargainers made a first offer which was at least equally attractive as 
the offers made by weak bargainers, but only 16 strong bargainers ended up included. 




offers, whereas others are already excluded despite their—more generous—offers. On 
the one hand, this seems at odds with the results from Study 3.3, which suggested that 
strong bargainers who make equal offers are more attractive than weak bargainers 
who make the same offers. However, of all 100 weak bargainers, only 13 made a first 
offer to the strong bargainer, suggesting that weak bargainers’ initial attraction—




The Strength-is-Weakness effect in coalition formation is the observation that 
individuals who have most resources are often excluded (Caplow, 1956; Chaney & 
Vinacke, 1960; Gamson, 1964; Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Murnighan, 1978b; van 
Beest et al., 2011, 2004a; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957). The current studies have 
investigated a likely cause of this Strength-is-Weakness effect—the use of 
proportional allocation rules by strong bargainers—and the question why they use 
these allocation rules. In this chapter, we have proposed two possible reasons. A first 
possible reason is that bargainers passively adopt the allocation rule that is made 
most salient by their bargaining position, thereby overlooking allocation rules that are 
more likely to be accepted by their counterparts. A second possible reason is that 
strong bargainers do consider multiple allocation rules, but actively select an 
allocation rule that would maximize their payoffs if their offer were accepted. 
Overall, the results from our studies support the second explanation. In 
Studies 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4, we found that strong bargainers allocated a larger share of 
the payoffs to themselves than weak bargainers, and, especially in Study 3.1 and Study 
3.4, a substantial portion of strong bargainers used a proportional allocation rule. This 
pattern of results was obtained despite the fact that participants started from a 
neutral viewpoint from which no allocation rule should have been particularly salient 
(Study 3.1 and Study 3.4), and even when they started from a weak position in which 
the equal allocation rule should have been more salient (Study 3.2). This indicates that 
strong bargainers’ self-serving allocations are unlikely due to a passive adoption of the 
proportionality rule, as an equal allocation could be equally salient (Study 3.1 and 
Study 3.4) or even more salient (Study 3.2). On the contrary, it suggests that strong 
bargainers take into account multiple allocation rules and actively select the one they 
think would benefit them the most. 
Although beyond the scope of this chapter, an interesting question that 
remains is why strong bargainers think that making a proportional offer would benefit 
them. Why would they assume these offers would be accepted? One possibility is 
that—although we repeatedly told participants that any two-party coalition was 
possible—the strong position induced a feeling of power. In line with previous 
research (Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006), it might be 




that this illusory feeling of power inhibited taking the perspective of weak bargainers 
and a subsequent overestimation that they would accept these offers. Another 
possibility is that bargainers overestimated the probability that they can turn to the 
other bargainer—possibly with a more attractive offer—when their first offer is not 
accepted, and that this perceived alternative increased their initial offer (see Pinkley 
et al., 2019 on illusory alternatives).  
 
What causes the Strength-is-Weakness effect? 
Results from Study 3.3 support the idea that when strong bargainers make 
proportional offers, they are likely to be excluded from coalitions. Moreover, in 
Studies 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4, strong bargainers’ offers were clearly lower than those of 
weak bargainers were. A closer look at our results, however, cast doubt on the 
assumption that these lower offers are the sole mechanism underlying the Strength-
is-Weakness effect. Given that a) a sizable proportion of strong bargainers made equal 
offers, b) Study 3.3 suggest that these offers should be very conducive for forming 
coalitions, and c) more strong bargainers in Study 3.4 were excluded than expected 
solely based on their first offers, it seems that Strength-is-Weakness effect is not only 
driven by the use of proportional allocation rules.  
If self-serving allocations are not the sole cause of the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect, what could be an additional cause? Looking at weak bargainers’ inclination to 
make opening offers to other weak bargainers, it seems some strong bargainers are 
already disadvantaged before having had an opportunity to make a generous offer. 
This suggests that the Strength-is-Weakness is not only driven by actual self-serving 
offers from strong bargainers, but also by the offers that weak bargainers expect them 
to make. That is, before anyone has made an offer, weak bargainers might already 
form expectations about the kind of allocations others will favor. Given that people 
often expect others to mainly propagate their own self-interest (D. T. Miller, 1999), 
weak bargainers might expect others to make self-serving offers. This expectation is a 
likely reason for weak bargainers to seek out other weak bargainers with whom they 
expect to obtain an equal rather than a proportional share. Even when a strong 
bargainer, against expectations, turns out to make an attractive offer, weak bargainers 
may have a tendency to stick to the small coalition they aimed for rather than 
switching their attention to the strong bargainer. One reason might be that 
participants simply feel committed to carrying out the coalition offer they proposed 
themselves. Another explanation could be that moving away from a mutually 
proposed coalition might be perceived to be risky. Bargainers do not know if they 
might have the same option in subsequent bargaining rounds and sticking to their 
original choice—which is often reciprocated by the other strong bargainer—might be 






Besides providing insight in the Strength-is-Weakness effect, the current 
studies also provide general insights on the use of allocation rules in coalition 
formation. Different theories on coalition formation (for an overview, see Komorita, 
1984) aim to predict which coalitions will form and how payoffs are allocated on the 
basis of certain allocation rules. Both minimum resource theory and bargaining theory 
predict that strong bargainers use proportional allocation rules, thereby making 
higher demands than weak bargainers, who—depending on theory—should use 
either proportional or equal allocation rules (Gamson, 1961a; Komorita & Chertkoff, 
1973).  
Whereas we indeed found that weak bargainers predominantly use equal 
allocation rules and strong bargainers on average make higher demands than weak 
bargainers do, strong bargainers used both proportional and equal allocation rules. 
These findings presuppose more heterogeneity in the use of allocation rules at the 
initial stages of coalition bargaining than prior theories have assumed. Although 
beyond the scope of this chapter, an interesting question for future research is which 
individual differences predict whether a strong bargainer uses equality or 
proportionality. Are, for example, selections of allocation rules guided more by 
different concerns for others, such as SVO (van Lange, 1997), or by cognitive 




A possible limitation is that we used a one-shot situation in which the amount 
of resources one has is related to neither bargaining power nor the size of the payoffs. 
There is evidence that the Strength-is-Weakness effect might diminish after multiple 
bargaining trials (Kelley & Arrowood, 1960) and situations in which those with more 
resources bring more money to the table (Komorita et al., 1989). Our focus, however, 
was on understanding situations in which Strength-is-Weakness effects are observed, 
not on identifying situations in which Strength-is-Weakness effects occur. Moreover, 
studies conducted in the realm of governmental coalition formation—which are 
clearly iterative situations and in which a larger coalition could be beneficial in terms 
of stability—do show evidence for both the use of proportional allocation rules 
(Warwick & Druckman, 2006) and exclusion of larger parties (Bäck & Dumont, 2008; 
Warwick, 1996), suggesting this might not always inhibit a Strength-is-Weakness 
effect. 
Another possible limitation is that we relied only on the 4(3-2-2) game in 
which one bargainer has 3 resources and two others have 2 each. A possible 
disadvantage of using this game is that one could also argue that the strong bargainer 
not only has more resources but is also unique and that this could account for 




participants’ preferences for this position. To rule out this alternative explanation we 
ran a study (N = 76) in which participants selected a position in a 5(4-3-2) game, in 
which three bargainers had 4, 3, and 2 resources respectively (see Appendix A). Like 
the 4(3-2-2) game, in this game, resources and alternatives are not correlated and a 
Strength-is-Weakness effect has been previously observed (Chaney & Vinacke, 1960; 
Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Vinacke, 1959; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957). The crucial 
difference is that in this game all three positions are unique. Again, the majority (75%) 
of all participants chose the position with most resources, ruling out that our earlier 
findings are driven by a need for uniqueness rather than a preference for having most 
resources. Moreover, the finding that the two weak bargainers are now dissimilar in 
votes but still make offers mostly to each other (74%) strengthens the idea that 
attraction between weak bargainers is due to expected bargaining behavior, rather 
than due to similarity. 
 
Conclusion 
The four studies presented here suggest that one presumed driving force 
behind the Strength-is-Weakness effect—the use of self-serving allocation rules by 
strong bargainers—persists in situations in which a passive adoption of this allocation 
rule cannot explain the effect. This suggests that strong bargainers actively select the 
proportional allocation rule in an attempt to maximize their payoffs. Furthermore, the 
studies cast doubt on whether the use of self-serving allocation rules is the main cause 
of the Strength-is-Weakness effect. First, we see that many weak bargainers make first 
offers to each other. Second, many strong bargainers apply equal allocation rules 
which—whilst making them more attractive—does not seem to dampen the Strength-
is-Weakness effect. A likely second mechanism behind the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect is thus that weak bargainers expect strong bargainers to bargain self-servingly, 
leading to an initial attraction between weak bargainers. Together, these results 
suggest that strong bargainers who use their ‘strength’ in resources as basis to claim a 
higher share of the payoffs—or those who are expected to do so—are very likely to 











Chapter 4  
 
On when having many resources leads to 
exclusion from coalitions:  
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A key observation in coalition formation is that bargainers with many 
resources—strong bargainers—are often excluded from coalitions: the Strength-is-
Weakness effect. Previous literature shows this is driven by (anticipated) high 
demands from strong bargainers, who (are expected to) claim an equitable share of 
the payoff, making them less attractive as coalition partners. We argue that the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect is contingent on whether resources are perceived to be 
relevant input (i.e., whether they are perceived to be a legitimate basis to calculate an 
equitable payoff). In two coalition bargaining experiments we increase input 
relevance by making participants earn resources (Study 4.1) and explicitly linking 
resources and payoffs (Study 4.2). We found evidence that input relevance increases 
attempts to include strong bargainers, but mixed evidence on whether this 
materializes into actual inclusion. Possibly, bargainers’ persistent self-serving 
perceptions of input relevance lead to disagreements between weak and strong 
bargainers, preventing strong bargainers from being included




In many situations, individuals or groups lack the resources to attain an 
outcome by themselves. In these situations, they need to pool their resources; they 
need to form a coalition. Gamson (1964, p. 85) defines a coalition as “the joint use of 
resources to determine the outcome of a decision in a mixed-motive situation 
involving more than two units.” For example, in multi-party government systems, 
individual political parties generally lack the seats to form a government and need to 
form a coalitional government combining their seats. Another example is companies 
engaging in joint ventures in order to increase their potential or market share. 
Two key questions in coalition formation research are which coalitions are 
formed and how the payoffs a coalition yields are allocated. According to classical 
coalition formation theories such as minimal resource theory (Gamson, 1961a, 1964) 
and bargaining theory (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973), the most important predictor is 
how many resources an individual or party has. Assuming that individuals apply 
equity norms and uphold the belief that “…a person ought to get from an agreement 
an amount proportional to what he brings into it” (Gamson, 1964, p. 88), these 
theories predict that individuals aim to form a coalition with as few resources as 
possible. After all, if someone who brings many resources to a coalition is entitled to a 
high share of the payoffs, approaching a coalition partner with fewer resources might 
lead to better outcomes. The resulting exclusion of bargainers with many resources 
has been labeled the Strength-is-Weakness effect (Caplow, 1956; Chaney & Vinacke, 
1960; Gamson, 1964; Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Murnighan, 1978b; van Beest et al., 
2011, 2004a; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957).22 
A caveat of previous literature is that the Strength-is-Weakness effect has 
been found in studies in which resources have been randomly allocated to 
participants rather than acquired through effort, and in which there is no explicit 
relationship between the resources and payoffs. Following insights from 
accountability theory (Konow, 1996, 2000), and equity theory (Adams, 1965; Walster 
et al., 1973) and its related coalition formation theories (Gamson, 1961a; Komorita & 
Chertkoff, 1973), we reason that in these situations resources are unlikely to be a 
legitimate basis for an equitable allocation. Hence, bargainers with many resources 
might be excluded because they demand an equitable share, a claim that is seen as 
undeserved by their counterparts. In this chapter, we investigate whether bargainers 
with many resources are included more often when exerted effort determines the 
amount of resources they hold (Study 4.1) and when there is an explicit link between 
the amount of resources participants hold and the share of the payoffs they are 
responsible for (Study 4.2). In these situations, coalition bargainers might—besides 
                                                                    
22 Note that we focus on simple situations in which payoffs do not vary between coalitions. See Komorita 




having economic motives to avoid those with many resources—feel that those with 
many resources deserve an equitable payoff and thereby inclusion in the coalition. 
 
The Strength-is-Weakness effect 
The notion that coalition bargainers apply equity norms and that this can be 
detrimental to larger parties has been corroborated by several field-studies looking at 
governmental coalition formation in Western European democracies (Bäck & Dumont, 
2008; Warwick & Druckman, 2006; Warwick, 1996). Most direct evidence, however, 
comes from lab studies utilizing simple weighted majority games (Komorita, 1984). In 
these simple weighted majority games, participants receive an amount of resources 
that is insufficient to obtain a monetary payoff alone. Participants can pool their 
resources in a coalition to obtain the payoffs together, but need to reach a consensus 
on how to allocate this payoff between themselves. For example, in a 5(4-3-2) simple 
weighted majority game, three participants receive 4, 3 and 2 resources respectively, 
and need to form a coalition with at least 5 resources. In this situation, participants 
with 4 resources have as many bargaining alternatives as the other two (namely two) 
and including them does not convey any advantage to their partners. On the contrary, 
following the earlier mentioned equity norms, they (are expected to) claim a larger 
share of the payoffs than the other bargainers. Consequently, the seemingly strong 
bargainers often end up being excluded from the formed coalition (Murnighan, 1978b; 
van Beest et al., 2011, 2004a; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957). 
 
Fairness and disagreement in coalition formation 
Besides economic motivations to maximize one’s payoffs, fairness 
motivations also play a large role in which coalitions are formed. Taking a social utility 
approach to coalition formation, Van Beest and colleagues (for a review, see van Beest 
& van Dijk, 2007) showed that coalition bargainers—besides valuing their own 
outcomes—derive utility adhering to fairness norms. We propose that, as part of this 
concern for fairness, coalition bargainers evaluate whether other bargainers deserve 
the share of the payoffs they claim. As participants with many resources—hereafter 
referred to as strong bargainers23—are expected to ask for a higher share due to the 
use of the equity norm (Gamson, 1961a, 1964), the pivotal question is whether those 
with few resources—hereafter referred to as weak bargainers—agree with the strong 
bargainers’ use of this equity norm. The observation that strong bargainers are often 
excluded from coalitions suggests that weak bargainers often disagree. 
                                                                    
23 Remember that the terms strong and weak bargainers are misnomers, as they are not reflective of true 
bargaining power. However, for the sake of continuity with previous literature, we retain these terms. 




A possible reason for this disagreement has been described by Adams (1965): 
which inputs are considered relevant24 in determining whether an exchange is 
equitable is highly subjective. In coalition formation, it seems that strong bargainers 
are more inclined to treat resources as relevant inputs than weak bargainers do, 
meaning that they will also disagree on how to fairly allocate the payoffs. This 
resonates with bargaining theory (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973) which presupposes 
the use of different allocation rules by strong and weak bargainers, and the notion of 
egocentric interpretations of fairness (e.g., Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997), in which 
bargainers consider allocation rules that benefit themselves as the fairest rules. We 
propose that when bargainers disagree on the relevance of resources, strong 
bargainers are likely (expected) to make equitable offers and that these offers—
whether actual or expected by weak bargainers—will lead weak bargainers to 
coalesce. We also propose that when it is clear to all bargainers that resources are 
relevant input this legitimizes the use of the equity norm by strong bargainers, 
promoting the inclusion of strong bargainers and thus decreasing the Strength-is-
Weakness effect. 
In two studies, we manipulated two aspects of resources that should increase 
their input relevance: the extent to which resources are acquired through effort, and 
whether there is an explicit link between the amount of resources participants hold 
and the share of the payoffs they are responsible for. This allows us to test whether 
the Strength-is-Weakness indeed decreases when input relevance increases. Below, 
we discuss the two aspects in order. 
 
Accountability theory and effort 
A first indicator of whether input is relevant is provided by accountability 
theory (Konow, 1996, 2000). Accountability theory postulates that a fair allocation is 
one in which income varies in relation to discretionary variables—variables under 
one’s control, such as effort—and not exogenous variables—variables outside of one’s 
control. In other words, bargainers are entitled to an equitable share of payoffs when 
they have worked for their resources, not when these are randomly acquired. In line 
with this idea, allocators in ultimatum bargaining games or dictator games make more 
unequal offers when they have exerted effort to either earned either their position as 
allocator or endowment rather than when these have been determined exogenously 
(Cherry, 2001; E. Hoffman, Mccabe, & Smith, 1996; E. Hoffman & Spitzer, 1985). More 
important to the current research question, when an advantage has been earned, 
these equitable allocations are also implemented by parties that do not benefit from 
                                                                    
24 Note that Adams’ use of the word ‘relevant’ refers to bargainers’ perceptions of whether it is legitimate to 
use a certain characteristic as input to calculate an equitable payoff. This use of this word is in no way 
related to the term ‘power-relevance’ which was coined by Kravitz (1981) to indicate whether differences 




equity, meaning people are willing to forgo money in order to give others what they 
are entitled to (Frohlich et al., 2004; Lee & Shahriar, 2016; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008; 
Ruffle, 1998). 
Effort in coalition formation. Although scarce, there is some evidence that 
earning resources in coalition formation increases its perceived relevance as input. In 
a study by C. E. Miller and Wong (1986), participants who were led to believe that they 
earned their resources based on their performance on a test of business knowledge 
made more equitable allocations of a coalition’s payoff than participants who received 
their resources randomly, meaning that those with more resources received more 
when these resources were earned. This study, however, focused on multi-valued 
games in which coalitions with more resources yield a higher payoff than smaller 
coalitions. Hence, strong bargainers were already often included, meaning this study 
did not allow a test of whether strong bargainers were included more often when 
resources were earned.  
One study that hints that making participants earn resources decreases the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect is described by Messe, Vallacher and Phillips (1974). In 
their study, participants bargained in a 5(4-3-2) pachisi coalition game. In the earned 
condition, participants earned 4, 3, or 2 resources by working on an unrelated task for 
2, 1.5, and 1 hour respectively. In the control condition in which resources were not 
earned a Strength-is-Weakness effect occurred; only 2 out of the 6 coalitions in this 
condition were large coalitions. In the earned condition, however, all 6 coalitions were 
large coalitions. Aside from the fact that this result warrants a high-powered 
replication, it is relevant to note that strong bargainers were instructed to work for a 
longer period rather than voluntarily exerting more effort. Consequently, the amount 
of resources participants had were outside of their control, whereas, according to the 
accountability principle (Konow, 1996, 2000), control is a prerequisite for relevant 
input. Moreover, Leventhal and Michaels (1969) found that individuals calculate input 
by evaluating work done relative to the amount of time allotted, meaning that time 
worked in itself does not equal amount of input. It is thus unclear whether strong 
bargainers were more often included as a restitution for lost time taken by the 
experimenter than due to a well-deserved reward. 
Another study that tested whether earning resources decreases the Strength-
is-Weakness effect is described by Wilke and Pruyn (1981). In their study, resources 
were purportedly assigned by comparing scores on an intelligence test. Although this 
manipulation decreased the Strength-is-Weakness effect, it is debatable whether this 
difference is due to differences in perceived deservingness alone. Participants were 
told that coalition members would engage in another intelligence test in which their 
score would be shared. The question is whether large coalitions were not formed 
because they apparently consisted of the most intelligent—rather than most 




deserving—participants. Moreover, it is open to debate whether scores on an 
intelligence test reflect effort rather than ability. 
In Study 4.1, we provide a cleaner test of the effect of earned resources on 
inclusion of strong bargainers. In this study, we used a real-effort slider task in which 
time was held constant and where differences in resources were related to 
performance in the task. Moreover, payoffs were the same for each possible coalition, 
meaning inclusion of strong bargainers cannot be attributed to motives to maximize 
one’s share of the payoff, but only to a desire to give others what they deserve. 
 
A relationship between resources and payoffs 
A second factor of which we propose that it increases the relevance of 
bargainers’ input is when there is a clear relation between one’s input and 
contribution to the payoffs. A basic assumption of equity theory (Adams, 1965; 
Walster et al., 1973) and related coalition formation theories such as minimum 
resource theory (Gamson, 1961a, 1964) and bargaining theory (Komorita & Chertkoff, 
1973), is the existence of an implicit or explicit relationship between one’s input and 
their claim on a share of the payoffs. In the latter two theories, this relationship 
between in- and output is assumed to be the driving force behind coalition bargaining; 
participants seek out certain coalition partners because they infer preferences on how 
to allocate the payoffs from the amount of resources that bargainers hold. 
In coalition settings that resemble simple weighted majority games, however, 
this relationship is far from explicit. Often, participants are informed that there is a 
payoff, without an explanation where it came from or how the resources bargainers 
hold relate to this payoff. If bargainers with more resources are not responsible for 
creating a larger share of the payoffs, it is likely that their resources will not be seen as 
relevant input and that their (expected) proportional claims are seen as illegitimate. If, 
however, it would be clear that those with more resources were also responsible for 
generating a larger part of the payoffs, resources might be viewed as relevant. In turn, 
this might enhance the perception that strong bargainers deserve a larger part of the 
payoffs and hence deserve to be included. 
In dyadic settings, there is some evidence for the notion that when one’s input 
directly determines the payoffs, these payoffs will be allocated more equitably than 
when payoffs are fixed (Cherry, 2001; Frohlich et al., 2004; Konow, 2000; Lee & 
Shahriar, 2016; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008; Ruffle, 1998). For example, when recipients 
increased payoffs by correcting spelling errors, dictators allocated more money to the 
recipient than when the payoffs were fixed (Frohlich et al., 2004). 
In coalition formation, to our knowledge, the only settings in which 
bargainers differentially contribute to the payoffs are multivalued coalition bargaining 




resources yield a higher payoff than coalitions with fewer resources. Hence, it is 
difficult to determine whether strong bargainers are included based on their relevant 
input or because including them yields a larger payoff than including a weak 
bargainer. 
To be able to disentangle the two motives, Study 4.2 added a condition in 
which participants with more resources contributed more to the overall payoffs 
rather than only to the coalition in which they are included. As the same budget is also 
available to smaller coalitions, an increase in the inclusion of strong bargainers cannot 
be accounted for by a motivation to maximize payoffs. Hence, in this setting, increased 
inclusion of strong bargainers most likely reflects an increased perception that strong 
bargainers deserve to be included. 
 
Relevant input and the Strength-is-Weakness effect 
Based on previous literature, we think it likely that the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect is partly due to a disagreement on whether resources are relevant input. In line 
with the notion of egocentric interpretations of fairness (e.g., Babcock & Loewenstein, 
1997), bargainers with more resources should be more inclined to treat resources as a 
relevant input than those with fewer resources, leading to disagreement. We argue 
that either letting participants earn their resources through effort or creating a direct 
relationship between resources and payoffs creates a shared perception of resources 




Our focal hypotheses relate to a higher involvement and subsequent inclusion 
of strong bargainers when resources are perceived to be relevant input than when 
they are not. 
We propose that—in line with a social utility approach to coalition formation 
in which coalition bargainers are guided by fairness concerns (van Beest & van Dijk, 
2007)—weak bargainers will think strong bargainers are more deserving of a share of 
the payoffs when resources are perceived to be relevant input than when they are not. 
We hypothesize that this increased perception of deservingness will translate into an 
increased number of first offers to strong bargainers when resources are earned 
compared to when they are not. This leads us to formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Weak bargainers are more likely to make their first offers to strong 
bargainers when resources are earned than when they are received randomly. 
H1b: Weak bargainers are more likely to make their first offers to strong 
bargainers when there is an explicit relationship between resources and payoffs than 
when there is no such relationship. 




A recent replication of the Strength-is-Weakness effect (See Chapter 2) has 
revealed that the preponderance of first offers to weak bargainers is a primary cause 
of the Strength-is-Weakness effect. We hypothesize that the predicted increase in first 
offers to strong bargainers when resources are perceived to be relevant input (H1a, 
H1b) will promote the formation of coalitions in which the strong bargainer is 
included, leading to the following hypotheses: 
 
H2a: Strong bargainers are more likely to be included when resources are earned 
through effort than when they are received randomly. 
H2b: Strong bargainers are more likely to be included when there is an explicit 
relationship between resources and payoffs than when there is no such relationship. 
 
Our final hypotheses relate to bargainers’ proposed allocations. According to 
the accountability principle (Konow, 2000) bargainers should be even more likely to 
apply the parity norm (Gamson, 1964)—which is rooted in equity theory (Adams, 
1965; Walster et al., 1973)—when resources are perceived to be relevant input. This 
leads us to formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
H3a: Strong bargainers claim a higher share of the payoffs in their first offer when 
they have earned their resources than when they have randomly received them. 
H3b: Strong bargainers claim a higher share of the payoffs in their first offer when 
there is an explicit relationship between resources and payoffs than when there is no 
such relationship. 
 
A data package including (meta) data, analysis scripts, stimulus materials, and 
preregistrations is available here: https://doi.org/10.34894/FCLGKP. Both studies 
and their hypotheses have been preregistered (Study 4.1: 
http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=q6bd7t; Study 4.2: 
http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ep4k8t). Moreover, for both studies we report all 
manipulations, measures and—where applicable—exclusion criteria. 
 
Study 4.1 
To test H1a, H2a, and H3a we utilized a 5(4-3-2) simple weighted majority 
game in which participants took on the role of a bargainer for a political party with 
either 4, 3 or 2 seats. Participants were told that they needed to form a coalition that 
holds at least 5 seats, in order to form a municipal government and be able to 
distribute the council’s budget of $90 million among the coalition members. In the 
Random Resources condition, we randomly assigned participants to the different 




seats based on their relative performance on real-effort slider task (see method 
section below).  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Our preregistered sample size was calculated using 
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). For 80% power for a two-tailed z-
test for independent proportions, in which we estimated that the percentage that the 
strong bargainer would be included would be 35% in the random condition and at 
least 50% in the effort condition, we needed at least 170 triads per condition.  
Our sample consisted of 1023 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (Mage = 
35.88 years, age range 18-72, 425 females, 591 males, 2 other) which were grouped 
into 341 triads. Participants received $1.80 for completing the task and another $0.05 
cents per $1 million they attained in the bargaining scenario, leading to a payout of 
between $1.80 and $6.30. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects 
conditions: a Random Resources condition in which participants’ resources were 
randomly assigned (n = 510 = 170 triads) and an Earned Resources condition in which 
participant received their resources based on performance on a real-effort slider task 
(n = 513 = 171 triads). 
Materials and procedure. 
General instructions. Participants read that they would take on the role of a 
bargainer for a political party, with the goal of being included in the municipal 
government of a new municipality and thereby obtaining a share of the budget.  
Participants then received information on how their party obtained their 
seats. Participants in the Random Resources condition read that parties received their 
number of seats on the basis of a random draw. Participants in the Earned Resources 
condition read the amount of seats was determined on the basis of how many citizens 
of the municipality voted for the party. Campaigning would be simulated by a slider 
task participants who performed better on the slider task would earn more seats for 
their party than participants who performed worse.  
After this, participants received information on the three phases of bargaining 
(see below). Next, participants in the Earned Resources condition completed a test 
round of the slider task. After this, we matched participants into triads. Participants in 
the Random Resources condition were randomly assigned to Party A (with 4 seats), 
Party B (with 3 seats), and Party C (with 2 seats). Participants in the Earned Resources 
condition first completed the slider task determining their bargaining position.  
Slider task. The slider task we employed was based on the real-effort slider 
task developed by Gill and Prowse (2019). In each of three rounds, participants saw 
21 sliders on one screen and had 30 seconds to position as many sliders as possible in 
the middle. After three rounds, participants who correctly positioned the most sliders 




were assigned to Party A (4 seats), participants who came in second were assigned to 
Party B (3 seats), and participants who performed worst were assigned to Party C (2 
seats).25 
Final instructions. Finally, all participants read how many seats everyone 
had and that a coalition with at least 5 seats (i.e., every two-party coalition) could 
form a municipal government and distribute $90 million among the coalition 
members. At this moment, we also informed participants that they would obtain a real 
bonus of $0.05 for every $1 million budget they obtained in the bargaining situation.  
Comprehension check. In order to gauge whether participants understood 
the instructions, participants completed a multiple choice quiz (correct answers in 
italics) asking for the size of the budget to be allocated (€90 million / This depends on 
the size of the coalition), what the payoffs would be of the party not included in the 
coalition (This depends on the offer that was accepted / This party doesn’t receive any 
money), and which coalitions could be formed (AB & AC / AB & BC / AC & BC / AB, AC, 
& BC). If participants made a mistake, they received a message that gave them the 
correct answer, and were presented with the question again until they answered 
correctly.  
Perceived control. To check whether our manipulation produced the 
intended perception of control over participants’ input—which, according to 
accountability theory (Konow, 1996, 2000) is necessary to make it a relevant input—
participants rated the extent to which they felt they had control over the amount of 
resources they obtained on a scale from 1 (No control) to 7 (Full control). 
Bargaining. Participants then proceeded to the bargaining phases. As a 
bargaining procedure we adapted the Komorita and Meek (1978) display procedure 
which consisted of three phases, which was recently adapted to an online version (See 
Chapter 5) using the open source software oTree (Chen et al., 2016). 
Phase I. In Phase I, all participants in a triad made a coalition offer. In this 
offer, they a) chose whom to send the offer, and b) indicated how they would like to 
distribute the €90 million between themselves and the chosen bargainer in 
increments of €1 million. 
Phase II. In Phase II, all participants saw all offers made in Phase I. They then 
selected one of the coalition offers that included them. This could be their own offer or 
an offer from another bargainer. 
Phase III. In Phase III, participants saw who selected which coalition offer. If 
two participants selected the same offer, the coalition formed and the payoffs were 
                                                                    
25 In both studies, participants assigned to position A (Study 4.1: M = 34.43, SD = 8.08; Study 4.2: M = 32.26, 
SD = 8.66) had clearly completed more sliders, than participants assigned to positions B (Study 4.1: M = 
25.22, SD = 7.09; Study 4.2: M = 22.00, SD = 7.60) which had completed more than C (Study 4.1: M = 15.81, 





distributed as agreed upon by the two bargainers. If no offer were selected by both 
prospective members of the coalition, a new round would start in which participants 
went through the same three phases. This process was repeated until two participants 
selected the same offer and a coalition would be formed. 
Manipulation check – Method of acquiring seats. After bargaining, 
participants answered a few final questions. First, as a manipulation check, we asked 
whether participants had obtained their seats through performance on a slider task or 
randomly.  
Deservingness of inclusion. To check whether earning resources increased 
the perception of resources as relevant input, we asked participants to which extent 
they agreed with the statement that parties with more seats deserved to be in the 





Comprehension check. Of all participants, 62.3% correctly answered all 
questions. Note that only 7% made more than one mistake and that participants who 
made a mistake were explained what the correct answer was. Participants to select 
the right answer before they could continue the study. As preregistered, we conducted 
all analyses twice: once including all participants (reported in main text) and once 
excluding those who did not answer all questions correctly. When interpretations 
differed, we reported this in footnotes. 
Manipulation check – Method of acquiring seats. Most participants 
correctly reported how they obtained their amount of seats: 93% in the Random 
Resources condition and 97% in the Earned Resources condition. 
Perceived control. To test whether our manipulation successfully enhanced 
the perceived control over acquiring seats, we conducted a 2 (Condition: Random 
Resources vs. Earned Resources) x 3 (Bargaining position: A vs. B vs. C) ANOVA on the 
perceived control over resources. First, we found a main effect of condition, F(1, 1017) 
= 268.76, p < .001, d = 1.35. As intended, participants who earned their resources in 
the slider task (M = 4.52, SD = 1.62) perceived more control over how many seats they 
had than those who randomly acquired their seats (M = 2.22, SD = 1.80). There was no 
main effect of bargaining position, F(2, 1017) = 1.98, p = .14, η2 < .01. We did find an 
interaction effect, F(2, 1017) = 11.86, p < .001, η2 = .01. As can be seen in Table 4.1, 
bargainers in the Random Resources condition did not differ in perceived control, but 
differences did exist in the Earned Resources conditions. The more resources 
participants had earned, the more they felt they had had control over it. Importantly, 
even those with 2 resources perceived more control over their resources when they 
had earned it than when they had randomly received them. 





Perceived control by position in Random Resources and Earned Resources conditions 
(Study 4.1). 
Resource    
Condition Position M SD 
Random A (4 seats) 2.34a 1.91 
(n =510) B (3 seats) 2.29a 1.87 
 C (2 seats) 2.01a 1.61 
Earned A (4 seats) 5.27b 1.21) 
(n = 513) B (3 seats) 4.57c 1.48 
 
C (2 seats) 3.71d 1.72 
Note: Different superscripted letters indicated significant differences (Tukey HSD, all 
ps < .01).  
 
First Offers. See Table 4.2 for an overview of the frequency of proposed 
coalitions and proposed mean allocations per condition. 
 
Table 4.2. 
Frequency of proposed coalitions and mean proposed allocation in Study 4.1. 
 Resource Proposed   Mean proposed allocation 
Condition Position Coalition n % MA MB MC SD 
Random A  AB 101 59.4% 52.33 37.67 - 9.84 
(n = 510) (4 seats) AC 69 40.6% 56.45 - 33.55 9.00 
 B  AB 90 52.9% 45.23 44.77 - 8.51 
 (3 seats) BC 80 47.1% - 51.89 38.11 8.78 
 C  AC 86 50.6% 50.14 - 39.86 12.14 
 (2 seats) BC 84 49.4% - 49.15 40.85 9.43 
Earned A  AB 103 60.2% 49.81 40.19 - 5.89 
(n = 513) (3 seats) AC 68 39.8% 56.96 - 33.04 9.85 
 B  AB 106 62.0% 45.67 44.33 - 9.41 
 (2 seats) BC 65 38.0% - 52.31 37.69 10.03 
 C  AC 102 59.6% 49.43 - 40.57 14.39 
 (2 seats) BC 69 40.4% - 48.87 41.13 12.21 
Note. Each coalition allocated $90 million between the coalition members. 
 
Target of first offer. As preregistered, we tested whether more first offers 
were made to bargainer A by bargainers B and C in the Earned Resources than in the 
Random Resources condition, using a two-tailed exact z-test of independent 




to bargainer A in the Earned Resources condition (n = 208, 60.8%) than in the 
Random Resources condition (n = 176, 51.8%), z = 2.38, p = .02, OR = 1.45. 
Proposed allocation. As preregistered, to investigate whether bargainers 
proposed more equitable allocations in the Earned Resources than the Random 
Resources condition, we conducted a 3 (Bargaining position: A vs. B vs. C) x 2 
(Condition: Random resources vs. Earned resources) ANOVA on proposed allocations 
in the first offer made. Against H3a, results did not show an interaction between 
bargaining position and condition, F(2, 1017) = 0.64, p = .53, η2 < .01, nor a main effect 
of condition, F(1, 1017) = 1.39, p = .24, d = 0.05.  
We did, however, find a main effect of bargaining position, F(2, 1017) = 72.37, 
p < .001, η2 = .11. Tukey HSD tests showed that bargainer A (M = 53.33, SD = 9.11) 
claimed more than bargainer B did (M = 47.74, SD = 9.85), p < .001, d = 0.59, who in 
turn claimed more than bargainer C did (M = 40.57, SD = 12.25), p < .001, d = 0.64.  
Outcomes. See Table 4.3 for an overview of the incidence of formed 
coalitions and mean payoffs obtained by bargainers within these coalitions. 
 
Table 4.3. 
Formed coalitions and mean allocations in Study 4.1. 
Resource    Mean allocation  
Condition Coalition n % MA MB MC SD 
Random AB 50 29.4% 48.56 41.44 - 4.46 
(171 triads) AC 48 28.2% 51.46 - 38.54 7.36 
 BC 72 42.4% - 47.49 42.51 5.95 
Earned AB 58 33.9% 47.38 42.63 - 4.80 
(170 triads) AC 57 33.3% 54.30 - 35.70 9.84 
 BC 56 32.7% - 50.41 39.59 9.55 
Note. Each coalition allocated $90 million between the coalition members. 
 
Formed coalitions. To test whether our manipulation reduced the Strength-
is-Weakness effect, we first tested for the existence of a Strength-is-Weakness effect 
within the two conditions. To do this, we conducted two separate exact binominal 
tests comparing the actual proportion of coalitions including bargainer A with the 
expected inclusion of A if all coalitions were formed equally often (as A is a member of 
two of the three possible coalitions, this is two-thirds). In the Random Resources 
condition, we found the expected Strength-is-Weakness effect: A is included in 57.6% 
of all coalitions, which is significantly lower than the two-thirds we would observe 
when all coalitions were formed equally often, p = .01, OR = 0.68.26 In the Earned 
Resources condition, we did not find a Strength-is-Weakness effect: bargainer A is 
                                                                    
26 This effect became non-significant when only including participants who passed all comprehension 
checks, p = .08, OR = 1.11. However, note that this analysis was conducted on only 38 participants. 




included in 67.3% of all coalitions, which does not significantly differ from equal 
formation of coalitions, p = .94, OR = 1.03. Against H2a, our preregistered two-tailed z-
test for independent proportions, however, did not reveal a significant difference 
between the two proportions, z = 1.83, p = .07, OR = 1.51. 
Allocation in formed coalitions. To explore whether our manipulation 
influenced the received payoffs for bargainers included in a coalition, we conducted a 
2 (Condition: Random Resources vs.  Earned Resources) x 3 (Bargaining Position: A vs. 
B vs. C) ANOVA on obtained payoffs. We obviously found no main effect of condition, 
F(1, 676) = 0.60, p = .44, d = 0.00, as the size of the budget is identical in the two 
conditions. We did find a main effect of bargaining position, F(2, 676) = 36.59, p < 
.001, η2 = .08.When included, bargainer A (M = 50.43, SD = 7.48) obtained a higher 
share of the payoffs than bargainer B (M = 45.70, SD = 7.37), p < .001, d = 0.64, who in 
turn obtained more than bargainer C (M = 39.33, SD = 8.56), p < .001, d = 0.80. 
We also found an interaction effect, F(2, 676) = 6.35, p < .01, η2 = .01.27 Tukey 
HSD tests (see Table 4.4) revealed that in both conditions bargainer A obtained a 
higher share of the payoffs than bargainer B, who obtained a higher share than 
bargainer C. Moreover, both bargainer A and B seem to obtain a similar share in the 
Random Resources as in the Earned Resources condition. Bargainer C, however, 




Share of payoff when included in coalition by position in the two conditions (Study 4.1). 
Resource    
Condition Position M SD 
Random A (4 seats) 49.98a 6.20 
 
B (3 seats) 45.01b 6.15 
 C (2 seats) 40.93c 6.81 
Earned A (4 seats) 50.81a 8.43 
 B (3 seats) 46.45b 8.44 
 
C (2 seats) 37.63d 9.85 
Note: Different superscripted letters indicated significant differences (Tukey HSD, all 
ps < .05). 
 
Process variables. Finally, we present analyses on process variables, 
showing participants’ perception of the bargaining situation and its effects on their 
bargaining behavior. 
                                                                    
27 This interaction effect became non-significant when only including participants who passed all 




Deservingness of inclusion.28 As preregistered, we tested whether our 
manipulation led to an increase in the perception that it is fair to include those with 
more resources by conducting a 2 (Condition: Random Resources vs. Earned 
Resources) x 3 (Bargaining position: A vs. B vs. C) ANOVA on the perception that 
strong bargainers deserve to be included. First, we again found a main effect of 
condition, F(1, 1012) = 24.65, p < .001, d = 0.48, showing that participants who earned 
their resources (M =4.48, SD = 1.77) thought it was more fair to include those with 
more resources than participants who randomly obtained their resources (M = 3.60, 
SD = 1.89). 
We also found a main effect of position, F(2, 1012) = 6.24, p < .001, η2 = .01. 
Tukey HSD tests showed that bargainer A (M = 4.50, SD = 1.87) (self-servingly) 
indicated higher agreement with the statement that it is fair to include those with 
more resources than bargainer B (M = 3.86, SD = 1.82), p < .001, d = 0.35 and 
bargainer C (M = 3.77, SD = 1.88) did, p < .001, d = 0.39. There was no significant 
difference in endorsement between bargainer B and bargainer C, p = .81, d = 0.05. 
There was also no interaction effect, F(2, 1012) = 0.51, p = .60, η2 < .01. 
Predicting first offers. To explore whether perceptions of control over 
resources and perceived deservingness of inclusion of large parties predicts to whom 
weak bargainer make offers (0 = Weak bargainer, 1 = Strong bargainer) we conducted 
a logistic regression. As can be seen in Table 4.5, both perceived control over 
resources and the perception that larger parties deserve to be included positively 
predicted making an offer to the strong rather than weak bargainer. 
 
Table 4.5. 
Logistic regression predicting participants’ target of first offer (Study 4.1). 
  95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Variable b (SE) Wald (p) Lower OR Upper 
Constant -1.06 (0.19) -5.34 (< .001) 0.23 0.35 0.51 
Perceived control over resources 0.14 (0.05) 3.15 (< .01) 1.05 1.15 1.26 
Perception that large parties 
deserve to be included 
0.23 (0.05) 4.91 (< .001) 1.15 1.26 1.39 
Note: R2 = .08 (Cox & Snell), .10 (Nagelkerke). Model 2(2) = 54.98, p < .001.  
 
Discussion 
In Study 4.1, we found evidence that acquiring resources through effort has 
the potential to increase the inclusion of strong bargainers. When coalition bargainers 
had acquired their resources through effort (rather than through random 
assignment), a) bargainers were more likely to think large parties deserve to be 
                                                                    
28 Five participants did not a provide response to this variable. 




included and b) strong bargainers actually received more first offers. Moreover, we 
found a Strength-is-Weakness effect in the Random Resources condition, but not in 
the Earned Resources condition. The inclusion rates of the strong bargainer, however, 
did not differ significantly between the two conditions. Finally, we found no 
systematic differences in proposed allocations and actual obtained payoffs of included 
parties between the two conditions, suggesting that bargainers make use of similar 
allocation rules in the two conditions and the crucial difference between the two 
conditions is which parties are approached. 
Interestingly, both perceptions of control over resources and perceptions that 
strong bargainers deserve to be included were higher in the Earned Resources 
condition than in the Random Resources condition, but these perceptions were still 
biased in a self-serving manner. This suggests that even when resources are seen as a 
more relevant input by all bargainers, strong and weak bargainers still seem to be to 
some extent in disagreement on the extent to which resources should shape 
bargaining and its outcomes.  
 
Study 4.2 
Results from Study 4.1 suggested that strength becomes less of a weakness 
when resources are earned through effort (in the Earned Resources condition we no 
longer found a Strength-is-Weakness effect). However, there was no benefit to being 
strong: strong bargainers were not included more often than chance level. In Study 
4.2, we investigated whether our second manipulation of input relevance—an explicit 
link between resource and payoff—would further increase the inclusion of strong 
bargainers, making strength in resources a strength in terms of inclusion. Specifically, 
we tested whether an explicit link between resources and payoff—versus no link— 
increases first offers to strong bargainers (H1b), increases inclusion of strong 
bargainers (H2b), and increases the claims made by strong bargainers in their first 
offers (H3b).  
In Study 4.2, we again utilized the 5(4-3-2) simple weighted majority game. 
The baseline condition was identical to the Earned Resources condition from Study 
4.1, but for clarity we renamed this the Fixed Budget condition: participants acquired 
their resources through the real-effort slider task, but the payoffs were a fixed $90 
million. In the Earned Budget condition, participants’ contribution to the payoffs was 
contingent on the resources they had acquired through the same slider task. 
Specifically, Party A ostensibly contributed $40 million, Party B $30 million, and Party 
C $20 million. Although the total payoffs were also $90 million, these payoffs were 







As Study 4.2 was highly similar to Study 4.1, we will only discuss the changes 
in detail. 
Participants and design. Our preregistered sample size was calculated using 
G*Power (Faul et al., 2007). Wanting to achieve 80% power for a one-tailed z-test 
independent proportions in which we estimated that—based on the inclusion rate of 
Study 4.1—the percentage that the strong bargainer would be included would be 67% 
in the Fixed Budget condition and would increase to at least 80% in the Earned 
Budget Condition, we needed at least 142 triads per condition.  
Our final sample consisted of 858 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (Mage = 
35.71 years, age range 18-78, 351 females, 495 males, 2 other, 10 did not provide 
data) which were grouped into 286 triads. Participants received $2.64 for completing 
the task and another $0.05 cents per $1 million they attained in the scenario, leading 
to a payout of between $2.64 and $7.14. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects 
conditions: a Fixed Budget condition in which the municipality’s budget was a fixed 
$90 million (n = 426 = 142 triads) and an Earned Budget condition in which Parties A, 
B, and C ostensibly contributed $40 million, $30 million, and $20 million respectively 
(n = 432 = 144 triads). 
Materials and procedure. Instructions were mostly identical to the Earned 
Resources condition in Study 4.1. The only difference was that participants in the 
Earned Budget condition read that the combined efforts of the three parties 
determined the municipality’s budget. The more effort a party exerted, the more they 
contributed to the budget of the municipality. Participants completed the same slider 
task and comprehension check as in Study 4.1. 
Perceived control over budget size. To test whether our manipulation 
indeed led to an increase in the perception that each participant was responsible for 
part of the budget, we asked participants to which extent they felt they had control 
over the size of the municipalities budget on a scale from 1 (No control) to 7 (Full 
control). 
Manipulation check – Contribution to the budget. After bargaining and 
answering the same deservingness question as in Study 4.1, as a manipulation check, 
we asked how participants contributed to the budget of the municipality (Parties with 
more seats contributed more/They did not contribute to it at all. The budget was 
fixed). 
Motivations. To explore the motivations of participants we asked them to 
which extent they were motivated to: 1) Maximize their own outcomes, 2) Minimize 
harm to other bargainers, and 3) Make sure that every bargainer got what they 
deserved, all on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). Although we did not have 
strong predictions, we were interested whether motivations to maximize resources 




were highest in the Fixed Budget condition and whether motivations to ensure that 




Comprehension check. Of all participants, 55.4% correctly answered all 
question. Note that only 3.3% made more than one mistake. Participants who made a 
mistake were explained what the correct answer was and had to select the right 
answer before they could continue the study. As preregistered, we conducted analysis 
twice: once including all participants (reported in main text) and once excluding those 
who did not answered all questions correctly. When interpretations differed, we 
reported this in footnotes. 
Manipulation check – Contribution to budget. In the Fixed Budget condition, 
66.2% correctly indicated that budget was fixed. In the Earned Budget condition, 
77.9% correctly indicated that those with more seats had contributed more. Although 
unplanned, due to this high failure rate we decided to conduct additionally analyses 
excluding those who failed the manipulation check. We report results from analyses 
done on this subset when its interpretations differ from analyses on the entire sample. 
Perception of control over budget size. To test whether those who 
ostensibly contributed to the budget size perceived to have had more control over the 
budget size, we conducted a 2 (Condition: Fixed Budget vs. Earned Budget) x 3 
(Bargaining position: A vs. B vs. C) ANOVA on the perceived control over budget size. 
First, we found a main effect of condition, F(1, 852) = 15.67, p < .001, d = 0.17. 
Participants in the Earned Budget condition (M = 3.95, SD = 1.69) indicated to have 
more control over the size of the budget than participants in the Fixed Budget 
condition (M = 3.65, SD = 1.72). There was no main effect of bargaining position, F(2, 
852) = 0.29, p = .75, η2 < .001. 
We again found an interaction effect, F(2, 852) = 5.39, p < .01, η2 = .01. As can 
be seen in Table 4.6, Tukey HSD tests reveal that bargainers in the Fixed Budget 
condition did not differ in the extent to which they perceived control over the budget. 
Moreover, only bargainer A reported having more in control in the Earned Budget 
than Fixed Budget condition. Additionally, bargainer A in the Earned Budget condition 





                                                                    
29 Only including those without comprehension check errors, we found the same overall pattern of results. A 
minor difference is that in the Earned Budget condition, bargainer B (M = 3.71, SD = 1.58) felt more in 





Perceived control by position in the Fixed Budget and Earned Budget conditions (Study 
4.2). 
Budget    
Condition Position M SD 
Fixed A (4 seats) 3.72a 1.75 
(n =426) B (3 seats) 3.57a 1.60 
 C (2 seats) 3.68a 1.82 
Earned A (4 seats) 4.51b 1.55 
(n = 432) B (3 seats) 3.79a 1.63 
 
C (2 seats) 3.55a 1.74 
Note: Different superscripted letters indicated significant differences (Tukey HSD, all 
ps < .01).  
 
Conducting the analysis on those who passed the manipulation check, we 
found that all bargainers reported having more control over payoffs in the Earned 
Budget than in the Fixed Budget condition. We found a main effect of position, F(2, 
608) = 7.56, p < .001, η2 = .02, bargainer A (M = 3.92, SD = 1.80) reported more in 
control than B (M = 3.51, SD = 1.60), p = .02, d = 0.26, and C (M = 3.00, SD = 1.59), p < 
.001, d = 0.36. Bargainer B and C’s perception of control did not differ, p = .53, d = 0.11. 
We found a main effect of condition, F(1,608) = 22.22, p < .001, d = 0.46, participants 
in the Earned Budget condition (M = 3.69, SD = 1.67) reported more control than those 
in the Fixed Budget condition (M = 3.42, SD = 1.74). We did not find an interaction 
effect, F(2, 608) = 1.78, p = .17, η2 < .01. 
First Offers. See Table 4.7 for an overview of the incidence of proposed 




















Proposed coalitions and mean proposed allocation in Study 4.2. 
Budget  Proposed   Mean proposed allocation 
Condition Position Coalition n % MA MB MC SD 
Fixed A  AB 85 59.8% 51.25 38.75 - 7.71 
(n = 426) (4 seats) AC 57 40.1% 57.04 - 32.96 11.00 
 B  AB 93 65.5% 46.14 43.86 - 7.79 
 (3 seats) BC 49 34.5% - 52.41 37.59 10.00 
 C  AC 97 68.3% 52.02 - 38.98 15.25 
 (2 seats) BC 45 31.7% - 47.40 42.60 13.97 
Earned A  AB 113 78.5% 52.00 38.00 - 8.32 
(n = 432) (3 seats) AC 31 21.5% 55.65 - 34.35 8.04 
 B  AB 108 75.0% 45.54 44.46 - 8.17 
 (2 seats) BC 36 25.0% - 52.03 37.97 7.35 
 C  AC 102 70.8% 51.01 - 38.99 9.49 
 (2 seats) BC 42 29.2% - 46.76 43.24 12.22 
Note. Each coalition allocated $90 million between the coalition members. 
 
Target of first offer. As preregistered, we tested whether more first offers 
were made to bargainer A by bargainers B and C in the Earned Budget than in the 
Fixed Budget condition, using a one-tailed exact z-test of independent proportions. In 
the Earned Budget condition, 210 (72.9%) first offers were made to A, compared to 
190 (66.9%) offers in the Fixed Budget condition. Against H1b, this difference, was not 
significant, z = 1.57, p = .06, OR = 1.33. 
Conducting the analysis on those who passed the manipulation check, the 
results were in line with H1b: significantly more first offers were made to strong 
bargainers in the Earned Budget condition (n = 167, 75.2%) than in the Fixed Budget 
condition (n = 102, 59.0%), z = 3.44, p < .001, OR = 2.11. 
Proposed allocation. As preregistered, to investigate whether bargainers 
proposed more equitable allocations in the Earned Budget than the Fixed Budget 
condition, we conducted a 3 (Bargaining position: A vs. B vs. C) x 2 (Condition: Fixed 
Budget vs. Earned Budget) ANOVA on claimed share of the budget in first offers. 
Against H3b, there was no interaction between bargaining position and condition, F(2, 
852) = 0.13, p = .88, η2 < .001, nor a main effect of condition, F(1, 852) = 0.40, p = .53, d 
= 0.03.  
We did find a main effect of bargaining position, F(2, 852) = 58.59, p < .001, η2 
= .12. Tukey HSD tests showed that bargainer A (M = 53.17, SD = 8.98) claimed more 
than bargainer B (M = 46.58, SD = 9.05), p < .001, d = 0.73, who in turn claimed more 




Outcomes. See Table 4.8 for an overview of the incidence of formed 
coalitions and mean payoffs obtained by bargainers within these coalitions. 
 
Table 4.8. 
Formed coalitions and mean allocations in Study 4.2. 
Budget    Mean allocation  
Condition Coalition n % MA MB MC SD 
Fixed AB 49 34.5% 48.49 41.51 - 7.64 
(142 triads) AC 40 28.2% 53.05 - 36.95 11.12 
 BC 53 37.3% - 49.85 40.15 4.93 
Earned AB 51 35.4% 48.73 41.27 - 6.00 
(144 triads) AC 47 32.6% 54.04 - 35.96 6.97 
 BC 46 31.9% - 50.07 39.93 6.46 
Note. Each coalition allocated $90 million between the coalition members. 
 
Formed coalitions. First, we conducted two exact binomial tests comparing 
the actual proportion that bargainer A is included with the expected inclusion of A if 
all coalitions were formed equally often (as A is a member of two of the possible three 
coalitions, this is two-thirds). These analyses showed no Strength-is-Weakness 
effects—nor Strength-is-Strength effects—in the Fixed Budget condition (62.7% 
inclusion rate), p = .33, OR = 1.68,30 nor in the Earned Budget condition (68.1% 
inclusion rate), p = .79, OR = 2.13.  
Moreover, our preregistered one-tailed z-test for independent proportions 
shows that, against H2b, there is no significant difference in formed coalitions 
between the Fixed Budget and Earned Budget condition, z = 0.87, p = .19, OR = 1.27.31 
Conducting the analysis on those who passed the manipulation check, we 
found a Strength-is-Weakness effect in the Fixed Budget condition (strong included 20 
times, 48.8%), p = .02, OR = 0.95, but no Strength-is-Weakness nor Strength-is-
Strength effect in the Earned Budget condition (strong included 50 times, 75.8%), p = 
.11, OR = 3.13. Moreover, in line with H2b, we found that strong bargainers in this 
subset are included significantly more often in the Earned Budget than in the Fixed 
Budget condition, z = 2.85, p < .01, OR = 3.28. 
Allocation in formed coalitions. To explore whether the presence or absence 
of a direct link between resources and payoffs influenced received payoffs for 
bargainers included in a coalition, we conducted a 2 (Condition: Fixed Budget vs. 
                                                                    
30 Only including those without comprehension check errors, we found a Strength-is-Weakness effect in the 
Fixed Budget condition: bargainer A was included in 13 coalitions (39.4%), p = .01, OR = 0.65. Do note that 
this analysis was conducted on only 33 triads. 
31 Only including those without comprehension check errors, we found a significantly higher inclusion rate 
of bargainer A in the Earned Budget (70.6%) than in the Fixed Budget condition (39.4%), z = 2.09, p = .02, 
OR = 3.69. 




Earned Budget) x 3 (Bargaining Position: A vs. B vs. C) ANOVA on obtained payoffs. As 
the size of the budget was identical in the two conditions, we obviously did not find a 
main effect of condition, F(1, 566) = 0.41, p = .52, d = 0.00. We did find a main effect of 
bargaining position, F(2, 566) = 69.02, p < .001, η2 = .17. When included, bargainer A 
(M = 50.92, SD = 8.30) obtained a higher share of the payoffs than bargainer B (M = 
45.65, SD = 7.59), p < .001, d = 0.66, who in turn obtained more than bargainer C (M = 
38.35, SD = 7.65), p < .001, d = 0.96. We did not find an interaction effect, F(2, 566) = 
0.50, p = .60, η2 = .001. 
Process variables.  
Deservingness of inclusion.32 As preregistered, we tested whether our 
manipulation led to an increase in the perception that it is fair that those with more 
resources should be included. For this, we conducted a 2 (Condition: Fixed Budget vs. 
Earned Budget) x 3 (Bargaining Position: A vs. B vs. C) ANOVA on the perception that 
large parties deserve to be included. We did not find a main effect of condition, F(1, 
848) = 0.31, p = .58, d = 0.07 (MFixed = 4.68, SDFixed = 1.73, MEarned = 4.78, SDEarned = 1.64). 
We did find a main effect of position, F(2, 848) = 5.85, p < .01, η2 = .01. Tukey 
HSD tests showed that bargainer A (M = 5.12, SD = 1.60) more strongly than bargainer 
B (M = 4.58, SD = 1.66), p < .001, d = 0.33 and bargainer C (M = 4.49, SD = 1.72), p < 
.001, d = 0.38, endorsed the statement that it is fair to include those with more 
resources. There was no significant difference in endorsement between bargainer B 
and bargainer C, p = .80, d = 0.05. There was also no interaction effect, F(2, 848) = 
0.08, p = .92, η2 < .001. 
Motivations.33 As preregistered, to test whether motivations differed 
between conditions, we conducted a MANOVA on the three questions concerning 
motivation during bargaining. This analysis revealed that there was no overall 
difference for the three motivations between the two conditions, F(3, 848) = 0.67, p = 
.57, Pillai’s Trace < 0.01. See Table 4.9 for means and standard deviations for the three 










                                                                    
32 Six participants did not provide responses to this variable. 






Means and SDs for motivations per condition (Study 4.2). 
  Fixed Budget  Earned Budget 
Motivation  M SD  M SD 
Maximize outcomes  5.42 1.49  5.51 1.35 
Minimize harm  4.06 1.86  4.04 1.83 
Make sure get what deserve  4.72 1.78  4.80 1.60 
 
Predicting first offers through perceptions. To explore whether perceived 
control over budget and perceived deservingness of inclusion of large parties predicts 
to whom weak bargainers make offers (0 = Weak bargainer, 1 = Strong bargainer) we 
conducted a logistic regression. As can be seen in Table 4.10, perceived control over 
budget did not predict target of first offer. The perception that larger parties deserve 




Logistic regression predicting participants’ target of first offer (Study 4.2). 
  95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Variable b (SE) Wald (p) Lower OR Upper 
Constant 0.001 (0.29) 0.01 (1.00) 0.57 1.00 1.75 
Perceived control over resources -0.01 (0.06) -0.18 (< .01) 0.88 0.99 1.11 
Perception that large parties 
deserve to be included 
0.20 (0.06) 4.49 (< .001) 1.09 1.22 1.36 
Note: R2 = .02 (Cox & Snell), .03 (Nagelkerke). Model 2(2) = 13.18, p = .001.  
 
Predicting first offers through motivations. As preregistered we tested 
whether the different motivations predicted to whom weak bargainers make offers (0 
= Weak bargainer, 1 = Strong bargainer) by conducting a logistic regression. As can be 







                                                                    
34 When only including participants who passed the comprehension check, the motivation to make sure that 
others get what they deserve predicted making offers to the strong rather than weak bargainer, b = 0.21, SE 
= 0.08, z = 2.49, p = .01. 





Logistic regression predicting participants’ target of first offer by motivation (Study 4.2). 
  95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Variable b (SE) Wald (p) Lower OR Upper 
Constant -0.06 (.46) -0.14 (.89) 0.38 0.94 2.33 
Maximize outcomes 0.04 (.06) 0.69 (.49) 0.92 1.04 1.18 
Minimize harm 0.04 (.06) 0.63 (.53) 0.92 1.04 1.17 
Make sure get what deserve 0.10 (.06) 1.59 (.11) 0.98 1.11 1.25 
Note: R2 = .01 (Cox & Snell), .02 (Nagelkerke). Model 2(3) = 5.70, p = .13.  
 
Discussion  
At first glance, Study 4.2 did not provide support for our hypotheses. We did 
not find a decrease in the Strength-is-Weakness effect when we increased the input 
relevance of resources by explicitly linking them to the payoffs. Moreover, bargainers 
with more resources made higher claims—and obtained a larger share of the 
payoffs—than bargainers with fewer resources, but this was not exacerbated in the 
Earned Budget condition. 
When we excluded participants who failed the manipulation check, the 
results were much more in line with our hypotheses. When there was an explicit 
relationship between resources and payoffs, strong bargainers received more first 
offers (H1b) and were included more often in coalitions (H2b), compared to when 
there was no such relationship. The observation that the shift in first offers is mainly 
due to a decrease in first offers to strong bargainers in the Fixed Budget condition—
and that the majority of manipulation check failures occurred in this condition—
suggests that at least part of these excluded bargainers made first offers to strong 
bargainers due to an erroneous belief that they had contributed more to the payoffs. 
In Study 4.2, we again found evidence for the existence of self-serving biases. 
Strong bargainers again feel that strong bargainers are more deserving of inclusion 
than their weaker counterparts do, suggesting again that participants are more likely 
to acknowledge the effect of our manipulation when it is in their own favor. 
 
General discussion 
In this chapter, we tested the proposition that the inclusion of strong 
bargainers in coalitions is partly determined by whether their resources are perceived 
to be relevant input (i.e., how legitimate it is to use their resources as input to 
calculate an equitable payoff). Across two studies, we found some evidence that 
increasing the input relevance of resources is conducive to (attempts at) including 
bargainer with many resources. In Study 4.1, we found that making participants earn 




resources are assigned randomly. We also found a Strength-is-Weakness effect in the 
Random Resources condition, but not in the Earned Resources condition. This 
difference, however, was not statistically significant (p = .07). In Study 4.2, we found 
mixed results based on which participants we include in our analyses. When including 
all participants, we did not find support for our hypotheses. When excluding 
participants who failed our manipulation check, however, we found that creating an 
explicit relationship between resources and payoffs promotes both first offers to and 
inclusion of strong bargainers. 
A striking observation in both studies is that the main difference between the 
conditions lies in which bargainers are approached by weak bargainers: an increase of 
first offers to strong bargainers. The behavior of strong bargainers in terms of how 
much money they demand in their offers does not differ between conditions: strong 
bargainers propose more or less equitable allocations, regardless of the source of 
resources and its link to payoffs. This corroborates our proposition that inclusion of 
strong bargainers does not depend on strong bargainers’ (invariant) treatment of 
resources as relevant input—using them to calculate an equitable payoff—but 
whether weak bargainers agree or disagree that this behavior is warranted. 
Our studies also provide a more general insight in the role of resources in 
coalition formation. An ongoing debate in coalition formation research is whether 
resources or bargaining power is more predictive in which coalitions are formed. 
Whereas theories based on resources (e.g., Gamson, 1961a; Komorita & Chertkoff, 
1973) predict the existence of a Strength-is-Weakness effect, theories based on 
bargaining power—such as pivotal power theory (Shapley & Shubick, 1954b) and 
minimum power theory (Gamson, 1964)—propose that resources should only 
influence formed coalitions and payoffs when they lead to differences in bargaining 
power. First, counter to predictions from power theories, we found that, when 
differences in resources are due to randomness, coalitions are not formed equally 
often. Second, we found that first offers and payoffs are strongly determined by the 
resources bargainers hold: those with more resources claim and receive a larger share 
of the payoffs when included in a coalition. An important realization is thus that 
coalition bargaining is strongly influenced by the amount of resources bargainers 
hold, even when differences in resources do not translate into differences in 
bargaining power.  
 
Self-serving biases and misperceptions 
The fact that we found stronger evidence for an increase in perceptions 
concerning input relevance and an increase in first offers to strong bargainers than 
actual inclusion of strong bargainers might lie in the self-serving perceptions coalition 
bargainers seem to entertain. In both studies, strong bargainers reported perceiving 
more control and were more likely to say they deserve to be included. It thus seems 




that strong bargainers are generally more likely to see resources as relevant input 
than their weaker counterparts do; a disagreement that might be a barrier against the 
inclusion of strong bargainers. This resonates with research showing that bargainers 
show egocentric biases in perceptions of fairness and that these biases lead to 
bargaining impasses (e.g., Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997). We speculate that strong 
bargainers might actually be included more often when these perceptions are less 
self-servingly biased. 
Another insight provided by our data is that participants seem to read more 
into differences in resources than seems to be there. Taking a closer look at our 
manipulation check from Study 4.2, we found that more errors occurred in the Fixed 
Budget condition than in the Earned Budget condition. This suggests that a substantial 
proportion of participants in the Fixed Budget condition seem to assume that 
resources and payoffs are related in situations in which they are not. This is 
compatible with previous literature on the Strength-is-Weakness effect which 
emphasizes that a large part of coalition formation is the process of participants 
making sense about what kind of situation they are in and acting upon these (possibly 
incorrect) perceptions (Psathas & Stryker, 1965). Besides providing theoretical 
insights, the notion that participants misattribute certain qualities to resources also 
has practical relevance: besides using salient instructions, researchers should make 
sure appropriate manipulation checks are in place, and maybe even more stringent 
comprehension checks to filter out participants who hold erroneous views of the 
bargaining situation. 
 
The magnitude of the Strength-is-Weakness effect 
A surprising finding was that the Strength-is-Weakness effect in the Random 
Resources condition in Study 4.1 was smaller than expected based on previous 
literature. Whereas we found that strong bargainers were included in 57.6% of the 
coalitions in this condition, in Chapter 2 we found that strong bargainers were 
included in only 34% of the cases. There are several possible reasons for this 
difference. First, the context in which we studied the Strength-is-Weakness effect in 
Chapter 2 is the landowner paradigm (van Beest et al., 2004b), in which participants 
take on the role of a landowners selling their parcels of land together, with differences 
in parcel size being the difference in resources. Whereas participants might not think 
those with more parcels are more deserving of inclusion, participants in the current 
studies might already have the perception that those who have a large electorate are 
naturally more deserving of inclusion. This fits with the convention that, in many 
countries with a multi-party system, the largest party is often given the leading role as 
formateur—the party starting negotiations—which increases the probability that they 




the two settings to investigate whether the inclusion of strong bargainers indeed 
differs between them. 
Another reason for the difference in the magnitude of the Strength-is-
Weakness effect might lie in the difference in wording regarding the source of the 
resources. To clearly manipulate the lack of input relevance in the Random Resources 
condition, we made it very clear that resources were received on the basis of a 
random draw. In the replication in Chapter 2, the source of differences in resources 
was more ambiguous. It is possible that, in the Random Resources condition, our 
explicit mentioning of the source of resources led to a higher shared perception about 
input relevance—and hence less disagreement—whereas there was more room for 
self-serving interpretations when the source of resources was more ambiguous, 
leading to more disagreement and thus a stronger precedent for the Strength-is-
Weakness effect. Future studies could compare settings in which it is made clear that 
differences in resources are due to effort, due to randomness, or in which the sources 
is more ambiguous. Our prediction is that the Strength-is-Weakness effect is largest in 
the ambiguous condition, smaller in the random condition and absent in the effort 




In two studies we investigated whether increasing the input relevance of 
resources in coalition formation (i.e., how legitimate it is to use their resources as 
input to calculate an equitable payoff)—either by making resources earned or having 
an explicit relationship between resources and payoffs—decreases the Strength-is-
Weakness effect. Overall, we found some evidence that increased input relevance 
increases first offers to strong bargainers, that perceptions regarding the relevance of 
resources predict first offers to strong bargainers, but that these perceptions are 
biased in a self-serving manner. Finally, we have mixed evidence on how these 
perceptions and first offers translate to inclusion in formed coalitions. In Study 4.1 we 
replicated the Strength-is-Weakness effect when resources were acquired randomly, 
and found weak evidence that earning resources reduced this effect. In Study 4.2, we 
found evidence that an explicit relationship between resources and payoffs promotes 
first offers to strong offers and their inclusion, but only when excluding bargainers 
who failed our manipulation check. Together, these results suggest that perceptions of 
input relevance do promote attempts to include strong bargainers, but that a 











The Online Coalition Game: 
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In this chapter, we present the Online Coalition Game (OCG): an open access tool 
written on the open access research platform oTree that enables high-powered 
interactive coalition formation experiments. Besides containing a tutorial on 
conducting studies using the OCG, we discuss two previous implementations. With 
these examples, we demonstrate that online use of the OCG provides the benefits of 
large sample sizes and fast data collection, whilst leading to valid and robust findings. 
Moreover, we show that small changes in the experimental set-up offer interesting 
opportunities to expand coalition formation theory by including insights from, 
amongst others, literature on bargaining, ostracism, communication, and vice versa




Coalition formation is a ubiquitous phenomenon. Coalitions can be seen at 
different levels of society: employees form (informal) coalitions to further their own 
goals in organizations (e.g., Stevenson et al., 1985), political parties form governments 
to rule countries (e.g., Bäck & Dumont, 2008), and companies form joint ventures to 
increase their market share or potential (such as the large KLM, China Southern, 
Xiamen and Air France joint venture; https://news.klm.com/successful-joint-venture-
expanded/).  
Despite this ubiquity, coalition formation research—a booming field from the 
50s until the 80s of last millennium—has not received much attention in 
contemporary social psychological theorizing. One reason for this decline may be the 
relative complexity of conducting these studies in which more than two participants 
interact in real time, combined with the increased awareness of needing large sample 
sizes to achieve sufficient statistical power. The latter may be exacerbated in coalition 
formation research, where the coalition that is formed is often the unit of analysis, and 
a group of at least three participants is needed for one observation. Despite the 
emergence of platforms that allow online real-time interactions between participants 
(e.g., Balietti, 2017; Chen et al., 2016; Hawkins, 2015; Pettit, Friedman, Kephart, & 
Oprea, 2014), up until now, there has been no openly available application that allows 
for online real-time coalition formation experiments. 
To address this issue, we have developed the Online Coalition Game (OCG): an 
application for conducting (online) interactive coalition formation research written 
for the open access platform oTree (Chen et al., 2016). Using the OCG allows 
researchers to conduct high-powered coalition formation experiments in which 
participants bargain online and in real-time about inclusion in a coalition and the 
division of the payoffs generated by a coalition. Moreover, making small changes in 
the experimental set-up of the OCG offers interesting opportunities to expand 
coalition formation theory by including insights from, amongst others, literature on 
bargaining, ostracism, communication, and vice versa. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we will describe the 
two major coalition formation procedures we have implemented in the OCG. Next, we 
will give a short overview of oTree and explain how to use it to conduct a study using 
the OCG. After this, we discuss the results of two projects. One project demonstrates 
the validity of using the OCG online by showing the robustness of a key finding in 
coalition formation—the Strength-is-Weakness effect (e.g., Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957)— 
and compares results in a traditional lab at a university and via Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (https://www.mturk.com) sample. We also present one project that 
demonstrates how a simple change in the OCG allowed us to investigate the effect of a 
moderator on established coalition formation findings and simultaneously extended 
accountability theory (Konow, 1996, 2000) to coalition formation settings. Finally, we 




threats to the need to belong due to exclusion (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, 
2007) or phantom BATNAs (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) (Pinkley et 
al., 2019). In Appendix B, we describe how different configurations of parameters 
make variations possible. In Appendix C, we describe the most important output 
variables. 
 
Experimental coalition formation protocols 
Coalition formation has been defined as “the joint use of resources to 
determine the outcome of a decision in a mixed-motive situation involving more than 
two units” (Gamson, 1964, p.85). It thus entails situations in which at least three 
individuals (or groups) strive to attain an outcome that they cannot attain 
individually, but in which individual gains cannot be maximized when all individuals 
cooperate. Hence, whereas in dyadic bargaining situations, the focal questions are is 
often whether and how bargainers reach a negotiated agreement, in coalition 
formation situations the focal question often is who reaches an agreement and who 
ends op excluded from it.  
In order to experimentally study these questions, coalition researchers have 
devised simple weighted majority games (see Komorita, 1984) such as the political 
convention (Gamson, 1961b) and landowner paradigms (van Beest et al., 2004a). 
Although they differ in context, these paradigms share the same structure: 
participants receive an amount of resources that is insufficient to obtain a monetary 
payoff by themselves, but which allows them to form coalitions in which their pooled 
their resources are sufficient to obtain the payoff together. Importantly, they do need 
to form a consensus on how to allocate this payoff among the members of the 
coalition. 
The simplest simple weighted majority game is one in which three 
participants each have one resources, and need to form a coalition with at least 2 
resources to be able to allocate a sum of money—a game referred to as a 2(1-1-1) 
simple weighted majority game. Often, however, bargainers differ in resources, such 
as in the common 5(4-3-2) game, in which three participants receive 4, 3, and 2 
resources respectively, and need to form a coalition with at least 5 resources. The way 
bargainers negotiate with each other, however, differs across different bargaining 
protocols. The OCG implements two dominant bargaining protocols for three-person 
coalition formation studies: the one-step Komorita and Meek (1978) display 
procedure and the more dynamic Kahan and Helwig (1971) procedure. This enables 
researchers to replicate classic (e.g., Komorita & Meek, 1978; Murnighan, 1978a) as 
well as newer (e.g., van Beest et al., 2004b) coalition formation studies or adjust these 
protocols according to the needs of the study. Another reason for choosing these two 
protocols is that in both situations the participants make initial offers at the same 
time, meaning that initial offers,which are independent of each other, are collected 




from all participants. In these cases, bargaining results cannot be accounted for by 
differences in speed of decision-making. 
 
One-step protocol  
The Komorita and Meek (1978) display procedure is one-step coalition 
bargaining protocol, meaning that when all members of a prospective coalition agree 
on how to allocate the payoffs the coalition is immediately formed. This bargaining 
protocol consists of three phases.  
In Phase I, all participants make a coalition offer. This offer consists of two 
things: a) with whom they want to form a coalition, and b) how they want to allocate 
the payoff in this coalition. Coalitions can only be formed—and thus proposed—if a 
specified threshold is reached. For example, in the 5(4-3-2) simple weighted majority 
game, bargainers—for convenience labeled A, B, and C—hold 4, 3, and 2 resources 
respectively and the threshold is 5 resources, meaning that every coalition (AB, AC, 
BC, and ABC) can reach this threshold and can thus be formed. 
See Figure 5.1 for the screen participants see when making an offer. In this 
example, we see the screen for bargainer A in a 5(4-3-2) simple weighted majority 
game. Note that in this example, the big ABC-coalition is prohibited, but the OCG has 
the option to allow its formation (see Appendix B on how to configure this). 
 
 




In Phase II, participants see all offers that were made in Phase I. Participants 
then select one of the coalition offers that includes themselves. This could be either 
their own offer or an offer from another participant. Note that it is possible that 
participants have made the exact same offers in Phase I (e.g., B and C both propose a 
BC-coalition and the exact same equal split of the payoffs). In this case, this offer is 
displayed only once but it is indicated which participants have proposed this offer. 
See Figure 5.2 for the screen participants see when choosing an offer. In this 
example, we see the screen for bargainer B. In the previous phase, A has offered to 
form a coalition with C in which A proposed to allocate the payoffs so that A gets $60 
million and C gets $40. Bargainers B and C both propose a BC-coalition, but B 
proposes to get $55 million and let C get $45 million, whereas C proposes an equal 
split of the payoffs. Note that the shown possibility to not select any coalition at all is 
an option that can be turned on or off (see Appendix B). 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Screenshot showing Phase II of bargaining using the OCG.  
 
In Phase III, participants see who has selected which coalition offer. If all 
members of a proposed coalition have selected this offer, this coalition is formed and 
the payoffs are distributed as agreed upon by the members of the coalition. If no 
coalition is selected by all prospective members, a new round starts in which 
participants go through the same three phases. This process is repeated until a 
coalition is formed or when the last round, specified by the experimenter, is reached. 
See Figure 5.3 for the screen participants see when offers are chosen and a 
coalition has been formed. In this example, both B and C have selected B’s offer, 




meaning B gets $55 million and C gets $45 million. Only A has selected the self-made 
AC-offer and ends up excluded from the negotiated deal. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Screenshot showing Phase III of bargaining using the OCG.  
 
Alternative offers protocol 
As a second bargaining protocol, we implemented the protocol from Kahan 
and Helwig (1971). Phase I and Phase II are identical to the ones used in the one-step 
procedure described above. After this, however, a few more steps are added, allowing 
those at risk at exclusion from a coalition to make an alternative offer, making the 
bargaining more dynamic than in the one-step procedure. 
In Phase III, participants see whom selected which coalition offer. If no offer is 
selected by all prospective members, a new round starts in which participants go back 
to phase I. If a coalition offer is accepted by all its prospective members, this does not 
directly lead to a coalition but to a tentative coalition. This means that the coalition is 
not binding, until the members of this tentative coalition confirm their preferences in 
Phase V. 
In Phase IV, the coalition bargainer that is not in the tentative coalition has 
the opportunity to make an alternative offer to one of the bargainers in the tentative 
coalition. In this way, they may be able to tempt one of the bargainers to break away 
from the tentative coalition. If the earlier mentioned ABC-coalition is allowed, there is 
no excluded bargainer, meaning that no counter offer is made. However, all bargainers 




In Phase V, members of the tentative coalition have the option to ratify the 
tentative coalition and allocate the payoffs as agreed. However, the bargainer who has 
obtained an alternative offer may choose this alternative offer as well (or no offer at 
all, if this option is enabled). If this alternative offer is selected, the coalition proposed 
in the alternative offer becomes the new tentative coalition and another alternative 
offer can be made. This process will be repeated until a coalition is ratified or when 
the last round, specified by the experimenter (see Appendix B), is reached. 
 
Conceptual overview of oTree 
The OCG is programmed to run on oTree (Chen et al., 2016), an open source 
platform that enables researchers to conduct real-time interactive experiments in the 
lab and over the internet. The reason for this is that oTree’s architecture makes it 
highly suitable for interactive bargaining. Whereas an in-depth tutorial of oTree is 
beyond the scope of this tutorial (see https://otree.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ for 
extensive documentation), we provide a conceptual overview here. 
 
Sessions and subsessions  
When conducting an experiment, multiple participants are recruited in one 
session. In this session, participants may complete multiple tasks that have their own 
applications (apps). Every app included in the session will have their own subsession. 
For example, when conducting a study using the OCG, participants usually go through 
two subsessions: first, they read the introduction (subsession 1) after which they 
bargain (subsession 2). More subsessions can be added if desired, for example one 
with a post-bargaining questionnaire or another bargaining protocol. 
 
Participants, players, and groups 
 When participants start a session, they can be identified throughout the 
entire session by a participant code. The word player refers to a role a participant 
takes while bargaining. In the OCG, player refers to the three different bargaining 
positions bargainers can have: A, B, and C. When participants are matched to interact 
with each other, they are put together in a group. In the OCG, three participants will 
form a group of three players. 
 
Pages and waitpages 
A (sub)session consists of different pages and waitpages. These are the 
different screens participants go through when completing a session. Pages refer to 
screens in which participants have to do something, be it reading a text, making an 
offer, or answering some questions. Waitpages are pages on which participants wait 
until all members of one group arrive on this page. These waitpages are used when 




input from all participants is needed for a next step in the application. In the OCG, 
there are waitpages in between the different phases in the bargaining protocol. For 
example, participants cannot go to the selection of offers (Phase II) until all 
participants have made their offer. Waitpages can also be used to match players in a 
group. The first page of the two OCG bargaining apps are such a waitpage. 
 
Hierarchy of objects 
 The above objects (session, subsession, group, players, and pages) are all 
nested. In a session there can be multiple subsessions, which contain groups, which 
contain players, who go through multiple pages and waitpages. This also means that it 
is relatively easy to conduct a certain computation for all players in a group or for all 
groups in a session. See the conceptual overview section in the oTree documentation 
for more technical details. 
 
Conducting a study using the Online Coalition Game 
In this section, we provide a step-by-step overview on how to conduct an 
(online) study using the Online Coalition Game as well as provide some tips on best 
practices. For in-depth documentation on each step described below, see the oTree 
documentation: https://otree.readthedocs.io/en/latest/. 
 
Installing the Online Coalition Game 
After installing oTree (see oTree documentation), and starting a new project, 
download the Online Coalition Game here: 
https://github.com/JoeriWissink/OnlineCoalitionGame. Copy the folders 
Online_Coalition_Game, Online_Coalition_Game_Alternative_Offer, 
Online_Coalition_Game_Introduction, and Online_Coalition_Game_ 
_Alternative_Offer_Introduction to your project folder and copy and paste the 
SESSION_CONFIGS from the settings.py file into your own settings.py file.  
 
Setting up a server  
Although studies can be tested on local devices, use of a web server is 
necessary for conducting an online study. The easiest way to do this is hosting the 
study on Heroku—a cloud hosting provider (https://www.heroku.com/). Another 
possibility is setting up a dedicated server. See the oTree documentation for more 
information. 
 
Configuring a session 
Experimenters interact with the server using an admin interface. Launching a 




the settings.py file located in your oTree project folder can be launched. In this file, we 
have already preset two session configurations under SESSION_CONFIGS, one using 
the one-step protocol and one using the dynamic protocol. Both include an 
Instructions subsession before the Bargaining subsession. It is also possible to add a 
session configuration under SESSION_CONFIGS. Moreover, the session can be 
configured in the admin Sessions page after selecting one of the session configurations. 
See Appendix B: Configuring the Online Coalition Game for a description of the 
different parameters of the OCG. 
 
Number of participants per batch 
Part of configuration a session is indicating how many slots to open for 
participants. When using an online platform such as Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(Mturk), we recommend collecting data for a single experiment in multiple batches of 
around 30 participants. We have noticed that substantially larger batches increase the 
differences in starting times between participants, making matching into triads more 
difficult. With too small batches, participant dropout might lead to too few 
participants to match. Also make sure to open up about double the amount of slots in 
oTree than number of HITs on Mturk. When participants start a study but do not finish 
it, they will take up a slot in oTree, but if a HIT is not returned in a specified time, a 
new HIT will be opened by Mturk. Enough open slots in oTree should be available to 
accommodate participants who accept one of these new HITs. 
 
Reaching participants 
After having created a session, access to the experiment can be given by 
distributing the session URLs found under the Links tab. When conducting a study on 
Mturk, the Session-wide link can be shared in the HIT. When conducting a lab session it 
might be easier to use stable URLs for each lab computer. In this case, a session can be 
launched, and configured, on the Rooms page in the admin interface instead of the 
Sessions page and the links to these stable URLs can be placed on the lab computer 
desktops. As oTree is totally URL based, all participants need is an internet capable 
electronic device.  
NB: Whereas the experiment functions well across platforms and browsers, 
we encountered an exception in which a real-effort slider task did not function 
properly on Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge. Using JavaScript, we managed to 
detect participants using these browsers and prompted them to use another browser 










After having launched a session, participants’ progress can be monitored 
under the Monitor tab. This tab shows how many participants are currently in the 
session and where they are in the session. 
 
Introduction subsession 
Due to the real-time nature of the OCG, we recommend starting a session with 
an introduction subsession in which participants are not yet matched. As there will be 
online participants who start a session but will not finish it, immediately matching 
participants will increase the chances that one participant in a group will make it 
impossible for the other (matched) participants to continue. By matching after the 
introduction subsession, only participants who have already read the first instructions 
will be matched increasing the chance that only active participants are grouped. In the 
two preset session configurations, we have added the instructions in a first subsession 
prior to the bargaining subsession.  
 
Matching page 
Once participants are forwarded to the actual OCG app, they will reach a 
matching page. Once three participants are on this page, they will be matched into a 
triad and continue. To make sure participants do not wait indefinitely, it is possible to 
add a time limit to the matching page by enabling leave_matching and setting the time 
limit by configuring leave_timer (see parameters below) after which participants will 
go to the end of the study and receive the base fee. 
 
Participant idleness/dropout 
After participants are matched, idleness of one participant could potentially 
stall the advancement of other participants in the same group. To counteract this, we 
added timers to all pages between the matching and the formation of a coalition. The 
time limit can be set by adjusting the timeout_time parameter when configuring the 
session (see parameters below). When participants have not completed a page within 
the allotted time, they will be kicked from the program. Participants within the same 
triad of this kicked participant will be forwarded to the end of the experiment where 
they can obtain their participation fee. 
 
Paying participants 
When participants are finished, they are forwarded to a screen displaying a 
randomly generated completion code, which they can enter when submitting their 
HIT on Amazon Mechanical Turk. This code also allows linking their HIT to the bonus 





After data is collected, it can be downloaded in the Data tab of a session or the 
general Data page displaying all sessions. See Appendix C for an overview of the most 
important outcome variables. 
 
Previous implementations 
Validation of the OCG and replication of the Strength-is-Weakness effect 
The first implementations of the OCG were two replications of the Strength-
is-Weakness effect in coalition formation, one in the lab and one on Mturk (studies 
and results described in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, data package available here: 
https://doi.org/10.34894/JXRELG. The Strength-is-Weakness effect is the observation 
that coalition bargainers with many resources are disproportionally often excluded 
from coalitions (e.g., Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957). In other words, bargainers with many 
resources are often excluded from a coalition, as the players in the two low-resource 
positions form a coalition. This project served as the first high-powered replication of 
the effect. Due to the unavailability of access to a large online population previous 
studies either had a small sample size (leading to questionable statistical power), or 
had to use within-subjects design (which might be problematic due to suggested 
learning effects (e.g., Kelley & Arrowood, 1960). 
In this project, we used the one-step procedure from Komorita and Meek 
(1978) in a 5(4-3-2) game in a landowner setting (van Beest et al., 2004b) in which 
player A had 4 acres of land, B had 3 acres and C had 2 acres and in which two 
participants needed to form a coalition with at least 5 acres of land in which they 
agreed on how to divide the $100,000 the landowner paid them (of which every 
$1,000 was converted to a real bonus of $0.05). We conducted a study with the OCG in 
both a lab setting at a university and one via Mturk. 
As three possible coalitions could be formed, a Strength-is-Weakness effect 
would mean that the formation of coalitions would deviate from a distribution in 
which all three coalition would be formed in one-third of the cases—with a 
disproportionate amount of BC-coalitions, excluding the bargainer with the most 
resources. Our lab sample of 156 psychology undergraduates (52 triads) had 80% 
power to find a medium to large effect size of w = 0.43 and we found an effect size of 
0.78. The BC-coalition was formed in 67% of the cases, the AC-coalition in 29% and 
the AB-coalition in only 4%, 2(2, N = 52) = 31.89, p < .001. In the Mturk sample of 240 
US Americans (80) triads we had 80% power to find a medium to large effect size of w 
= 0.35 and obtained an effect size of w = 0.72. The BC-coalition was formed in 65% of 
the cases, the AC-coalition in 27.5% and the AB-coalition in only 7.5%, %), 2(2, N = 
80) = 40.90, p < .001. 




The comparison between the lab sample and the Mturk sample also allowed 
us to validate the use of the program across different platforms. As both studies 
yielded highly similar results that were in line with previous literature—and 
comprehension across both studies was similar: in the lab 84% answered all 
comprehension checks correctly versus 83% on Mturk—these first uses of the OCG 
suggest that it leads to robust and valid results, both offline and online. Moreover, the 
online data collection was clearly showed to be a more time-efficient method: in the 
lab, we collected 52 triads in 10 weekdays, whereas we collected 80 triads online in 
just a few hours spread across three workdays. 
Besides the benefits, conducting online interactive research brings its own 
challenges (see Arechar et al., 2017). The main challenge we encountered in this 
project was matching participants and handling dropout. We paid a participation fee 
to participants who waited but did not get matched and to participants who dropped 
out due to an idle participant they were matched to. These participants did not 
provide data but did constitute 35% of our sampled participants. Note that the above 
percentage is likely dependent on various factors, such as the minimum amount of 
time participants need to wait on the matching waitpage (in this study 5 minutes), the 
maximum amount of time participants have on one page when matched (in this study 
2 minutes, see Appendix B for an explanation on how to set timers), and familiarity 
with the interface. As an example of the latter, in this study, 12 participants—and thus 
also their 24 matched participants—got stuck due to trying to make offers incorrect 
format and thus dropped out due to the time limit. In the current version of the OCG, 
we have added a mandatory practice offer to avoid this issue. 
 
Adding moderators and extending accountability theory 
Our second implementation demonstrates how a simple change in the 
configuration of the OCG allowed us to test a moderator of the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect whilst at the same time broadening the scope of accountability theory (Konow, 
1996, 2000). In this project, we manipulated how bargainers attained their resources: 
through random assignment or through a real-effort slider task (study and results 
described in detail in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, data package available here: 
https://doi.org/10.34894/FCLGKP.  
According to accountability theory, one’s fair allocation should “vary in 
proportion to the relevant variables that he can influence (e.g., work effort but not 
according to those that he cannot reasonably influence (e.g., a physical handicap)” 
(Konow, 2000, pp. 1973–1974). Ample research shows that people are in favor of 
equitable allocations based on earned input but not based on randomly received input 
(e.g., Frohlich et al., 2004; Lee & Shahriar, 2016; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008; Ruffle, 
1998). Our hypothesis was that this phenomenon extends to inclusion in coalitions: 




more resources—who generally ask for an equitable share based on their resources—
are approached and included more often than bargainers with more resources that 
have randomly received their resources, despite the possibility of avoiding these 
bargainers and opting for a cheaper coalition.  
To test this, we again used an incentivized 5(4-3-2) game and one-step 
protocol embedded in a scenario in which participants bargain for municipal parties 
that have 4, 3, and 2 seats respectively and in which 5 seats were necessary to 
distribute allocate the budget of $90 million (with each $1 million being converted to a 
$0.05 bonus). In a Random Resources condition (170 triads), participants were 
randomly assigned their resources. In the Earned Resources condition (171 triads), 
participants who performed better on a real-effort slider task obtained more 
resources than those who performed worse (see Appendix B for instructions on how 
to implement the slider task). More first offers were made to those with more 
resources when resources were earned (60.8%) than when they were randomly 
received (51.8%), %), z = 2.38, p = .02, OR = 1.45. There was, however, no strong 
evidence that bargainers with the most resources were included more often when 
resources were earned (67.3%) than when they were assigned randomly (57.6%), z = 
1.83, p = .07, OR = 1.51. Answers on a post-bargaining questionnaire complemented 
this data from first offers and formed coalitions, thereby suggesting a possible 
explanation for these outcomes. Perceptions that bargainers with more resources 
deserve to be included (measured on a 7-point scale) were higher in the Earned 
Resources condition (M = 4.48, SD = 1.77) than in the Random Resources condition (M 
= 3.60, SD = 1.89), F(1, 1012) = 24.65, p < .001, d = 0.48. However, these perceptions 
were always higher for the bargainers with most resources themselves (M = 4.50, SD = 
1.87) than for those with 3 resources (M = 3.86, SD = 1.82), and 2 resources (M = 3.77, 
SD = 1.88), F(2, 1012) = 6.24, p < .001, η2 = .01. This suggests that bargainers with 
most resources did receive more first offers in the Earned Resources condition 
because they were considered deserving of inclusion, but that their own (even more 
inflated) sense of deservingness led them to bargain in a self-interested way that did 
not promote actual inclusion.  
 
Future avenues 
The second project described above demonstrates that the OCG enables the 
extension of theories to coalition formation settings, which allows a focus on the 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. Besides the possibility of incorporating real-
effort slider tasks, the availability of a computerized coalition formation task opens 
interesting up interesting avenues for research. For example, using the oTree chat 
functions can be used to further study the role of communication channels in coalition 
bargaining (e.g., Swaab et al., 2009).  




Moreover, varying whether an inclusive coalition including all participants 
can be formed (see Appendix B on how to configure this) could inform about 
dynamics regarding inclusion and exclusion. As such, the OCG could be used to 
investigate whether exclusion from the bargaining table leads to similar threats to the 
need to belong as social exclusion typically does (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Perhaps 
such exclusion hurts even if it is financially beneficial (similar to €yberball studies, 
van Beest & Williams, 2006), and people make suboptimal coalition offers in order to 
avoid exclusion. Moreover, whereas we know a lot about the consequences of 
exclusion (see Williams, 2007), the OCG could complement this research by studying 
processes leading to inclusion and exclusion.  
The OCG could also be used to further investigate the effect of phantom 
BATNAs (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) (Pinkley et al., 2019; Pratkanis 
& Farquhar, 1992). In dyadic studies, BATNAs are often a static, predetermined payoff 
that participants get if they are not able to reach a negotiated outcome. Phantom 
BATNAs, on the other hand, are uncertain alternatives that may or may not 
materialize. Within the coalition formation framework, the bargainer a participants do 
not send an offer to could be seen as a phantom BATNA, someone to make an offer to 
if one’s preferred coalition turns out to be less profitable than expected. As such, 
phantom BATNAs could be conceptualized in terms of bargaining alternatives by 
manipulating the number of resources bargainers hold and the number of resources a 
coalition needs to have to access the payoffs. Whereas research on phantom BATNAs 
shows that having more opportunities leads to higher power perceptions and higher 
bargaining performance (Pinkley et al., 2019), these hypotheses could be tested in the 
realm of coalition formation in which driving a hard bargain may lead to exclusion. 
Finally, the OCG framework could be extended to, for example, conduct 
experiments with more than three bargainers, or to conduct multivalued studies in 
which different coalitions yield different payoffs. Although this is not possible within 
the current version of the OCG, programming enthusiasts with knowledge of Python, 
HTML and Django, should be able to build these features on top of the existing code. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented the Online Coalition Game: an open access tool 
enabling high-powered interactive coalition formation research. We demonstrate that 
online use of the OCG provides the benefits of large sample size and fast data 
collection, whilst leading to valid and robust findings. Moreover, we show that small 
changes in the experimental set-up offer interesting opportunities to expand coalition 
formation theory by including insights from, amongst others, literature on bargaining, 

















Individuals often form coalitions to attain outcomes they cannot attain 
individually. An ill-understood observation is that strong coalition bargainers, 
bargainers with many resources, are surprisingly often excluded from coalitions 
(Caplow, 1956; Chaney & Vinacke, 1960; Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Murnighan, 
1978b; van Beest et al., 2011, 2004b; Vinacke, 1959; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957; Wilke & 
Mulder, 1971, 1974). The aim of this dissertation is to further the understanding of 
the processes underlying this Strength-is-Weakness effect.  
To better understand the Strength-is-Weakness effect, we first investigated 
its prevalence. Are strong bargainers actually often excluded? Are there situations in 
which they are less often excluded or even most often included? Second, a shared 
property of the three empirical chapters in this dissertation is the focus on the use of 
equity norms by coalition bargainers. Do people actually apply these equity norms? If 
so, why do they use them? 
The structure of this discussion is as follows. First, I will give an overview of 
the findings from this dissertation’s studies, thereby answering the above questions. 
Second, I will evaluate the three previous explanations—confusion theory, the 
conspiracy hypothesis, and the use of equity norms—in the light of the obtained 
findings. Third, I will integrate the obtained findings and propose a tentative new 
theory of how the Strength-is-Weakness effect emerges. After this focus on the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect, I will elaborate on broader theoretical and practical 
implications of the obtained findings. Finally, I will address some limitations and 
remaining questions that can be addressed in future research. 
 
Overview of findings – Answers to questions 
How strong is the empirical support for the Strength-is-Weakness effect?  
The Strength-is-Weakness effect is an often-documented phenomenon. A 
limitation of previous studies, however, is that they often contained very small sample 
sizes, leading to low statistical power and thereby increasing the probability of false 
positives (Ioannidis, 2005). Moreover, it is unclear to which extent the Strength-is-
Weakness effect has been an artefact of the most often used experimental paradigms 
and/or protocols (e.g., Kelley & Arrowood, 1960).  
To address these issues, we conducted two high-powered replications. Using 
the Online Coalition Game (OCG) we have developed, participants bargained in a 5(4-
3-2) landowner paradigm in which bargainer A had 4, B had 3, and C had 2 resources. 
Results from these two replications provide evidence that the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect is a robust phenomenon. Both in our psychology student lab setting (Study 2.1) 
and using an Amazon Mechanical Turk sample (Study 2.2), the majority of formed 
coalitions were BC-coalitions (i.e., coalitions between the bargainers with 3 and 2 




respectively. This inclusion rate is about 30% lower than would be expected when all 
coalitions would be formed equally often (66.6%). 
Evidence for a Strength-is-Weakness effect is also provided by results from 
two other studies in this dissertation. In Study 3.4, participants bargained in a 4(3-2-
2) landowner paradigm. In this study, strong bargainers were included in 34% of 
formed coalitions. In Study 4.1, participants bargained in a 5(4-3-2) simple weighted 
majority game in which bargainers negotiated for inclusion in (and access to the 
budget of) a municipal council. In this study, strong bargainers were included in 
57.6% of formed coalitions, a percentage that again was statistically different from 
66.6%.  
 
Do coalition bargainers use equity norms in coalition bargaining?  
The assumption that bargainers use equity when deciding how to allocate 
payoffs—and that this leads to Strength-is-Weakness effects—is at the center of 
classic coalition theories (e.g., Gamson, 1961a; Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973). This 
means that bargainers with more resources are postulated to expect and demand a 
higher share of the payoffs generated by a coalition. Direct evidence for this 
assumption, however, remains scarce. The main reason for this is that coalition 
theories have been typically tested at the level of coalition outcomes (formed 
coalitions and allocations within these coalitions) and not at the level of coalition 
processes, such as first offers. Consequently, there is little evidence that the Strength-
is-Weakness effect is due to the use and/or expectation of equity norms in actual 
bargaining.  
In Chapter 2, we focused on two ways in which equity norms could lead to a 
Strength-is-Weakness effect. First, we looked at the application of equity norms, by 
looking at differences in the magnitude of opening offers between bargainers with 
different resources. In both Study 2.1 and Study 2.2—and all other studies in this 
dissertation in which we could test this effect—we found that bargainers with more 
resources on average proposed to keep more for themselves in their first offers than 
bargainers with fewer resources did. This was not only the case for the strongest 
bargainers (with 4 resources), but bargainers with 3 resources also proposed to claim 
more for themselves than bargainers with 2 resources did. These same differences 
were found in final allocations in the formed coalitions in Studies 2.1, 2.2, 4.1, and 4.2: 
those with more resources on average obtained a higher share of the payoffs than 
those with fewer resources. Given that this behavior incentivizes weak bargainers to 
form the cheapest winning coalition, it is reasonable to assume a causal relationship 
between differences in magnitude of offers and the Strength-is-Weakness effect. 
A second way the notion of equity norms could lead to a Strength-is-
Weakness effect is through expected use of equity norms. If weak bargainers expect 




bargainers, they are incentivized to avoid strong bargainers from the outset. To 
investigate whether this is the case, we analyzed to whom bargainers make their first 
offer. Across many studies in this dissertation (Studies 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, and 3.435), we 
indeed found that most first offers were made to the other bargainer who had the 
fewest resources. A further finding that supports the notion that equity norms are 
expected comes from Study 3.3. In this hypothetical study, a strong and a weak 
bargainer made a first offer to weak bargainers who did not have the opportunity to 
make an offer themselves. In this setting, we found that the hypothetical strong 
bargainers were indeed avoided when they made equitable offers, but were actually 
preferred as coalition partners when they proposed an equal split of the payoffs. This 
suggest that strong bargainers are usually avoided because they are expected to make 
unattractive offers, but that when strong bargainers have the opportunity to counter 
this expectation timely, they are in fact included quite often. 
 
Why do strong coalition bargainers use equity norms in coalition bargaining?  
In Chapter 2, and supported by studies from other chapters, we established 
that coalition bargainers adhere to—and expect the use of—equity norms. Previous 
theorizing does not explain why strong bargainers apply equity norms, especially in a 
setting in which differences in resources do not lead to differences in bargaining 
power. In Chapter 3, we tested two alternative accounts against each other. The first 
was the passive adoption account. According to this account, strong bargainers, in line 
with bargaining theory (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973), take equity as a starting point in 
their reasoning. Subsequently, in a similar vein as findings on egocentric 
interpretations of fairness (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997), bargainers engage in 
biased reasoning due to their bargaining position. Consequently, they fail to consider 
the likely fairness principle preferred by the weak bargainers, namely equality. A 
second hypothesized account was the active selection account in which strong 
bargainers consider both equality and equity but, as hinted at by Wilke (1985), make 
equitable offers strategically in the hopes of increasing their obtained payoffs. 
In Studies 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4 we assigned participants to either no position at 
all—after which participants could choose their own position—or assigned 
participants to the weak bargaining position—after which they could choose whether 
or not to switch to a strong bargaining position. In the former setup, viewing the 
bargaining position from no position at all, participants should not be able to passively 
adopt equity. In the latter, participants assigned to the weak bargaining position 
should even initially adopt the principle of equality, because this is the fairness 
principle that should be triggered by thus position (see Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973). 
                                                                    
35 Study 3.3 did not allow us to test this effect. In Chapter 4, we only expected this preference for weak 
bargainers in the control condition of Study 4.1. A too strong emphasis on random allocation of resources 




Regardless, we found that, on average, strong bargainers still claimed a higher share 
for themselves than weak bargainers did. Based on these results, we concluded that 
strong bargainers are more likely to actively choose to apply equity whilst bargaining 
instead of passively adopting equity because it is the most salient allocation rule.  
 
Is having many resources always a liability? 
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we have found support for the notion that having 
many resources in power-irrelevant settings (i.e., in which bargainers differ in 
resources but have the same pivotal power) is detrimental to one’s inclusion in a 
coalition. A fourth central question in this dissertation was whether this is always the 
case.  
The role of relevant input. In Chapter 4 we focused on what Adams (1965) 
calls relevance of input. Input relevance refers to the perception that the input is 
perceived to be a legitimate basis to calculate an equitable payoff. Adams argued that 
when people disagree on whether input is relevant, they also disagree on whether an 
allocation of payoffs based on this input is fair. Based on this notion, we reasoned that 
the Strength-is-Weakness effect would also be impacted by perceptions of input 
relevance. That is, if strong bargainers (are expected to) apply equity norms, this is 
likely to be accepted more by weak bargainers when they perceive resources to be 
relevant versus when they find them irrelevant.  
In Chapter 4, we manipulated input relevance of resources in two ways. In 
Study 4.1, we manipulated whether resources were acquired through randomness or 
through performance of a real-effort slider task, which according to accountability 
theory (Konow, 1996, 2000) should lead to a perception of input relevance in the 
latter condition. In Study 4.2, we increased relevance of resources by making an 
explicit link between input (i.e., resources) and output (i.e., payoffs); strong bargainers 
contributed more to the overall payoffs than weaker bargainers did.36 Our main 
hypotheses were that an increase in input relevance should lead to an increase in first 
offers to and inclusion of strong bargainers. 
We found partial evidence for these two hypotheses. In Study 4.1, strong 
bargainers who earned their resources were seen as more deserving of inclusion in a 
coalition and were more often approached. Moreover, we found a Strength-is-
Weakness effect when resources were randomly attained and no Strength-is-
Weakness effect when resources were earned. However, the difference in inclusion 
rate of strong bargainers between the two conditions, was not statistically significant 
(p = .07). In Study 4.2, we found no differences in first offers to and inclusion of strong 
bargainers between the two conditions. However, when analyzing a subset in which 
we excluded the large number of participants who failed the manipulation check—i.e., 
                                                                    
36 Note that strong bargainers contributed more the general payoffs for everyone and not only to a coalition 




participants who indicated that resources and payoffs were linked in the condition in 
which they were not and vice versa—we did find an increase in both first offers to and 
inclusion of strong bargainers.  
Interestingly, although this provides tentative evidence that strong can be 
included more often when resources are perceived to be relevant input, in no 
situation did the Strength-is-Weakness flip over to a Strength-is-Strength effect in 
which the inclusion rate of strong bargainers exceeds 66.6%. These results thus 
suggest that the original disadvantage of strong bargainers is so large that attempts to 
make them more attractive seem to make them at most equally attractive as weak 
bargainers rather than more attractive. 
The role of perceptions. Another important insight provided by the results 
from Chapter 4 is the role perceptions of the bargaining situation play in determining 
who gets included in a coalition. Weak bargainers’ perceptions that strong deserved to 
be included—which was heightened in our experimental conditions—predicted first 
offers to strong (vs. weak) bargainers. Moreover, in line with accountability theory 
(Konow, 1996, 2000), the extent to which weak bargainers felt the amount of 
resources they held was controllable—which was heightened in the effort condition—
also predicted first offers to strong bargainers. Chapter 4 also showed the 
consequences of biased or even wrongful perceptions of the bargaining situation. Both 
abovementioned perceptions were biased in a self-serving way: strong bargainers 
indicated that resources were more controllable than weak bargainers said they were, 
and found themselves more deserving on inclusion than their weaker counterparts 
did. We suspect that these self-serving perceptions foster disagreement over 
appropriate payoff allocations, keeping strength in resources from becoming a real 
strength in terms of inclusion. Finally, results from Study 4.2 suggest that people can 
have downright incorrect perceptions about the bargaining situation and that that 
these incorrect perceptions can lead to unexpected behavior. They suggest that a 
proportion of participants in the control condition incorrectly perceived a link 
between resources and payoffs and that this wrongful perception led to more offers to 
strong bargainers. 
Making attractive offers (timely). Other situations in which strength in 
resources is less of a weakness is in settings in which strong bargainers can (timely) 
make attractive offers. In Study 3.3, we found that equitable offers from strong 
bargainers were often rejected, but equal offers from strong bargainers were more 
often accepted over equal offers from weak bargainers. This finding, however, needs a 
disclaimer. In study 3.3, participants simultaneously received two hypothetical offers: 
one from a strong and one from a weak bargainer. The offer participants accepted 
would be executed immediately. That these offers are so successful here but 
apparently less so in the interactive bargaining studies suggests the following. Weak 




strong bargainers to apply equity norms. This initial attraction between weak 
bargainers might then function as a commitment to forming that coalition, or a safe 
option, from which opting out might be perceived to be risky. Consequently, weak 
coalitions might form despite an equally good (or even better) offer from a strong 
bargainer. This thus suggests that strong bargainers should not only make attractive 
equal offers to promote their own inclusion in a coalition, but that they should do it in 
a timely fashion, before weak bargainers have a chance to find each other.  
Beyond power-irrelevant and simple settings. The focus of this 
dissertation has been on simple situations (i.e., with a fixed payoff for every coalition) 
with power-irrelevant resources (i.e., in which bargainers differ in resources but have 
the same pivotal power). To conclude this section, I will use insights from previous 
research to comment on whether strong bargainers are more likely to be included 
when resources are power-relevant or in multivalued settings in which payoffs vary 
between formed coalitions. 
We can reasonably assume that strength is less of a weakness when resources 
are power-relevant. On the basis of theories like minimum power theory (Gamson, 
1964) and the weighted probability model (Komorita, 1974), bargainers with more 
bargaining alternatives are more likely to be included in a coalition, simply because 
they are more necessary for the successful formation of coalitions than parties with 
lower pivotal power. This notion has been empirically supported (Murnighan, 1978b). 
In multivalued settings, coalitions including strong bargainers yield a higher 
payoff than smaller coalitions. In such settings, including a strong bargainer might be 
beneficial, as long as the higher share claimed by a strong (versus a weak) bargainer is 
sufficiently offset by the increase of the total payoffs. This notion finds support in a 
coalition bargaining study in which three bargainers always contributed 60, 40 and 20 
points respectively to the payoffs but in which their resources differed across 
conditions (Komorita et al., 1989). In this study, the bargainer with the most resources 
was included more often when their relative strength in resources was not that large 
(i.e., in a 19-15-11 game) but was not included more often when it was large (i.e., in a 
27-15-3 game). This suggests that choosing a coalition partner can be a trade-off 
between the absolute payoffs they bring to a coalition and the amount of payoffs they 
are suspected to claim in a coalition. 
 
Evaluation of previous explanations 
Above, I gave an overview of the most important findings from this 
dissertation. In this section, I will evaluate the three previously proposed explanations 







The confusion hypothesis 
The first previous explanation for the Strength-is-Weakness effect was the 
confusion hypothesis (e.g., Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957). 
According to this explanation, strong bargainers are often excluded because they fail 
to realize the formation of a coalition is necessary to attain the coveted payoffs. As 
weak bargainers realize this quicker, they are more likely to initiate bargaining and 
thus form a coalition, excluding the strong bargainer. The assumption made is thus 
that only strong bargainers, and not weak bargainers, confuse differences in resources 
with differences in pivotal power. Hence, strong bargainers should be the only one 
whose behavior deviates from the rational perspective that all bargainers are equal. 
In all our studies, however, we found that all three bargainers deviate from 
this rational perspective. First, the majority of both strong and weak bargainers, 
instead of only the former, make their first offers to the other bargainers with fewest 
resources. Second, not only the strong bargainer claims a higher share of the payoffs 
than the other bargainers do; in situations in which bargainer B has more resources 
than bargainer C, the former claims a larger share than the latter. The notion that 
strong bargainers are responsible for their own exclusion because they understand 
the situation differently than the other bargainers thus does to receive support. 
 
Conspiracy theory  
The second previously proposed explanation for the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect was conspiracy theory (e.g., P. J. Hoffman et al., 1954; Wilke & Mulder, 1971). 
According to this conspiracy theory, weak bargainers view the strong bargainer’s 
position as an initial (unearned) advantage. The assumption is that exclusion of strong 
bargainers is seen as a way to offset this initial advantage. 
One result from this dissertation that meshes with this perspective is that 
weak bargainers are initially attracted to each other. Moreover, the finding that this 
initial attraction is attenuated when the distribution of resources is determined 
through effort, does suggest that fairness and deservingness play a role in the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect. Given that there is no actual advantage of being a strong 
bargainer in our studies, however, conspiracy theory has a hard time explaining why 
strong bargainers are excluded. Moreover, as conspiracy theory lays the cause of the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect in the hands of weak bargainers, it also fails to explain 
why strong bargainers also try to form a coalition with the weakest bargainer instead 
of being indifferent between the other bargainers. 
 
The use of equity norms  
The third explanation that has been proposed for the existence for the 




this perspective, strong bargainers are avoided because they claim a higher share of 
the payoffs, or are at least expected to do so. The avoidance of strong bargainers is 
thus seen as a rational decision, driven by a motivation to maximize one’s own 
payoffs. 
In the studies presented in this dissertation, we have found much support for 
the use of equity norms. Bargainers with many resources claim a higher share of the 
payoffs than bargainers with fewer resources do. Moreover, initial offers are directed 
at those with fewer resources to avoid those whom are expected to make the largest 
claim. Finally, we found that strong bargainers increased their inclusion rate when 
they could timely make equal offers. We thus found evidence for the (expected) use 
equity norms and some evidence for their causal role in the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect.  
Previous theorizing on equity and the Strength-is-Weakness effect, however, 
fails to explain the entirety of the Strength-is-Weakness effect. First, it fails to explain 
why strong bargainers use equity in the first place, especially in settings in which 
having more resources does not lead to more pivotal power or an increase of the 
coalition’s payoff. Second, it does not specify under which conditions—and thus 
why—strong bargainers’ proposals to allocate the payoffs equitably are rejected. 
 
What causes the Strength-is-Weakness effect? - Towards a new theory 
In this section, I will use insights from the studies conducted in this 
dissertation and from theories on partner selection in biological markets to propose a 
new tentative theory on the underlying causes of the Strength-is-Weakness effect. 
 
The strategic use of equity norms 
First, I propose that the Strength-is-Weakness effect is partly caused by a 
conscious, yet misguided, choice by strong bargainers to apply equity norms when 
formulating their opening offer. Conscious, because this behavior persists when other 
allocation rules are highlighted. Misguided, because strong bargainers seem to 
mispredict the consequences of this decision. In a way, confusion hypothesis’ 
assumption that strong bargainers do not have a rational perception of the bargaining 
situation is correct. However, this misperception does not seem to lie in perceptions of 
power, but the perception that their equitable offers will be accepted. 
An open question is why strong bargainers think their offers are acceptable in 
the first place. A suggestion comes from literature on partner selection in biological 
markets. According to this perspective (e.g., Barclay, 2013), individuals can make 
themselves attractive through competitive generosity; by offering more benefits to a 
prospective bargainer than their competitors. However, a high ‘market value’ (i.e., the 




competitive generosity. In other words, high quality partners are attractive in 
themselves and thus do not have to advertise themselves. This raises the possibility 
that strong bargainers in coalition formation overestimate their market value and 
thus attractiveness to others and hence fail to engage in outbidding their competitors. 
Results from Study 3.3 suggest that strong bargainers may have a higher market value 
than weak bargainers when both make similar (attractive) offers, but strong 
bargainers might not realize that this only is the case when a large connotation of 
being strong—making equitable offers—is taken out of the equation. However, the 
observation that strong bargainers even make these self-serving offers in the studies 
from Chapter 3 suggests that strong bargainers themselves do not have to think that 
power-irrelevant resources hold much value. It rather seems that strong bargainers 
hope resources carry some signaling value, and that the resulting attractiveness 
permits them to make self-serving offers. 
 
(Ir)relevance of resources 
This use of equity norms is only part of the mechanisms leading to the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect. The second contributor seems to be a disagreement 
between strong and weak bargainers on whether resources are relevant input for 
calculating an equitable share of the payoffs. Looking at the differences and 
similarities between the control conditions and experimental conditions in the studies 
reported in Chapter 4, two things stand out. First, the observed pattern of first offers 
did not differ as a function of input relevance. Regardless of input relevance condition, 
on average, strong bargainers claimed a higher share of the payoffs than weak 
bargainers did. Second, weak bargainers’ approach of strong bargainers increased in 
conditions in which resources were made more relevant. This suggests that strong 
bargainers always behave as if resources are relevant input, but that weak bargainers 
only accept this (expected) behavior when resources are actually relevant. However, 
self-reported perceptions of input relevance and deservingness suggest that, even 
when resources are more relevant, biased perceptions may foster lingering 
disagreement, stopping strength in resources becoming strength in terms of inclusion. 
 
The tentative verdict  
Taking the abovementioned mechanisms together, I propose that both strong 
and weak bargainers contribute to the emergence of a Strength-is-Weakness effect. 
Weak bargainers contribute to the effect because they seek out other weak bargainers, 
especially when the relevance of resources is absent or ambiguous. The reason for this 
behavior is that they expect strong bargainers to claim a larger share of the payoffs 
than weaker bargainers and they can maximize their own payoffs by avoiding them. 




strong bargainers, because they perceive them to be more deserving of an equitable 
share of the payoffs. 
Strong bargainers contribute to the effect by making unattractive, equitable 
offers, even when the relevance of resources is absent or ambiguous. Strong 
bargainers do not make these offers because they think that these offers are the most 
attractive. Rather, strong bargainers overestimate the impact of their resources on the 
other bargainers. They understand that having many resources does not bring direct 
advantages, but nevertheless hope resources carry some signaling value, making them 
attractive as bargaining partners. Strong bargainers’ perceptions of the situation thus 
are not biased in the sense that they think they are more advantaged, but towards 
thinking that others think they do. 
Moreover, I propose that disagreement between strong and weak bargainers 
regarding input relevance and subsequent deservingness contributes to the Strength-
is-Weakness effect. Strong bargainers are likely to ascribe input relevance to 
resources or at least act as if resources are relevant. Conversely, weak bargainers are 
likely to discount the relevance of input. Consequently, strong bargainers are likely to 
make equitable offers that are perceived to be illegitimate by weak bargainers. 
Moreover, weak bargainers may be unlikely to approach strong bargainers whom they 
expect to make these illegitimate offers. 
Finally, I propose that the Strength-is-Weakness effect might also occur 
despite attractive offers from strong bargainers. Weak bargainers often make first 
offers to each other, before they have observed the first offers from the other 
bargainers. These first, reciprocal offers may function as a commitment that leads to 
the formation of a weak coalition, despite attractive offers from strong bargainers. The 
reciprocal first offers may also make the weak coalition a safe default option, which is 
likely to materialize if further pursued. A deviation from this perceived default option 
might be perceived to be riskier, promoting the formation of a weak coalition.  
 
Broader theoretical implications 
Besides providing insights on the Strength-is-Weakness effect, the findings 
from this dissertation also have broader theoretical implications. 
 
Resources versus pivotal power 
Findings from this dissertation contribute to a classic debate in coalition 
formation literature: whether coalition outcomes can be predicted by differences in 
resources or differences in pivotal power (e.g., Gamson, 1964; Kravitz, 1981; van 
Beest et al., 2004a). In this dissertation, bargaining behavior and outcomes could be 
predicted based on the power-irrelevant resources participants held. Hence, this 
provides support for theories that conceptualize input as resources, such as minimum 




It provides support for the idea that resources have a normative function: that they 
provide “a standard or frame of reference for a fair or equitable division of the reward 
in a coalition” (Komorita, 1984, p. 193). This does not mean that pivotal power, 
resulting from differences in resources, does not also shape coalition formation 
outcomes. It is, however, important to realize that, in the absence of differences in 
pivotal power, differences in resources provide psychological meaning on the basis of 
which coalition bargainers make decisions that steer coalition outcomes. 
Note that I do not suggest a return to classic coalition formation theories 
focusing mainly on the explanatory power of resources and bargaining alternatives. 
When testing these classic theories, the dominant approach has been to manipulate 
the configuration of resources and test the fit between predicted coalitions and 
payoffs, based on the assumptions of several theories, and the observed coalitions and 
payoffs. Such an approach has several limitations. One of these limitations is that such 
an input-output perspective leads to a black box regarding the mediating processes. 
As others have done before me (Komorita & Parks, 1995; van Beest & van Dijk, 2007; 
Wilke, 1985), I advocate for a process-oriented approach theory to coalition formation 
research in which psychological, rather than structural, factors and their 
consequences for coalition behavior and outcomes are studied. This dissertation has 
contributed to this ideal by investigating the (psychological) processes leading to the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect by manipulating factors pertaining to psychological 
processes and/or measuring the processes, such as perceptions of deservingness and 
salience of allocation norms. 
 
Strategic and ‘real’ fairness in coalition formation 
The results from the studies reported in this dissertation also relate to a 
broader discussion on whether bargainers are steered by actual concerns for fairness 
or whether fairness principles are employed strategically (e.g., van Dijk, Leliveld, & 
van Beest, 2009; van Dijk & Tenbrunsel, 2005). There is evidence that individuals 
apply fairness strategically (e.g., Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995), 
for example by seeming to allocate payoffs equally in an Ultimatum Bargaining Game, 
while in fact the allocated chips are worth twice as much for themselves (e.g., Kagel, 
Kim, & Moser, 1996; van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000, Study 1). Other research, however, has 
reported behavior in which participants seemingly benefit others without any ulterior 
motives. Examples are non-zero offers in dictator games (Kahneman, Knetsch, & 
Thaler, 1986; van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000, Study 2), in which there is no repercussion 
for unfair allocations, and the formation of costly oversized coalitions if this prevents 
others from incurring disproportionate losses (van Beest, van Dijk, de Dreu, & Wilke, 
2005; van Beest et al., 2003). 
In the studies presented in this dissertation, we have found evidence for 




seems to be strategic: even when the principle of equality is highlighted, strong 
bargainers adhere to the equity principle, suggesting that this is a strategic decision 
rather than a misinformed attempt to make a fair offer. Conversely, the increased 
approach of strong bargainers by weak bargainers when resources are earned 
indicates a less self-serving notion of fairness. This behavior suggests coalition 
behavior based on an assessment on how deserving one is of certain outcomes, even if 
this means approaching a bargainer that is likely to ask for a higher share of the 
payoffs. 
This dissertation thus lends support for a balanced view on self-interest and 
fairness, in which, in line with classic theorizing, bargainers form coalitions that 
maximize their payoffs given a certain fairness principle (e.g., Gamson, 1964; 
Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973), but in which bargainers also evaluate and value the 
outcomes of others. Our findings are thus in line with the social utility approach to 
coalition formation, which postulates that coalition bargainers derive utility from 
their own and others’ outcomes (van Beest & van Dijk, 2007). Whereas this approach 
has mainly focused on the notion that bargainers are averse against harming each 
other, the current results complement this view by showing that coalition bargainers 
evaluate how deserving bargainers are of certain outcomes and act on the basis of this 
evaluation, even if this means obtaining a smaller share of the payoffs. 
 
Extending accountability theory 
Findings in this dissertation also show that accountability theory can be 
extended from situations in which the main question is how to allocate payoffs, to 
situations that add the question with whom payoffs will be shared. Accountability 
theory states that the application of equity norms is deemed acceptable when the 
input for an equitable calculation is based on input that is within one’s control, such as 
effort, but not input that is outside one’s control, such as random windfalls or a 
handicap (Konow, 1996, 2000). A logical extension of this theory to coalition 
formation would predict a higher inclusion of strong bargainers when resources are 
earned through effort versus when they would have been assigned randomly. 
However, the possibility to select the person to share the payoffs with could lead to 
more self-interested avoidance of strong bargainers. Although the evidence we 
provided for an actual increase in inclusion of strong bargainers was not very strong, 
strong bargainers were approached more often when they have attained their 
‘advantage’ in resources through effort rather than through randomness. This 
suggests that coalition bargainers are sensitive to input relevance when deciding 







The role of (mis)perceptions in coalition formation 
A final important insight provided by the results from this dissertation’s 
studies is the important role of (mis)perceptions of the bargaining situations in 
shaping coalition formation. Whereas this role of (mis)perceptions has been 
recognized by scholars (e.g., Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Psathas & Stryker, 1965; Wilke 
& Mulder, 1971), the focus has largely been on perceptions regarding resources and 
pivotal power. Based on our findings, however, the objects of these (mis)perceptions 
seem to be one’s attractiveness as a bargaining partner, input relevance, and 
deservingness rather than resources and pivotal power. Although structural aspects of 
the bargaining situation may be understood similarly by strong and weak bargainers, 
self-serving biases regarding more person-focused variables seem to have the 
potential to create disagreement leading to Strength-is-Weakness effects. A striking 
example of this notion is the observation that strong bargainers perceived the amount 
of resources one has to be more controllable than weak bargainers (Study 4.1). This 
suggests that basic biases such as attributing successes to oneself and failures to 
external factors (e.g., Sobel, 1974) have the potential to distort the effect of input 
relevance and thus perceived deservingness in a coalition bargaining settings. 
This also has implications for researchers studying coalition formation 
processes. Especially Study 4.2 shows the importance of installing appropriate 
manipulation checks to control for misperceptions of the presented bargaining 
situation. Although certain biased perceptions might be persistent—and actually the 
topic under investigation—misperceptions regarding the manipulated variables can 
distort the effect of manipulations. In Study 4.2, it seems that this was the case for our 
manipulation of relationship between resources and payoffs, because a large 
proportion of participants also reported seeing this relationship in the control 
condition. Besides trying to create unambiguous manipulations, an additional 
challenge seems to be to create effective manipulation checks and preregister 
exclusion criteria. 
 
Practical implications - Interventions 
A finding that is central to this dissertation is that coalition bargainers who 
have many resources are very often excluded from coalitions. Whereas this might not 
be a problem when this means excluding exploitive bargainers, strong bargainers 
seem excluded more often than warranted based on the first offers. In these cases, 
discrimination based on resources seems unfair to those who happen to have more of 
them. Moreover, in some situations, such as governmental coalition formation, 
potential coalition members are representatives and resources are dictated by the 
support of their constituency. In these situations, excluding strong bargainers means 
excluding the representative that speaks for the largest proportion of voters, 




There might thus be situations in which a more level playing field for all 
coalition bargainers is desirable. Below I will discuss several interventions that might 
accomplish this. As both strong and weak bargainers are partly responsible for the 
emergence of a Strength-is-Weakness effect, interventions aimed at reducing it should 
be aimed at both strong and weak bargainers. 
 
Changing perceptions 
One of the interventions aimed at strong bargainers concerns changing their 
perceptions of the bargaining situation. Importantly, previous studies have shown 
that interventions aimed at changing coalition bargainers’ perceptions that all 
bargaining positions are equal (Vinacke et al., 1964) or aimed at highlighting that 
there are multiple distributive fairness principles (Chapter 3 of this dissertation) are 
unsuccessful in decreasing the Strength-is-Weakness effect. A tentative conclusion of 
this dissertation is that strong bargainers make unattractive offers because they think 
they are attractive partners in themselves who can get away with these offers. If this is 
the case, interventions should be aimed at preventing strong bargainers from 
overestimating their own attractiveness, for example by highlighting that weak 
bargainers are likely to see their large amount of resources as a threat rather than an 
asset. 
Likewise, interventions could be aimed at decreasing weak bargainers’ focus 
on the resources of the other bargainers. Whereas resources do predict the magnitude 
of first offers, a large proportion of strong bargainers make attractive, egalitarian 
offers, meaning that exclusion based on resources is not always warranted. Moreover, 
previous research suggests that the ability to provide feedback on offers can decrease 
self-serving offers (Chertkoff & Braden, 1974), meaning that rejecting strong 
bargainers offers but giving them a second chance may prove fruitful. 
Another practical implication of the current work is that the existence and 
magnitude of a Strength-is-Weakness effect may be contingent on how (un)ambiguous 
the source one one’s resources is. Following our extension of accountability theory 
(Konow, 1996, 2000), the perception that one has acquired many resources through 
effort should increase the probability that others are willing to include them in a 
coalition. Possibly, disagreement regarding input relevance, and thus the Strength-is-
Weakness effect, may be lower in settings in which the process of acquiring resources 
is transparent (e.g., in a fair election in which there is a clear relation between 
acquired votes and seats) than in situations in which the source of resources is less 
traceable. A practical implication is thus that it might pay off for strong coalition 
bargainers to change the other bargainers’ perceptions of input relevance by 
highlighting the effort they have exerted to be in their ‘advantaged’ position. Hence, 
communicating that one is a common person that has toiled hard to achieve their 




superhuman such a oneself. Of course, given the self-serving biases discussed earlier, 
the question is whether others will believe this or downplay this effort. 
 
Structural interventions 
Another practical implication of the current dissertation is that inclusion of 
strong bargainers can be promoted when they can timely announce their egalitarian 
intentions. As such, institutionalized norms as giving the largest party the first 
opportunity to start bargaining might promote their inclusion. Non-experimental 
evidence for this notion can be found in governmental coalition formation. Analyses of 
this type of coalition formation in Western European democracies shows that parties 
that have most seats in parliament often become the one to start negotiations (i.e., the 
formateur) and that this formateur status promotes inclusion in the governmental 
coalition (Bäck & Dumont, 2008; Warwick, 1996). 
Another intervention that might be successful in promoting the inclusion of 
strong bargainers is by making bargaining as public as possible. Previous studies have 
shown that bargaining in public (vs. private) channels promotes the formation of 
inclusive coalitions including all bargaining partners (Swaab et al., 2009). The current 
findings suggest that initial offers between weak bargainers could promote the 
formation of weak coalitions, despite later attractive offers from strong bargainers. 
Making coalition bargaining a public event including all coalition bargainers might 
work against initial commitments, creating a more level playing field. However, the 
question is whether this intervention is tenable or whether weak bargainers would 
still approach each other through backroom politics. 
 
Limitations and remaining questions 
The research conducted in this dissertation was aimed at uncovering the 
underlying processes leading to the Strength-is-Weakness effect in coalition 
formation. In the process, multiple follow-up questions have also been uncovered. 
 
Why do strong bargainers actively select the equitable allocation rule? 
In this dissertation, we found little evidence for the notion that strong 
coalition bargainers passively adopt equity norms without thinking beyond this most 
salient notion of distributive fairness. Based on this, I speculate that strong coalition 
bargainers actively select this notion of distributive fairness over the notion of 
equality because they think it will help them achieve higher payoffs. I also speculate 
that this might be due to strong bargainers’ overestimation of their own market value 
or attractiveness. However, as I have mentioned in Chapter 1 whilst discussing 




for another explanation. Hence, follow-up research is necessary to verify my 
speculations. 
A possible way to study the question of whether strong bargainers 
overestimate their market value could be to look at whether they show stronger signs 
of expectancy violation when their offers are rejected, or when they are excluded, than 
weak bargainers do. After all, the more attractive individuals think they are, the more 
surprised they should be when they are rejected. An unobtrusive way of measuring 
this expectancy violation is through pupillometry: previous research has established 
that pupils involuntarily dilate in response to these expectancy violations (Preuschoff, 
’t Hart, & Einhäuser, 2011). Hence, observing pupil dilation of strong and weak 
bargainers after rejection could shed more light on their own perceived 
attractiveness. This type of process-tracing research could be a next step in the 
development of process-oriented coalition formation theories. 
 
Why do weak bargainers stick to their first reciprocal offers? 
Results from this dissertation suggest that the Strength-is-Weakness effect 
partially exists because weak bargainers initially make first offers to other weak 
bargainers. They do this because they expect less attractive, equitable offers from 
strong bargainers. However, it also seems that weak bargainers choose each other as 
coalition partners, despite having received attractive offers from strong bargainers. 
When strong and weak, however, make equally attractive offers and the recipients 
have not made an offer themselves, strong bargainers are preferred as a coalition 
partner (see Study 3.3). Based on this apparent discrepancy, I speculate that this 
formation of weak coalitions, despite attractive offers from strong bargainers, is due 
to the initial offers from weak bargainers to each other. Future studies could 
investigate whether this is indeed the case and what the underlying mechanism 
exactly is. Does a first offer function as a commitment from which bargainers do not 
want to deviate? Or do reciprocal offers between weak bargainers signal that pursuing 
this coalition is a safe bet from which deviating is a risky decision? 
 
When do strong bargainers apply the fairness principle of equality? 
This dissertation provides support for the use of equity norms by strong 
bargainers. A surprising finding, however, was that offers made by strong bargainers 
were more heterogeneous than expected based on previous theories. Specifically, we 
found that a large proportion of strong bargainers made equal offers. Notably, these 
offers were made more often in Study 3.1 and Study 3.2 than any other study. A 
question that thus rises is in which circumstances strong bargainers decide to select 
the notion of equality and make equal offers to a prospective coalition partner 
One speculated cause for the difference in equal offers between different 




game used in Chapter 3, and the 5(4-3-2) game used in other chapters. On the one 
hand, the equal positions of bargainer B and C in the 4(3-2-2) game could draw 
attention to the idea that all bargainers are actually equal, making equality the more 
appropriate norm to use. On the other hand, it could also be the case that strong 
bargainers match the opening offers they expect from weak bargainers. In the 4(3-2-
2) game, both equality and equity predict 50-50 offers by weak bargainers, and it 
might be that some strong bargainers match these expected offers because they think 
it will increase their chance of inclusion. 
Note, however, that the studies in Chapter 3 differed from others in more 
ways than the configuration of resources. Most studies in Chapter 3 were of a 
hypothetical nature and without any monetary consequences for the participants, 
whereas the other studies were all incentivized interactions. Hence, an alternative 
explanation for the observed differences might be that individuals respond more 
egalitarian in situations in which they have nothing to gain or lose, but become more 
self-serving when there is real money at stake. Another limitation of the studies 
presented in Chapter 3, is that I did not conduct a factorial experiment in which I 
compared offers made in a control condition with offers made in the presented 
intervention conditions. Based on a comparison between first offers made by strong 
and weak bargainers, we concluded that our intervention did not change bargaining 
behavior, as strong bargainers made more self-serving offers than weak bargainers 
did. However, lacking a factorial design, we cannot fully exclude the idea that our 
interventions are the cause of the abundance of equal offers in Chapter 3. Moreover, 
based on our studies, we cannot rule out that the option to select a bargaining position 
or switch bargaining position has had unexpected side effects. Hence, additional 
studies are necessary to disentangle the factors that could explain when strong 
bargainers make equal, rather than equitable, allocations. 
 
What determines the magnitude of the Strength-is-Weakness effect? 
One result that stood out in this dissertation is the finding that the magnitude 
of the Strength-is-Weakness differed across conditions. Whereas the inclusion rate of 
strong bargainers was 33% and 35% in Study 2.1 and Study 2.2, the inclusion rate in 
the control condition of Study 4.1 was 58%. One aspect of Study 4.1 that might 
account for this fact is that, due to our aim to have a clear manipulation of earned 
resources, we emphasized the random nature of resources in the control condition. 
Possibly, this strong cue of irrelevance of resources highlighted that there was no 
reason for strong bargainers to apply equity norms. Although strong bargainers did 
ask for a higher share than weak bargainers did, this emphasis on irrelevant resources 
might have prompted a proportion of weak bargainers to believe that there would be 
no danger in approaching strong bargainers, promoting the formation of coalitions 




On the basis of this, I speculate that the magnitude of Strength-is-Weakness 
effect would be highest in settings in which no information about input relevance is 
given. In these situations, there is ample room for self-serving interpretations of input 
relevance or suspicions about others’ self-serving interpretations. When information 
about input relevance is less ambiguous, this wiggle room is diminished, which should 
result in fewer perceptions and behaviors leading to the Strength-is-Weakness effect. 
Finally, the magnitude of the Strength-is-Weakness effect should be smallest when 
information unambiguously signals that resources are relevant input. Future studies 
could test whether the ambiguity of cues relating to input relevance indeed determine 
the magnitude of the Strength-is-Weakness effect. 
 
Which emotions play a role in shaping the Strength-is-Weakness effect? 
In this dissertation, and previous theorizing on the Strength-is-Weakness 
effect, the focus has been on the cognitive processes. Future research could be aimed 
at uncovering the role of emotions in the Strength-is-Weakness effect.  
Given our findings on earned versus randomly received resources, a good 
first candidate for this research is the emotion of envy. According to modern theories 
of envy (Lange, Weidman, & Crusius, 2018; van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009), 
envy can take two distinct forms: benign envy, which promotes raising oneself to the 
level of the envied one, and malicious envy, which promotes taking the envied one 
down to one’s own level. Moreover, whereas benign envy is related to appraisals of a 
deserved and controllable advantage, malicious envy is related to appraisals of an 
undeserved advantage due to factors beyond one’s control (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & 
Pieters, 2012). An interesting possibility is that situations in which resources are 
earned promote benign envy, and that approaching strong bargainers might be a way 
to bring oneself close to the level of the envied bargainer, whereas situations in which 
resources are unearned trigger malicious envy, and excluding strong bargainers might 
be a way of taking them down. 
 
Are self-serving perceptions in coalition bargaining conscious or unconscious? 
Another remaining question is whether the self-serving biases observed in 
our studies are unconscious biases or whether they are a conscious way of 
rationalizing self-serving behavior. In Chapter 3, we reasoned that the use of equity 
norms in first offers was an active (and thus conscious) decision. For the perceptions 
of control over resources, input relevance and deservingness in Chapter 4, however, 
this assessment is a bit more difficult. On the one hand, it seems possible that weak 
bargainers actually perceived to have less control over resources than strong 
bargainers did. On the other hand, however, under- or overstating the controllability 




equity norm, depending on whether this is in or against one’s favor. Future research 
could be aimed at trying to disentangling these two explanations. 
 
What are the consequences of being excluded from a coalition? 
This dissertation has investigated the antecedents of exclusion from a 
coalition. Little, however, is known about the consequences of being excluded from a 
coalition. It would, for example, be interesting to investigate whether exclusion from 
the bargaining table leads to similar threats to the need to belong and coping behavior 
as social exclusion typically does (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, 2007). 
Moreover, future studies could investigate whether exclusion is perhaps also more 
painful for strong bargainers than for weak bargainers. This could be the case because 
strong bargainers might think they are more attractive and hence expect the exclusion 
less. 
Closing remarks 
The aim of this dissertation was to provide more insight into the mechanisms 
underlying the Strength-is-Weakness effect. The obtained insights provide the 
ingredients for a tentative process-oriented theory regarding the causes of the 
Strength-is-Weakness effect. First, it seems that the Strength-is-Weakness effect is 
largely caused by the (expected) use of equity norms by strong bargainers, and that 
these equity norms are strategically employed as a justification for obtaining a large 
share of the coalition’s payoff. Second, the extent to which this (expected) use of 
equity norms is accepted by weak bargainers seems to hinge on whether resources 
are perceived to be relevant input; whether they are a legitimate basis for an equal 
allocation. Finally, this perception of relevance seems to depend both on cues 
provided by the situation and on self-serving perceptions of input relevance based on 
bargaining position. 
The Strength-is-Weakness effect in coalition formation is a phenomenon that 
has intrigued, and puzzled, researchers for several decades. Now, almost 65 years 
after the classic Vinacke and Arkoff paper, the puzzle has not yet been fully solved. 
With this dissertation, however, I am confident to have identified and correctly placed 
some of its pieces. Moreover, I hope that that the novel tentative theory presented in 
this dissertation, as well as future research conducted using the OCG, helps frame the 
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This study serves as a pilot study for Study 3.2. The pilot study suffered from 
a few issues, which led us to believe the results might not be reliable, making Study 3.2 
a replication of this initial study. First, the sample size was initially determined to 
have sufficient power to detect a difference in switching between the assigned 
conditions. Hence, the study suffered from lack of power to detect a difference 
between the allocations of bargainers in the different positions. Second, the large 
difference in switching between strong and weak bargainers led to unequal sample 
sizes, which exacerbated this power issue. To address these issues, we ran a second, 
high-powered and preregistered study (see AsPredicted #3054, 




Materials and measurements were identical to those used in Study 3.2, apart 
from a few exploratory variables. For full description of all materials, see Study 3.2. 
Participants and design. For this study, 100 US based respondents (Mage = 
33.5 years, age range 19-68, 37 females, 63 males) were recruited via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk in exchange for $1.56. They were randomly assigned to one of two 
between-subjects positions: a weak position (n = 51) or a strong position (n = 49).  
Exploratory measures.  
Certainty of switching choice. After choosing to switch to another position or 
retain the assigned position, participants indicated how certain they felt about their 
decision whether or not to switch positions on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at all 
certain) to 7 (Very certain). 
Estimated probability offer acceptance. After participants made their 
allocation, they indicated on a slider what their estimated probability (0-100%) was 
that the opening offer would be accepted. 
Rationale for position choice. In an attempt to identify unknown reasons to 
select certain bargaining positions, participants were asked an open-ended question 
why they chose the position they did. This, however, did not lead to new insights and 
the reasons are not reported here. 
 
Results 
Switching. A total of 23 of 51 (45%) initially weak participants switched to a 
strong position, versus 4 of 49 (8%) initially strong participants who switched to a 
weak bargaining position. A chi-square test of independence shows that this 
difference is statistically significant, 2(1, N = 100) = 17.30, p < .001, w = 0.42. Due to 
the extremely small group that switched from a strong to a weak position, the 
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remaining analyses were conducted on the remaining three conditions: Stay Weak (n 
= 28), Switch to Strong (n = 23), and Stay Strong (n = 45). 
Comprehension check. Out of all remaining 100 participants, 20 gave at 
least one wrong answer. Having made errors was unrelated to being in one of the 
three remaining conditions, 2(2, N = 96) = 2.48, p = .29, w = 0.16. For the sake of 
completeness, all participants were retained in all analyses. 
Allocation of payoffs. A one-way ANOVA comparing allocation to self 
between those who stayed in a weak position (M = 51.11, SD = 10.09), those who 
switched to a strong position (M = 56.74, SD = 11.44), and those who stayed in a 
strong position (M = 52.89, SD = 8.76), d = 0.38) revealed no significant difference 
between the three groups, F(2,93) = 2.14, p = .12, η2p = .04. 
Choice of bargaining partner. Of the 28 participants who stayed in a weak 
position, 25 made an offer to the other low-resource bargainer, 2(1, N = 28) = 17.29, 
p < .001, w = 0.78. 
Exploratory analyses. 
Certainty of switching choice. A one-way ANOVA showed that there were no 
differences in certainty between those who switched to a strong position (M = 5.78, SD 
= 1.38), those who stayed in a weak position (M = 6.07, SD = 1.12), and those who 
stayed in a strong position (M = 6.07, SD = 1.16), F(2, 93) = 0.49, p = .61, η2p = .01. 
Estimated probability offer acceptance. A one-way ANOVA showed that 
there were no differences in the estimated probability that one’s offer would be 
accepted between those who switched to a strong position (M = 73.16, SD = 22.31), 
those who stayed in a weak position (M = 70.86, SD = 17.65), and those who stayed in 
a strong position (M = 67.30, SD = 21.00), F(2, 93) = 0.61, p = .55, η2p = .01. 
 
5(4-3-2) Study 
This study is intended to rule out uniqueness as a reason for choosing the 
strong bargaining position. See general discussion of Chapter 3. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. For this study, 76 US American respondents (Mage = 
38.3 years, age range 20-72, 39 females, 37 males) were recruited via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk in exchange for $1.56. Sample size was calculated with G*Power 
(Faul et al., 2007) to be able to detect a medium to large effect size (w = 0.36) when 
testing for a preference for bargaining positions with 80% power.  
Materials and procedure. Since the procedure was almost identical to that 
of Study 3.1, only differences to this procedure will be mentioned here.  
Game structure. Participants chose a position in a 5(4-3-2) political 




and C (2 votes). Again, participants were told that any coalition of two individuals 
would suffice to attain and allocate a sum of $100. 
Certainty of position choice. After choosing their bargaining position, 
participants indicated how certain they felt about their choice on a scale ranging from 
1 (Not at all certain) to 7 (Very certain). 
Estimated probability offer acceptance. After participants made their 
allocation, they indicated on a slider what their estimated probability (0-100%) was 
that the opening offer would be accepted.  
Reservation price. Participants indicated their reservation prices by 
indicating, for each other bargainer, how much they would minimally accept in order 
to agree to form a coalition. 
Rationale for position choice. Participants were asked an open-ended 
question why they chose the position they did. Again, these answers did not provide 
new insights and are not reported here. 
Motivation. Participants indicated, on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 
(Very much), to which extent they were motivated to maximize their own payoffs, 
maximize the difference in payoffs, minimize the difference in outcomes, and obtain 
equal payoffs (items adapted from van Beest, Steinel, & Murnighan, 2011). Due to low 
reliability of the scale (α = .49), the items were analyzed separately.  
 
Results 
Comprehension check. Out of all 76 participants, 10 made at least one 
mistake in the quiz. Errors were unrelated to choice of position, 2(2, N = 76) = .44, p = 
.80, w = 0.08. For completeness, all participants were retained in the analyses. 
Choice of position. The majority of participants chose the bargaining 
position with most resources. Fifty-seven participants (75%) chose position A, 13 
participants (17%) chose position B, and 6 participants (8%) chose position C. A Chi-
square goodness of fit test shows that these proportions differed significantly from 
33%, the expected percentage when participants would be indifferent and would have 
chosen a position randomly, 2(2, N = 76) = 60.34, p < .001, w = 0.89.  
Due to the small number of participants choosing positions B and C, we 
grouped them together as weak bargainers for all subsequent analyses. Yet, due to the 
relatively low sample and cell sizes, we interpret the results from these analyses with 
caution. 
Certainty of position choice. An independent-samples t-test shows that 
strong bargainers (M = 6.16, SD = 1.07) felt more certain about choosing their position 
than weak bargainers (M = 5.32, SD = 0.95), t(74) = 3.06, p = .01, d = .83. 
Choice of bargaining partner.  A Chi-square goodness of fit test shows that 
weak bargainers more often made an offer to the other weak bargainer (n = 14) than 
to the strong bargainer (n = 5), 2(1, N = 19) = 4.26, p = .04, w = 0.47.  
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Allocation of payoffs. An independent samples t-test shows that strong 
bargainers (M = 55.33, SD = 11.26) did not claim significantly more than weak 
bargainers (M = 56.05, SD = 14.90), t(74) = -0.22, p = .83, d = -.06.  
Estimated probability offer acceptance. An independent samples t-test 
shows that strong bargainers (M = 73.91, SD = 19.41) estimated the probability that 
their offer would be accepted to be higher than weak bargainers (M = 61.32, SD = 
17.97), t(74) = 2.49, p = .01, d = 0.66. 
Motivation. Due to low reliability of the scale (α = .49), the items were 
analyzed separately. Independent samples t-tests showed that strong and weak 
bargainers did not differ in any motivation (ps between .14 and .92). 
Reservation price. An independent samples t-test shows that mean 
reservation prices of strong bargainers (M = 52.33, SD = 11.39) were higher than that 

















When starting a session of the online coalition game, there are a number of 
parameters that can be configured. 
 
Protocol 
Which bargaining protocol is used is determined by the chosen session 
configuration. To use the one-step protocol use Online Coalition Game One-Step 
Protocol and for the more dynamic alternative offer protocol use Online Coalition 
Game Dynamic Protocol. 
 
Player resources and decision point 
Configuring resources_player_A, resources_player_B, and resources_player_C 
determines the amount of resources the different bargainers in a triad hold. With 
decision_point, a threshold can be set, determining which coalitions can form a 
coalition. NB: While setting the resources and decision point, take into account that 




Setting grand_coalition to True will enable the formation of a three-player 




Configuring total_payoff will set the size of the payoffs participants bargain 
for. Note that only integers are accepted. 
 
Payoff conversion 
Configuring payoff_conversion sets the conversion rate from obtained payoff 
to bonus payment.  
 
Incentives 
When incentives is set to True, participants will receive information about the 
conversion rate and earned bonus. If set to False, this information is left out. NB: Make 




Configuring base_fee sets the amount of money participants receive for 
reaching the end of the game, either after forming a coalition, having waited long 
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When select_none is set to True, participants will have the option to choose no 
coalition offer at all in Phase II: Selecting offers. When it is set to False, this option is 
not available. 
NB: When using the dynamic bargaining protocol and grand coalitions are 
allowed, setting select_none should be set to True to give bargainers an option to 
retreat from a tentative ABC-coalition. 
 
Timeout time 
Configuring timeout_time sets the amount of seconds participants are allowed 
to spend on each page between the matching and the formation of a coalition. 
 
Earned 
When earned is set to True, participants will obtain their bargaining position 
based on their relative performance on three rounds of a real-effort slider task. Within 
a triad, the participant that completed most sliders obtains position A, the participant 
that came in second position B, and the one that came in last position C. When earned 
is set to False, participants will randomly obtain one of the three positions. When 
used, a test round is added to the instructions. 
NB: The sliders do not work well when using Internet Explorer or Microsoft 
Edge. To prevent participants with these browsers from taking the study, a script has 




Configuring slider_time sets the amount of seconds participants will have to 
complete as many sliders in each of the three rounds. 
 
Comprehension check 
When comprehension_check is set to True, participants will receive three 
comprehension questions concerning the setting. 
 
Leave matching 
When leave_matching is set to True, participants will be forwarded from the 




this function requires a landing app in which the following code is added to the last 




         self.participant.vars['wait_page_arrival'] = time.time() 
 
Leave timer 
Configuring leave_timer sets the amount of seconds participants wait to be 
grouped before being forwarded to end of the study. 
 
Number of rounds 
In the OCG, the number of rounds—configured with num_rounds in 
Online_Coalition_Game\models.py or 
Online_Coalition_Game_Alternative_offer\models.py, not via the session configuration—
determines the maximum number of rounds participants have to form a coalition. 
When a coalition is formed, the remaining number of rounds will be skipped. When a 
coalition is not formed within the number of rounds set, participants will be 














After an experiment, oTree provides a large dataset with one row per 
participant and many variables for each round. Below, we outline the key variables 
necessary to understand the bargaining process and outcomes. 
 
Table C.1. 
Output variables from the Online Coalition Game. 
Variable name Stores 
position Player position (A, B, or C) 
proposed_coalition Name of the coalition proposed in 
Phase I 
allocate_to_player_A/B/C Proposed allocation to players A, B 
and C 
selected_coalition_name Name of the selected coalition in 
Phase II 
tentative_selected_coaltion_name. Name of the selected coalition in 
Phase II (dynamic protocol) 
selected_coalition_allocation_A/B/C Allocations of the selected offer 
tentative_selected_coalition_allocation_A/B/C Allocations of the selected offer  
(dynamic protocol) 
counter_proposed_allocation Alternative offer (dynamic protocol) 
counter_allocate_to_player_A/B/C Allocations of the alternative offer 
ratify_coalition Participants’ choice to ratify the 
tentative coalition or select the 
alternative offer 
money Obtained share of the budget 
completion_code Participant’s completion code 
formed_coalition_name Name of the formed final coalition 
payoff_A/B/C Final payoffs of participants 
proposed_coalition_player_A/B/C Proposed coalitions of players 
allocation_A_to_B Proposed allocation of player A to 
player B 
selected_coalition_name_player_A/B/C Name of the selected coalition in 
Phase II 
tentative_selected_coalition_name_player_A Name of the selected tentative 
coalition in Phase II (dynamic 
protocol) 
selected_coalition_allocation_A_player_B Allocation to player A in the coalition 
selected by player B 
 
 





Allocation to player A in the 
coalition selected by player B 
(dynamic protocol) 
tentative_formed_coalition_name Name of formed tentative coalition  
(dynamic protocol) 
counter_proposed_coalition_name Name of the proposed alternative 
coalition (dynamic protocol) 
counter_proposed_allocation_to_player_A/B/C Proposed allocation in the 
alternative offer (dynamic protocol) 
ratify_coalition_A/B/C Choice of players to ratify tentative 
coalition or choose the alternative 
offer (dynamic protocol) 
new_tentative_formed_coalition_name Name of the new tentative formed 
coalition (dynamic protocol) 
new_tentative_payoff_A/B/C Allocations in the new tentative 
payoff (dynamic protocol) 
round_begin Phase at which the round begins  
(dynamic protocol) 
round_end Phase at which the round ends  
(dynamic protocol) 
participant.code Unique participant ID in a session 
group.code Unique group ID in a session 















Een promotietraject is een transformatief proces. Losse flarden gedachten 
transformeren van onderzoeksvragen naar hypothesen. Losse projecten, studies en 
manuscripten transformeren uiteindelijk naar een proefschrift. En aan het eind van 
het traject transformeer ik van MSc naar PhD. 
Naast deze intellectuele transformaties heb ik ook als persoon de nodige 
transformaties doorgemaakt. Ik heb moeilijke keuzes gemaakt die me uiteindelijk een 
gelukkiger persoon gemaakt hebben. 
Terugkijkend op de afgelopen 5 jaar realiseer ik me dat ik bovenstaande 
transformaties nooit had kunnen voltooien zonder een groot aantal mensen. Dit zijn er 
zoveel dat de volgorde van dit dankwoord vast niet altijd logisch zal zijn en ik wellicht 
mensen zal missen (sorry!). 
Ilja, toen ik de research master volgde heb jij ooit tussen neus en lippen door 
gezegd dat je graag nog eens met een PhD-student het Strength-is-Weakness effect 
wilde uitpluizen. Bedankt dat je er uiteindelijk voor gekozen hebt om dit met mij aan 
te gaan. Bedankt voor je grote betrokkenheid, zowel bij het project als bij mij als 
persoon. Niels, Tila, bedankt dat jullie je bij deze coalitie hebben aangesloten. Ik denk 
dat we samen wel degelijk de payoffs hebben weten te vergroten. 
Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, and in particular the 
Department of Social Psychology, thank you for having me around for nearly 10(!) 
years. Thank you for the good scientific discussions, weird lunch conversations, fun 
and insightful conference trips and Friday drinks. 
Tony, thank you for OGRE activities, gaming discussions, Cthulhu keeping, 
restaurant (and pancake) rating and kitten petting. Christoph, thank you for dragging 
me to concerts, introducing me to new bands, rekindling my love for metal and 
providing me with Käse Kraner. Gisi, Aron en Noam, bedankt voor de gezellige 
activiteiten in jullie tuin (barbecuen, voetballen, etc.). Cong, thank you for sharing, 
listening and breaking through pluralistic ignorance. Thank you for amazingly folded 
dumplings and hot pot. Willem, zonder jouw tech-support was het Online Coalition 
Game nooit wat geworden. Bedankt voor je oTree, Python en R advies en me berispen 
als mijn code te messy of inefficiënt is. Bedankt voor je nihilistische idealisme, 
Pokémon Go wandelingetjes en me hooked krijgen aan soulsborne games. 
 Of course, extra thanks goes out to my office mates (P72 & S414). Thank you 
for our ‘close the door’ gossip and weekly Don’t stop believin’ and Seagulls (stop it 
now!)-jams. 
SoCCCo people, thank you for having me as an intern. The two months of 
doing research, hanging out at Aachener Weiher and drinking Kölsch helped me 
decide I wanted to pursue a PhD. Joris, Paul, thank you for your advice and furious 
rewriting of our paper. 
A big thanks to all the wonderful people I’ve met during conferences around 




knowledge and fun social events. An even more special shout out to p > .05, for great 
scavenging, pubbing and sharing of life lessons in said pubs. 
Fellow REMA peeps, thank you for being such a tightknit group! Thank you 
for providing a good learning environment as well as all the fun and much needed 
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Nieuwe collega’s van BiO, bedankt voor jullie vertrouwen en warmte 
waarmee jullie me, ondanks deze rare corona- en videobelcrisis, hebben ontvangen. Ik 
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scientific discussions, very productive ‘work and whisky’ days, and for mediating my 
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Tuur, samen met Arnoud zijn jullie de leukste blijhoofden die ik ken (en dan komt 
daar vast een enorm blijhoofd bij!). 
Mark, bedankt voor de goeden(?) garpjens en goede(!) samenwerking die de 
bachelor en research master zoveel beter maakten. Bedankt voor fripjens van Franske 
en lauwe Schultenbräu. Lieke, ook jij bedankt voor je goeden(?) garpjens, plotselinge 
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plezier hebben bij het lezen van ‘mijn eerste boek’ en kijk uit naar het ontmoeten van 
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verslaan), gerecht-uitbeeldingen, goed uitgekozen biertjes, en voor het laten zien dat 
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Annick en Carlos, bedankt voor de gezellige etentjes waarbij ik aan het eind 
van de avond niet alleen veel te veel (maar lekker!) gegeten heb, maar ook door menig 
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bedankt dat je als (semi-?)ambtenaar een voorbeeld voor me bent. 
Perry, Bea en Bart, dankjewel voor alle popquizgezelligheid als Sgt. Perry. Als 
het weer mag gaan we weer mooi de popquizmarathon doen waarin ik vooral veel “Oh 
ja!” roep en van locatie naar locatie ren. 
Patadj (of moet ik *at*dj zeggen?), fijn dat we na zoveel jaar toch steeds 
contact weten te houden. Bedankt voor jullie onbegrijpelijke gesprekken over het 
recht, grasmat-tutorials, maar vooral veel gezelligheid. Ook leuk dat we daar nu 
wandelingetjes met Eline (en binnenkort nog een kleine) aan toegevoegd hebben!  
Bierdealers Koen en Miel, bedankt voor de gestage instroom van nieuwe 
spannende bieren, zelfs/juist tijdens de lockdown! Als het weer verantwoord is kom 
ik graag weer over de vloer voor goede muziek, leuke praatjes en om samen een mooi 
flesje te delen. 
Biervrienden Joris, Judy, Pierre, Ton, Maarten en Richard, fijn dat 
Tilburg/Brabant toch zo klein is dat ik jullie telkens weer tegen het lijf blijf lopen. 
Bedankt voor het samen proeven en slap geouwehoer.  
Lieve kattenvrienden van Stichting de Kittenmand. Bedankt voor het goede 
werk dat jullie voor onze favoriete viervoeters doen en bedankt dat ik er deel van uit 
mag maken. De aanwezigheid van kittens zorgt voor de nodige levendigheid, maar 
vooral ook rust, zeker tijdens het vele thuiswerken. 
Hans en Laila, bedankt voor alle gezellige uitjes en etentjes en het laten zien 
dat het heel goed mogelijk is om hard te werken en tegelijk levensgenieter te zijn.  
Mam, jij hebt de afgelopen jaren ook de nodige moeilijke keuzes gemaakt. 
Bedankt voor je openheid daarover en wederzijdse steun. Ik hoop dat we elkaar 





Peter en Petra, bedankt dat jullie altijd voor mij en Alice klaar staan met 
advies en steun. Bedankt voor al het lekkere eten en drinken dat ik met jullie mag 
delen. Ik meld me graag aan voor het testpanel voor kitchen aid recepten! 
Alice, mijn grote liefde en beste vriend. Jij bent de grootste reden that I never 
stopped believin’. Bedankt voor je onvoorwaardelijke steun en liefde. Zonder jou zou 
ik nooit de persoon (en wetenschapper) zijn die ik nu ben. Team JAM forever!!!
 
 
 
 
 

